(e) Evidence of his independent apostleship drawn from his conduct on a visit to Jerusalem fourteen years after the preceding one (2:1-10)

Following, as before, a chronological order, the apostle now narrates the circumstances of a very important occasion on which he came in contact with those who were apostles before him. At the outset he calls attention to the length of his absence from Jerusalem, fourteen years, during which, so it is implied, he had had no contact with the Jerusalem apostles; then to the fact that when he went up it was not at their command, but in obedience to divine revelation; then, indicating that the question at issue was then, as now in Galatia, the circumcision of the Gentiles who had accepted his gospel, he tells how he laid his gospel before the Jerusalem Christians, and in a private session before the pillars of the church, James and Cephas and John, since he recognised that their disapproval of his preaching might render of no avail his future work and undo what he had already done. Though, out of consideration for the opponents of his gospel of freedom from law, who had crept into the Jerusalem church for the purpose of robbing the Christians of their freedom and bringing them into bondage to the law, the apostles urged him to circumcise Titus, a Greek Christian who was with him, he refused to do so; and so far from his yielding to the authority or persuasion of these eminent men, whose eminent past did not weigh with him, as it did not with God, they imparted nothing new to him, but when they perceived that God, who had commissioned Peter to present the gospel to the Jews, had given to Paul also a commission to the Gentiles, these leaders of the church cordially agreed to a division of the territory and of responsibility. Paul and Barnabas were to preach among the Gentiles, Peter among the Jews, and the only additional stipulation was that Paul and Barnabas should remember the poor among the Jewish Christians, which thing, Paul affirms, he gladly did.

Then after fourteen years I again went up to Jerusalem, with Barnabas, taking Titus also along. 2And I went up in accordance with [a] revelation. And I laid before them the gospel which I preach among the Gentiles,—but privately before the men of eminence—lest perchance I should run or had run in vain. 3But not even Titus, who was with me and was a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised (4now it was because of the false brethren surreptitiously brought in, who sneaked in to spy out our freedom which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might bring us into bondage [that his circumcision was urged], 5to whom not for an hour did we yield by way of the subjection [demanded]), that the truth of the gospel might continue with you. 6And from those who were accounted to be something—what they once were matters not to me—God accepts not the person of man—for to me the men of eminence taught nothing new—7but on the contrary when they saw that I had been entrusted with the gospel to the uncircumcised as Peter with the gospel to the circumcised—8for he who wrought for Peter unto an apostleship to the circumcised wrought also for me unto an apostleship to the Gentiles—9and when, I say, they perceived the grace that had been given to me, James and Cephas and John, who were accounted pillars, gave to me and to Barnabas right hands of fellowship, that we should go among the Gentiles and they among the circumcised, 10provided only that we should remember the poor, which very thing I have also taken pains to do.

1. Ἔπειτα διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν πάλιν ἀνέβην εἰς Ἰεροσόλυμα “Then after fourteen years I again went up to Jerusalem.” Since for the purposes of his argument that he had not been dependent on the other apostles (cf. 1:12, 17) it is his contacts with them that it is pertinent to mention, the fact that he speaks of these as visits to Jerusalem (cf. 1:18) indicates that throughout the period of which he is speaking Jerusalem was the headquarters of the apostles. And this being the case the denial, by implication, that he had been in Jerusalem is the strongest possible way of denying communication with the Twelve. It follows also that, had there been other visits to Jerusalem in this period, he must have mentioned them, unless indeed they had been made under conditions which excluded communication with the Twelve, and this fact had been well known to his readers. Even in that case he would naturally have spoken of them and appealed to the well-known absence of the apostles or have spoken, not of going to Jerusalem, but of seeing those who were apostles before him.

Ἔπειτα, primarily a particle of chronological succession, clearly has this force here, as is suggested by διὰ…ἐτῶν. The ἔπειτα… ἔπειτα … ἔπειτα of 1:18, 21 and the present v. mark the successive steps of a chronological series, and at the same time of the apostle’s argument, because he is arranging it on a chronological framework; they thus acquire as in some other cases (see 1 Thessalonians 4:17, 1 Corinthians 15:46) a secondary logical force. That διά may mean “after the lapse of” is clearly shown by Hdt. 3:27; Soph. Ph. 758; Xen. Cyr. 1. 4:28, and other passages cited by L.&S. s. v. A. II 2, and by W. XLVII i. (b) (WM p. 475), and that this use was current in Jewish Greek appears from Deuteronomy 9:11, Mark 2:1, Acts 24:17. That this rather than “throughout,” the only alternative meaning in chronological expressions, is the meaning here is evident from the unsuitableness of “throughout” to the verb ἀνέβην. On the question whether the period is to be reckoned from the same starting point as the three years previously named (1:18) or from the end of that period, there is room for difference of opinion. Wies. Ell. Alf. hold the former view; Ltft. Mey. Beet, Sief. Lip. Zahn, Bous. the latter. For the exposition of the apostle’s thought at this point the question is of little consequence. His purpose is evidently to emphasise the limited amount of his communication with the Twelve as tending to show that he did not receive his gospel from them, and for this purpose it matters little whether the period during which he had no communication with the Twelve was fourteen years or eleven. For the chronology of the life of Paul, however, the question is of more significance. While it is impossible to determine with certainty which view is correct, the balance of probability seems to favour reckoning the fourteen years as subsequent to the three years. The nature of his argument requires him to mention not how long after his conversion he made this visit, but during how long a period he remained without personal communication with the other apostles, which period would be reckoned, of course, from his latest preceding visit. This argument is somewhat strengthened by the use of the preposition διά, which, meaning properly “through,” and coming to signify “after” only through the thought of a period passed through, also suggests that the period of fourteen years constitutes a unit in the apostle’s mind—an unbroken period of non-communication with the apostles.

The substitution of τεσσάρων for δεκατεσσάρων (advocated by Grot. Seml. et al., named by Sief. and Zahn ad loc.), resting as it does on no external evidence, calls for no refutation. The supposed difficulties of the chronology of the apostle’s life based on δεκατεσσάρων are insufficient to justify this purely conjectural emendation of the text.

For the doubt whether πάλιν belonged to the original text expressed by Zahn and Bous. there seems slight justification. It is lacking in no ancient ms., though standing in DFG d g Goth. Aeth. after ἀνέβην, and in but one ancient version, the Boh. The quotation of the sentence without it by Mcion. Iren. Ambrst. Chrys. seems insufficient evidence that the original text lacked it.

μετὰ Βαρνάβα, “with Barnabas,” i. e., accompanied by him, as in Matthew 16:27, 1 Thessalonians 3:13, 2 Thessalonians 1:7, rather than accompanying him, as in Matthew 25:10, Matthew 26:47, Acts 7:45; for the remainder of the narrative, especially the constant use of the first person singular, implies that Paul and not Barnabas was the chief speaker and leader of the party.

συνπαραλαβὼν καὶ Τίτον· “taking Titus also along.” Titus is thus assigned to a distinctly subordinate position as one “taken along,” and the members of the party evidently ranked in the order, Paul, Barnabas, Titus. The apostle says nothing at this point concerning the reason for taking Titus with him. But the specific mention of the fact and the part that Titus played in the subsequent events (vv. 3-5) suggest that Paul intended to make his a test-case for the whole question of the circumcision of the Gentile Christians.

Concerning the tense of the participle συνπαραλαβών, see BMT 149, and cf. Acts 12:25. The act denoted by the participle, though coinciding in time with the action of the principal verb, is expressed by an aorist rather than a present participle, because it is conceived of as a simple fact, not as an action in progress, least of all as one within the time of which the action of the principal verb falls.

2. ἀνέβην δὲ κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν· “and I went up in accordance with [a] revelation,” i. e., in obedience to such [a] revelation. The word ἀποκάλυψις evidently has the same meaning here as in 1:12 (see the discussion there and detached note on Ἀποκάλύπτω and Ἀποκάλυψις, p. 433), but refers in this case to a disclosure of the divine will respecting a specific matter, not, as there, to a revelation of the person Jesus in his true character. Concerning the specific method in which the divine will that he should go to Jerusalem was disclosed to him, and whether directly to him or through some other person, the apostle says nothing. Nor can it be determined whether the word is here used indefinitely, referring to a (specific) revelation, or with merely qualitative force, describing revelation as the method by which he obtained his conviction that he ought to go to Jerusalem. On the former point, however, cf. 2 Corinthians 12:1 ff. Acts 13:1, Acts 13:16:7, Acts 13:9, Acts 13:21:11, Acts 13:27:23ff..

For a similar use of the preposition κατά cf. Acts 23:31, Romans 16:26, 2 Thessalonians 3:6. “In accordance with,” being the more usual and exact meaning of κατά, is to be preferred to the nearly equivalent sense, “because of.” In Romans 16:25 and Ephesians 3:3, though the phrase is the same, the sense is different.

καὶ ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, “And I laid before them the gospel which I preach among the Gentiles.” The pronoun αὐτοῖς, having no definitely expressed antecedent, is to be taken as referring in general to those whom he visited in Jerusalem, i. e., the Christian community. Concerning the word εὐαγγέλιον, see detached note, p. 422; the use of the term here is doubtless the same as in 1:6. The questions at issue between Paul and those of a different opinion in Jerusalem were not historical, nor practical in the sense that they pertained to the methods of gospel work, but doctrinal, having to do with the significance of the work of Christ, the conditions of salvation, the obligations of believers. The use of the present tense, κηρύσσω, reflects the apostle’s thought that he is still at the time of writing preaching the same gospel which he had been preaching before he made this visit to Jerusalem. Cf. the similar implication, though with a reverse use of tenses, in 1:11. The use of a past tense, ἐκήρυξεν, would almost have suggested that what he then preached he was now no longer preaching. “Among the Gentiles,” the apostle says, suggesting that he not only preached to the Gentiles but to the Jews also, so far as they were in Gentile lands. Note the same phrase in 1:16 and εἰς τὰ ἔθνη in 2:8, all of which indicate that Paul conceived his apostleship to be not simply to the Gentile people but to the people of Gentile lands.

Ἀνατίθημι, found from Homer down, is apparently used only in later writers in the sense “to present” (matter for consideration). See 2 Malachi 3:9; Acts 25:14, only N. T. instance, and cf. M. & M. Voc. s. v.

κατʼ ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν, “but privately before the men of eminence.” Those who are here designated as οἱ δοκοῦντες are evidently the same who in v. 6 are called οἱ δοκοῦντες and οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναί τι, and in v. 9 οἱ δοκοῦντες στύλοι εἶναι, and in v. 9 are also identified as James and Cephas and John. See note in fine print below. By these phrases the three men named are described as the influential men, the leaders, of the Christian community in Jerusalem. There is nothing in the present passage or in the usage of the words to indicate that they are used with irony.

On the question whether this phrase refers to the same interview spoken of in ἀνεθέμην … ἔθνεσιν, so that τοῖς δοκοῦσιν is merely a more definite designation of αὐτοῖς, or to a different one, so that there was both a public and a private meeting at which Paul set forth his gospel, probability is in favour of the latter; for although an epexegetic limitation may certainly be conjoined to what precedes by δέ, yet it is Paul’s usual habit in such cases to repeat the word which the added phrase is to limit (cf. ἀνέβην in this v.; Romans 3:22, Romans 3:9:30, 1 Corinthians 1:16, 1 Corinthians 2:6, Php 2:8—in 1 Corinthians 3:15 it is otherwise). In this case, moreover, it is difficult to suppose that Paul should have used the very general αὐτοῖς if, indeed, he meant only three men, or to see why if he referred to but one interview he should not have written simply καὶ ἀνεθέμην τοῖς δοκοῦσιν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, etc. Among modern interpreters Wies. Ell. Ltft. Mey. Weizs. Holst. Sief. Lip. Zahn, Bous. et al., understand the language to imply two interviews; Zeller, Neander, Alf. Beet. Vernon Bartlet (in Expositor, Oct., 1899), Emmet, et al., but one.

On the use of κατʼ ἰδίαν, which can not mean “especially” (as Bous. et al.) but only “privately,” cf. Matthew 17:19, Mark 4:34, Mark 9:28 etc.; Ign. Smyrn. 7:2: πρέπον οὖν ἐστίν … μήτε κατʼ ἰδίαν περὶ αὐτῶν λαλεῖν μήτε κοινῇ.

The phrase οἱ δοκοῦντες, vv. 2, 6b is an example of a usage rare in ancient Greek literature. The participle alone, as here, is found in Eur. Hec. 295 and Troiad. 613, both times in the sense “men of standing and consequence, men of esteem.” There is no hint of any derogatory flavour in the phrase. In Herodian 6. 1:3, sometimes cited under this head, τοὺς δοκούντας has a predicate in καὶ σεμνοτάτους καὶ … σωφρονεστάτους following. The meaning is “those esteemed both most dignified and most sober.” With this cf. οἱ δοκοῦντες στύλοι, v. 9. The expression οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναί τι which Paul uses in v. 6 a (and from which, as Zahn holds, the shorter form is derived by ellipsis) is found in the same form and meaning in Plato, Gorg. 472 A, where it is synonymous with εὐδοκίμους a few lines above; cf. also Euthyd. 303 C, where the phrase is the same, except that the εἶναί τι is inverted. The same phrase, however, is used also in the sense “those who think themselves something”; so Plut. Apophth. lacon. 49, and probably Plato, Apol. 35 A. The meanings of the word δοκεῖν itself as used in these or similar phrases are as follows: 1. “To be accounted, esteemed” (a) in the indifferent sense of the word. See vv. 6 a, 9; cf. Plato, Apol. 35 A; Plut. Aristid. 1:7; Epictet. Enchir. 13: κἂν δόξῃς τισιν εἶναί τις, ἀπίστει σεαυτῷ. 2 Mac. 9:10 (?) Mark 10:42, 1 Corinthians 12:22 (?) (b) in the definitely honourable sense, “to be highly esteemed,” as in vv. 2, 6 b. 2. “To account one’s self,” as in Galatians 6:3, 1 Corinthians 3:18, 1 Corinthians 8:2, 1 Corinthians 10:12, Jam 1:26, Proverbs 26:12. For an especially close parallel to Galatians 6:3 see Plato, Apol. 41 E. Thus in all of the four instances in the present passage the word has substantially the same meaning, differing only in that in vv. 6 a, 9 the word is colourless, the standing of those referred to being expressed in the predicate, while in vv. 2, 6b, the predicate is omitted and the verb itself carries the idea of high standing.

μή πως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον. “lest perchance I should run or had run in vain.” μή πως expresses apprehension (see more fully below). The whole phrase implies that the apostle saw in the existing situation a danger that his work on behalf of the Gentiles, both past and future, might be rendered ineffectual by the opposition of the Jerusalem church, or of certain men in it, and the disapproval of the apostles, and that fearing this, he sought to avert it. The ground of his apprehension is, of course, not a doubt concerning the truth of the gospel which he preached—it would be an impossible incongruity on his part to attribute to himself such a doubt in the very midst of his strenuous insistence upon the truth and divine source of that gospel—but rather, no doubt, the conviction that the disapproval of his work by the leading apostles in Jerusalem would seriously interfere with that work and to a serious degree render it ineffectual. The apostle’s conduct throughout his career, notably in the matter of the collection for the poor of Jerusalem, and his own last visit to Jerusalem (see 1 Corinthians 16:1-3 1 Corinthians 16:2 Cor. chs. 8, 9, esp. 9:12-15, Romans 15:25-32, esp. v. 31), show clearly that it was to him a matter of the utmost importance, not only to prevent the forcing of the Jewish law upon the Gentiles, but at the same time to maintain the unity of the Christian movement, avoiding any division into a Jewish and a Gentile branch. To this end he was willing to divert energy and time from his work of preaching to the Gentiles in order to raise money for the Jewish Christians, and to delay his journey to the west in order personally to carry this money to Jerusalem. His unshaken confidence in the divine origin and the truth of his own gospel did not prevent his seeing that the rupture which would result from a refusal of the pillar apostles, the leaders of the Jewish part of the church, to recognise the legitimacy of his mission and gospel and so of Gentile Christianity on a non-legal basis, would be disastrous alike to the Jewish and the Gentile parties which would thus be created.

Εἰς κενόν found also in Lxx (Leviticus 26:20, Job 39:16, Micah 1:14, Isaiah 29:8, etc.); Jos. Ant. 19. 27 (1:4), 96 (1:13); Bell. 1. 275 (14:1); in late Greek writers (Diod. Sic. 19. 9:5) and in the N. T. by Paul (1 Thessalonians 3:5, 2 Corinthians 6:1, Php 2:16) is with him always, as usually in the Lxx, a phrase of result meaning “uselessly,” “without effect.” Running, as a figure of speech for effort directed to an end, is not uncommon with Paul (1 Corinthians 9:24, 1 Corinthians 9:26, Galatians 5:7, Php 2:16; see also Php 3:14, 2 Timothy 4:7).

The clause μή … ἔδραμον has been explained: (1) As an indirect question, “whether perhaps I was running or had run in vain.” τρέχω is in this case a present indicative, retained from the direct form. So Usteri, assuming an ellipsis of “in order that I might learn from them,” Wies., who assumes an ellipsis of “in order that they might perceive,” and Sief., who supplies “to put to test the question,” and emphasises the fact that since μή expects a negative answer the apostle implies no doubt respecting the result of his work, but only the abstract possibility of its fruitlessness. (2) As a final clause, “that I might not run or have run in vain” (so Frit. Beet). (3) As an object clause after a verb of fearing implied, “fearing lest I should run or had run in vain.” τρέχω is in that case most probably a pres. subj., referring to a continued (fruitless) effort in the future. A pres. ind. would be possible (GMT 369.1) referring to a then existing situation, but is a much less probable complement and antithesis to ἔδραμον than a pres. subj. referring to the future. Cf. 1 Thessalonians 3:5. So Ltft. Ell. (?), Lip. (though apparently confusing it with the preceding interpretation). To the first of these it is to be objected that it involves a doubtful use of μή πως. Goodwin (GMT 369 fn. 1) distinguishing clearly, as Sief. following Kühner (II 1037, 1042, but cf. Kühner-Gerth, II 391 fn., which corrects Kühner’s error) fails to do, between the indirect question and the clause of fear, maintains (L.&S. sub. μή πως, however, contra) that μή is never used in classical writers in an indirect question. Sief., indeed, alleges that this indirect interrogative use is common in later Greek, but cites no evidence. μή πως is certainly not so used in Paul, with whom it is always a final particle, occurring in a pure final clause, or in a clause of fear, or in an object clause after verbs of precaution (1 Corinthians 8:9, 1 Corinthians 8:9:27, 2 Corinthians 2:7, 2 Corinthians 9:4, 2 Corinthians 11:3, 2 Corinthians 12:20, Galatians 4:11, 1 Thessalonians 3:5; it is not used by other N. T. writers) and there is no certain instance of μή so used in N. T.; Luke 11:35, which is generally so taken, is at best a doubtful case. To the second interpretation it is a decisive objection that a past tense of the indicative is used in final clauses only after a hypothetical statement contrary to fact and to express an unattained purpose. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled here. The verb ἀνεθέμην expresses a fact, not what would have been under certain circumstances, and the apostle certainly does not mean to characterise the purpose that he might not run in vain as unattained. The attempt of Frit., approved by W. Lev_2 (b) β (WM. p. 633), to give the sentence a hypothetical character by explaining it, “that I might not, as might easily have happened if I had not communicated my teaching in Jerusalem, have run in vain,” is not only artificial, but after all fails to make the principal clause ἀνεθέμην, etc., an unreal hypothesis. See GMT 333, 336. The third interpretation is consistent both with general Greek usage and with Paul’s use of μή πως, and is the only probable one. It involves, of course, the implication of a purpose of the apostle’s action, viz., to avert what he feared, that his future work should be fruitless, or his past work be undone. But such implication is common in clauses of fear. When the verb of fear is expressed, the μή clause expresses by implication the purpose of an action previously mentioned or about to be mentioned (Acts 23:10, 2 Corinthians 12:20); when the fear is only implied the μή clause, denoting the object of apprehension, conveys by implication the purpose of the immediately preceding verb (2 Corinthians 9:4, 1 Thessalonians 3:5). The use of the aorist indicative following a statement of fact suffices, however, to show that in this case the clause expresses primarily an object of apprehension. The objection of Sief. to this interpretation, that Paul certainly could not have implied that his fear of his past work being rendered fruitless was actually realised, rests upon a misunderstanding of the force of a past tense in such cases. This implies not that the fear has been realised —in this case one would not express fear at all, but regret—but that the event is past, and the outcome, which is the real object of fear, as yet unknown or undetermined. Cf. GMT 369; BMT 227, and see chap. 4:11, where the object clause refers to a past fact, the outcome of which is, however, not only as yet unknown to him, but quite possibly yet to be determined by the course which the Galatians should pursue in response to the letter he was then writing.

3. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ Τίτος ὁ σὺν ἐμοί, Ἕλλην ὤν, ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι· “But not even Titus, who was with me, and was a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised.” In antithesis to the possibility of his work proving fruitless (by reason of the opposition of the Jerusalem church and apostles) Paul here sets forth the fact that on this very occasion and in a test-case his view prevailed. For ἀλλά introducing the evidence disproving a previously suggested hypothesis, see Romans 4:2, 1 Corinthians 2:9. The fact of the presence of Titus with the apostle had already been mentioned in the preceding sentence. Its repetition here in ὁ σὺν ἐμοί is evidently, therefore, for an argumentative purpose, and doubtless as emphasising the significance of the fact that he was not circumcised. It is upon this element of the sentence especially that οὐδέ “not even” throws its emphasis. The opponents of Paul, the “false brethren” desired, of course, the circumcision of all Gentile Christians. But so far were they from carrying through their demand that not even Titus, who was there on the ground at the time, and to whom the demand would first of all apply, was circumcised. The non-circumcision of Titus, therefore, was in reality a decision of the principle. The phrase ὁ σὺν ἐμοί is thus concessive in effect. See BMT 428. The participial phrase, Ἕλλην ὤν, adds a fact, probably like ὁ σὺν ἐμοί, known to the readers, but necessary to be borne in mind in order to appreciate the significance of the fact about to be stated. Like the preceding phrase it also is concessive (BMT 437), “though he was a Greek” (and hence uncircumcised; not of course, “although a Greek and hence under preeminent obligation to be circumcised,” which neither Paul nor his opponents would have claimed). Though the Greek construction is different in the two phrases, the thought is best expressed in English by joining them as in the translation given above. Segond also renders “qui était avec moi et qui était Grec.” The term Ἓλλην is doubtless to be taken in its broad sense of “Gentile,” as in Romans 1:16, Romans 1:2:9, Romans 1:10 et freq., a usage which occurs also in Jos. Ant. 20:262 (11:2), and in the Christian Fathers (Th.). This is the first mention of circumcision in the epistle. The fact so well known to Paul and his readers as to require no explicit mention, but clearly brought out later in the letter, that the legalistic party insisted most strenuously upon circumcision, is here incidentally implied. ἠναγκάσθη is undoubtedly to be taken as a resultative aorist (BMT 42), and οὐδὲ ἠναγκάσθη denies not the attempt to compel but the success of the attempt. That the attempt was (unsuccessfully) made is clearly implied in the context.

The argument of Sief. for his interpretation, making οὐδὲ ἠναγκάσθη a denial that pressure was brought to bear on Paul, i. e., by the apostles, confuses the distinction between the meaning of the word and the force of its tense. ἀναγκάζω is used consistently throughout N. T. in the present and imperfect with conative force (Acts 26:12, Galatians 2:14, Galatians 6:12), signifying “to apply pressure,” “to (seek to) compel”; in the aorist, on the other hand, consistently with a resultative sense, in the active “to compel,” in the passive, “to be forced” (Matthew 14:22, Mark 6:45, Luke 14:23, Acts 28:19, 2 Corinthians 12:11). What, therefore, the aorist with οὐκ denies is simply the result. Whether that result did not ensue because no pressure was applied, or because the pressure was successfully resisted, can be determined only by the connection. The fact, however, that the imperfect with οὐκ would have clearly expressed the thought that no effort was made, and the clear implication in the context that effort was made are practically decisive for the present case. Sief.’s contention that the context excludes effort on the part of the apostles to have Titus circumcised is unsupported by the context, and involves a misapprehension of Paul’s contention throughout the passage; this is not that the apostles did not disagree with him, and always approved his position, but that he was independent of them; in this particular matter, that they yielded to him. See esp. v. 7 with its clear implication of a change of front on the part of the apostles. For other interpretations of οὐκ … περιτμηθῆναι, see below on the various constructions ascribed to διὰ… ψευδαδέλφους.

4. διὰ δὲ τὸυς παρεισάκτους ψευδαδέλφους, “now it was because of the false brethren surreptitiously brought in.” The question what this phrase limits, i. e., what it was that was done because of the false brethren, is one of the most difficult of all those raised by the passage. The most probable view is that it is to be associated with the idea of pressure, urgency, implied in οὐδὲ ἠναγκάσθη. The meaning may then be expressed thus: “And not even Titus… was compelled to be circumcised, and (what shows more fully the significance of the fact) it was urged because of the false brethren.” If this is correct it follows that there were three parties to the situation under discussion in Jerusalem. There were, first, Paul and Barnabas, who stood for the policy of receiving Gentiles as Christians without circumcision; on the other hand, there were those whom Paul characterises as false brethren, and who contended that the Gentile Christians must be circumcised; and finally there were those who for the sake of the second party urged that Paul should waive his scruples and consent to the circumcision of Titus. This third party evidently consisted of the pillar apostles, with whom Paul held private conference (v. 3) and who because of Paul’s representations finally themselves yielded and gave assent to Paul’s view (vv. 7-9). With the second party it does not appear that Paul came into direct contact; they are at least mentioned only as persons for whose sake, not by whom, certain things were done. It is thus clearly implied that they who in person urged the circumcision of Titus (οἱ δοκοῦντες) did not themselves regard it as necessary except as a matter of expediency, as a concession to the feelings or convictions of those whom Paul designates as false brethren, but who were evidently regarded by the other apostles rather as persons whose prejudices or convictions, however mistaken, it was desirable to consider. On the question whether the apostles carried their conciliatory policy to the extent of urging the circumcision of all Gentile converts, see fn. p. 91.

Παρείσακτος, a word not found in extant classical writings, is nevertheless given by the ancient lexicographers, Hesych. Phot. and Suid. Cf. Frit. Opuscula, pp. 181 ff. (Th.); Sief. ad loc., p. 101, fn. In view of the frequent use of the passive of verbs in later Greek in a middle sense, and of the definition of this word by Hesych. Phot. and Suid. by the neutral term ἀλλότριος, it is doubtful whether the passive sense can be insisted upon, as if these false brethren had been brought in by others. The relative clause, οἵτινες etc., distinctly makes the men themselves active in their entrance into the church, which though by no means excluding the thought that some within were interested in bringing them in, throws the emphasis upon their own activity in the matter. Nor is the idea of surreptitiousness, secrecy, at all clearly emphasised. That they are alien to the body into which they have come is what the term both etymologically and by usage suggests. ψευδάδελφος, used elsewhere in N. T. only 2 Corinthians 11:26, evidently means those who profess to be brethren, i. e., to be true members of the Christian body, but are not so in fact. Cf. Paul’s use of the term ψευδαπόστολος, 2 Corinthians 11:13. These words παρεισάκτους ψευδαδέλφους express, of course, Paul’s judgment concerning these men when he wrote. That they were so looked upon by the other apostles at the time of the events here referred to does not necessarily follow.

The community into which “the false brethren” had made their way is unnamed. That they had made their influence felt in Antioch, if not also generally among the churches having Gentile members, and that they came from Jerusalem and were in some sense representatives of that church, is implied in the very fact that Paul and Barnabas came up to Jerusalem about the matter. If, therefore, παρεισάκτους and παρεισῆλθον refer to a visit to a church, we should mentally supply with them “into the church at Antioch,” or “into the churches among the Gentiles.” But if, as is more probable, these words refer to incorporation into the membership of the body, then the reference is either to the church at Jerusalem, which is favoured by the facts above cited as indicating that they were actually from Jerusalem, or the Christian community in general, which is favoured by the indefiniteness of the language here employed and the fact that the apostle’s indignation is most naturally explained if he is thinking of these men not as additions to the Jerusalem church in particular, with which he was not directly concerned, but as an element of discord in the Christian community. In either case it is clear that they emanated from Jerusalem and were exerting their influence as a foreign element at Antioch or in general in the churches having Gentile members. See further, par. 12, p. 117.

Of the numerous constructions which have been adopted for the phrase διὰ … ψευδαδέλφους the following may be named:

1. Those which make it limit some following word. (a) εἴξαμεν. So, omitting οἵς οὐδέ (in v. 5; cf. textual note below), Tert. et al., and in modern times Zahn. This yields the sense, “but because of the false brethren… I yielded for a brief space.” This may be dismissed because based on a text insufficiently supported by textual evidence, and giving the impossible sense that Paul yielded by way of the subjection demanded by the false brethren that the truth of the gospel might continue with the Gentiles.* (b) So, retaining οἵς οὐδέ, but assuming that the insertion of οἵς involves an anacoluthon, Wies. p. 110; Philippi; and substantially so Weizs. Ap. Zeit. p. 155. Cf. Butt. p. 385. Paul, it is supposed, having intended at first to make διὰ… ψευδαδ. limit οὐκ εἴξαμεν directly, was led by the length of the sentence to insert οἵς, thus changing the thought from an assertion that on their account he did not yield into a denial that he yielded to them, and leaving διὰ … ψευδαδ. without a regimen. The objection of Sief. (ad loc., p. 98) to this interpretation that these two conceptions “yielded on account of” and “yielded to” are so different that the one could not be merged in the other is of little force; for certainly Paul might naturally think of a yielding to a demand made for the sake of the false brethren as in effect a yielding to them. Nor can the fact of the anacoluthon itself be urged against this view, since anacolutha are common in Paul, and especially so in this very paragraph. The real objection to this interpretation lies in the difficulty of supposing that Paul could say that he refused to circumcise Titus because it was requested for the sake of the false brethren, or as Wies. in effect makes it, by them. Is it to be supposed that, when the very question at issue was the legitimacy of the gospel which offered itself to the Gentiles without legal requirement, he would have consented to circumcise Titus, if only the request had not been made for the sake of the false brethren? Weizs., indeed, interprets διὰ … ψευδαδ. as giving not the decisive reason, but for the urging of which Titus would have been circumcised, but a contributory reason, which made his course all the more necessary—a meaning which has much to commend it, but which it seems would have necessitated the insertion of some such word as μάλιστα (cf. chap. 6:10).

2. Those which make διὰ … ψευδαδ. limit what precedes, introducing an epexegetic addition to the preceding statement. So Sief., who, joining this verse closely to the words ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι and making οὐκ limit the whole phrase, finds in the sentence the meaning that no attempt was made for the sake of the false brethren to compel Titus to be circumcised. In other words, though the leading men might not unnaturally have urged the circumcision of Titus for the sake of the false brethren, no such compulsion was in fact applied. Aside from the improbable sense given to οὐδὲ … ἠναγκάσθη (see on v. 4), this involves an extremely difficult if not impossible sense of δέ, concerning which see on v. 2. To have yielded this meaning διὰ … ψευδαδ. must have stood in the least prominent position in the midst of the sentence, not subjoined and emphasised by δέ, or if for the sake of making the denial of Titus’s circumcision—the fact itself—unequivocal, it was necessary that the words διὰ … ψευδαδ. should stand apart, then they must have become a phrase of concession or opposition, expressing the thought, “though urged by,” or “in spite of the false brethren,” or have been introduced by οὐδέ, “and not even for the sake of the false brethren.” Cf. on οὐδέ under 1:12. Mey. also joins this phrase closely to what precedes, but to the whole expression οὐδὲ … περιτμηθῆναι, and finds in it the reason why Titus was not circumcised, i. e., because the false brethren urged it. If this relates to Paul, constituting his reason for refusing to consent to the circumcision of Titus, it is open to the same objection as 1 (b) above, viz., it implies that but for the advocacy of it by the false brethren Paul would have had no objection to the circumcision of Titus. If, on the other hand, the phrase is understood to refer to the motives of the eminent Jerusalem brethren, giving their reason for not asking for or consenting to the circumcision, then we have the representation that the false brethren urged the circumcision of Titus, and that the Jerusalem apostles opposed it not on principle, but because it was being urged by the false brethren; a view which attributes to them a degree of opposition to the legalistic party in the Jewish portion of the church, and of championship of the freedom of the Gentiles, which does not comport with the otherwise known history of the apostolic age, and which would, it would seem, have made this council itself unnecessary. Had the facts, moreover, been what this interpretation makes them, Paul could hardly have failed to bring out with greater distinctness what would have been so much to the advantage of his case, as he has done, e. g., in vv.7-9.

The joining of the phrase with ἀνεθέμην, or ἀνέβην, advocated by some of the older modern expositors (see in Sief.), scarcely calls for discussion. These interpretations yield a not unreasonable sense, and avoid many of the difficulties encountered by the other constructions, but it is hardly conceivable that the reader would be expected to supply mentally a word left so far behind.

3. Those which make διὰ … ψευδαδ. limit something supplied from the preceding. (a) οὐκ ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι (Ell.) or οὐκ περιετμήθη (Frit. cited by Ltft.). This is not materially different from making it limit οὐδέ … περιτμηθῆναι already expressed, as is done by Mey., and is open to the same objections. (b) περιετμήθη, Rück. et al.; advocated by Hort. (WH. II app. p. 121). According to this interpretation οὐ throws its whole force on ἠναγκάσθη, only the compulsion, not the circumcision, being denied; δέ is adversative, and introduces the statement of the reason why Titus, though not compelled, was nevertheless circumcised, viz., because of the false brethren. This is perhaps the most improbable of all the proposed interpretations. If the circumcision of Titus was carried through without Paul’s consent, then how could he have said that it was not compelled? If with his consent and, as he says, because of the false brethren, how could he say that he had not yielded to them for so much as an hour? What was such consent but precisely ἡ ὑποταγή, the surrender which they demanded (cf. on τῇ ὑποταγῇ, v. 5)? And with what honesty could he have maintained that he had pursued this course at Jerusalem, “that the truth of the gospel might continue with you,” when in fact he had on that occasion surrendered the very thing which was to him the key to the whole situation so far as concerned the relation of the Gentile to the law and to Christ? Cf. 5:1-4. In fact, any view which assumes that Titus was circumcised involves the conclusion that Paul surrendered his case under compulsion or through wavering, and that in his present argument he made a disingenuous and unsuccessful attempt to prove that he did not surrender it. (c) The thought of (unsuccessful) pressure implied in οὐδὲ … ἠναγκάσθη. This view (set forth in the larger print above), and well advocated by Ltft. pp. 105, 106, yields a clear and consistent account of what took place, showing the Jerusalem apostles standing between the extremists on both sides, advising Paul to consent to the circumcision of Titus for the sake of peace, while Paul, seeing in such a yielding a surrender of vital principle to the false representatives of Christianity, persistently refused; it accounts at the same time for the insertion of the phrase, and for the characterisation of the men referred to as false brethren, etc., showing at the same time the extent to which the Jerusalem apostles could, from Paul’s point of view, be led astray, so as even to advocate a course dictated by regard for those who were in reality only false brethren, and suggesting a contributory reason for his resistance, that the demand for the circumcision of Titus originated with spies from without, men who had no proper place in the church at all. This view alone brings this portion of the paragraph into line with the apostle’s general argument by which he aims to show his entire independence, even of the other apostles.

If it be judged too harsh and difficult to supply from the preceding language the thought, “this was urged,” the most reasonable alternative view is that of Wies. et al. (1 (b) above). From a purely linguistic point of view this interpretation is perhaps the easiest of all that have been proposed, and if it could be supposed, with Weizs., that Paul would refer in this unqualified way to a reason which was, after all, only contributory, it would be the most probable interpretation of the passage.

οἵτινες παρεισῆλθον κατασκοπῆσαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἡμῶν “who sneaked in to spy out our freedom.” The liberty of which the apostle here speaks is, of course, the freedom of the Christian from bondage to the law, which would have been surrendered in principle if the Gentile Christians had been compelled to be circumcised. Cf. 4:8, 9, 11-31, and esp. 5:1-3, 13. That he calls it “our freedom” (cf. ὑμᾶς at the end of v.5) shows that although the obligation of the Gentile to be circumcised was the particular question at issue, this was in the apostle’s mind only a part of a larger question, which concerned both Jewish and Gentile Christians, or else that Paul is for the moment associating himself with the Gentile Christians as those whose case he represents. The Antioch incident (vv. 11-21) shows how closely the question of the freedom of the Jews was connected with that of the liberty of the Gentile Christians, both in fact and in the apostle’s mind. Yet there is nothing in his narrative to indicate that in the discussion at Jerusalem the freedom of the Gentile was explicitly considered in relation to anything except circumcision. Still less is it to be assumed that the question of the obligation of the Jewish Christians in respect to foods or defilement by association with Gentile Christians was at this time brought up. Rather does the expression “that the truth of the gospel might continue with you” suggest that at this time the only question raised pertained to the Gentiles, and this is further confirmed by the situation which afterwards arose at Antioch, in which the question of foods and particularly the obligation of the Jews in respect to them appears as one on which an agreement had not been previously reached.

Παρεισέρχομαι is a verb not uncommon in later Greek, meaning literally “to come in alongside,” but usually (not, however, in Romans 5:20) implying stealth. See exx., cited by Th.; and esp. Luc. Asin. 15, εἰ λύκος παρεισέλθοι (Sief.). κατασκοπέω, “to spy out,” with the associated idea of hostile intent, purpose to destroy (Grk. writers from Xenophon down, Lxx, here only in N. T.) is here nearly equivalent to “stealthily to destroy.”

ἥν ἔχομεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, “which we have in Christ Jesus.” The preposition ἐν is probably used here to mark its object as the causal ground or basis of the freedom which we possess, the person by reason of whom and on the basis of whose work we have this freedom. See Th. ἐν, I 6c, and Acts 13:39, Romans 3:24, Romans 5:9 and note on v.17 below. Others (see Ell., e. g., h. l. and v. 17) take ἐν in the sense “in mystical union with,” a meaning which the word sometimes has in Paul. But in view of the clear instances of the causal sense both before names of Christ and other words, it is certainly to be preferred here where the so-called mystical sense itself becomes intelligible only by adding to it a causal sense, making it mean “by virtue of our union with.”

ἵνα ἡμᾶς καταδουλώσουσιν, “that they might bring us into bondage,” i. e., to the law, implying an already possessed freedom. Observe the active voice of the verb, excluding the sense to bring into bondage to themselves, and cf. 4:9, 10, 4:21-5:1. Undue stress must not be laid on ἡμᾶς as meaning or including Jewish Christians (cf. on ἐλευθερίαν ἡμῶν above), yet its obvious reference is to Christians in general, not to Gentile Christians exclusively. The whole phraseology descriptive of these “false brethren” implies, as Weizs. has well pointed out (Ap. Zeit. pp. 216-222, E. T., I 257-263) that they were distinct and different from the original constituents of the church, a foreign element, introduced at a relatively late date, distinguished not only from the apostles but from the primitive church in general, and this not only personally but in their spirit and aims. By κατασκοπῆσαι and ἵνα καταδουλώσουσιν Paul definitely charges that these men entered the church for a propagandist purpose, that they joined the Christian community in order to make it legalistic, and implies that previous to their coming non-legalistic views were, if not generally held, at least tolerated. Cf. also on 1:24. As concerns the apostle’s reflection upon the character of these men and the unworthiness of their motive, some allowance must necessarily be made for the heat of controversy; but that fact does not seem to affect the legitimacy of the inferences from his statement as to the state of opinion in the Jewish church and of practice among Gentile Christians. These facts have an important bearing on the question of the relation of Paul’s narrative in this chapter to that of Acts, chaps. 6, 7, 10, 11. The recent entrance of these men into the church and the implication as to the condition of things before they came suggest that the representation of Acts that the Jerusalem church was in the early days of its history tolerant of non-legalistic views, and not unwilling to look with favour on the acceptance of Gentiles as Christians, is not in itself improbable. It is at least not in conflict with the testimony of this letter.

On the use of a future in a pure final clause, see BMT 198 and cf. Luke 14:10, Luke 20:10, Acts 21:24, Acts 28:27, Romans 3:4.

5. οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἲξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ, “to whom not for an hour did we yield by way of the subjection (demanded).” Though the request that Paul and those with him should yield was made not by, but because of, the false brethren, he clearly saw that to grant the request would be in effect to surrender to the latter. Hence the dative here instead of διὰ οὕς, corresponding to διὰ τοὺς ψευδαδέλφους. The article before ὑποταγῇ is restrictive, showing that the word is used not simply with qualitative force, but refers to the particular obedience which was demanded. The phrase is therefore epexegetic of εἴξαμεν, indicating wherein the yielding would have consisted if it had taken place, and the negative denies the yielding, not simply a certain kind of yielding. This fact excludes any interpretation which supposes that Paul meant simply to deny that he yielded obediently, i. e., to a recognised authority, while tacitly admitting a conciliatory yielding (as is maintained by those who hold that he really circumcised Titus). For this thought he must have used the dative without the article. Cf. Php 1:15-18, 1 Thessalonians 4:4, 1 Thessalonians 4:5.

On πρὸς ὥραν, meaning “for a short time,” see 2 Corinthians 7:8, 1 Thessalonians 2:17, Philemon 1:15, where, as in the present passage, ὥρα is not a definite measure of time, a twelfth of a day, but merely a (relatively) short time; in the cases cited, some days or weeks; in the present passage rather, as we should say in English, “a moment,” “an instant.” Cf., not as exactly similar instances, but as illustrating the flexibility of the word, Matthew 10:19, Matthew 10:26:40, 45, 55.

Οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν. The reading at this point has been the subject of extended discussion, especially by Klostermann, Probleme im Aposteltexte, pp. 36 ff., Sief. Com. ad loc., and Zahn Com. ad loc. and Excurs. I. The principal evidence may be summarised as follows:

πρὸς ὥραν (without οἷς οὐδέ): D* d e plur codd. lat. et gr. ap. Victorin. codd. lat. ap. Hier. al. Irenint. Tert. Victorin. Ambrst. Pelag.

οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν: codd. gr. et lat. ap. Ambrst., quidam (codd.?) ap. Victorin. Mcion, Syr. (psh.), and (accg. to Sief.) one ms. of Vg.

οἶς πρὸς ὥραν: Jerome quotes certain persons as asserting: et hoc esse quod in codicibus legatur Latinis, “quibus ad horam cessimus.” Primasius (XI 209, quoted by Klostermann, p. 83; cf. Plummer, Com. on 2 Corinthians, p. lv) says: Latinus habet: “quibus ad horam cessimus.” Sedulius: Male in Latinis codicibus legitur: “quibus ad horam cessimus.”

οἶς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν: אABCDcorr FGKLP, 33, and Grk. mss. generally, f g Vg. Syr. (psh. harcl.) Boh. Arm. Aeth. codd. gr. ap. Hieron.; also Bas. Epiph. Euthal. Thdrt. Damas. Aug. Ambr. Hier.

Klostermann and Zahn adopt the first reading. Tdf. Treg. WH. Ws. RV. and modern interpreters generally, the fourth. The evidence shows clearly that the difficulty of the latter reading was early felt, and that, for whatever reason, a syntactically easier text was current among the Latins. The evidence against οἶς οὐδέ, however, is not sufficient to overcome the strong preponderance in its favour, or the improbability that any one would have introduced the anacoluthic οἷς. But since the reading οἷς without οὐδέ is very weakly attested it remains to accept the reading which has both οἷς and οὐδέ.

ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου διαμείνῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. “that the truth of the gospel might continue with you.” The clause states the purpose of his refusing to yield. To make it a statement of the purpose of the yielding as Zahn does, omitting οἷς οὐδέ is, especially in view of the τῇ before ὑποταγῇ, to represent Paul as making the absurd statement that, in order that the truth of the gospel that men are free from law might abide with the Gentiles, he yielded to the demand of the legalists and did as they required. It is also to convert a paragraph which is put forth as an evidence that he had always maintained his independence of men into a weak apology for having conceded the authority of the Twelve. The term εὐαγγέλιον evidently has here the same sense as in v. 2 and in 1:7 (cf. the notes on those vv., and note word ἀλήθεια here). The genitive is a possessive genitive, the truth is the truth contained in, and so belonging to, the gospel. Cf. ἡ τῶν νόμων ἀλήθει[α], Papyri in Brit. Mus. II p. 280, cited by M. and M. Voc. The effect of the triumph of the view of Paul’s opponents would have been to rob the Gentiles of the truth of the gospel, leaving them a perverted, false gospel. See 1:7. The verb διαμείνῃ implies that at the time referred to the truth of the gospel, i. e., the gospel in its true form as he preached it, not in the perverted form preached by the judaisers, had already been given to those to whom he refers under ὑμᾶς.

Πρός meaning properly “towards” and then “with,” usually of persons in company and communication with others (1 Thessalonians 3:4, 2 Thessalonians 2:5, 2 Thessalonians 3:10, Galatians 1:18, Galatians 1:4:18, Galatians 1:20) is here used like μετά in Php 4:9, of the presence of an impersonal thing with men. The idea of possession is not in the preposition, but is suggested by the context and the nature of the thing spoken of. ὑμᾶς may refer specifically to the Galatians, to whom he is writing, in which case it is implied that they had already received the gospel at the time of this Jerusalem conference. But the more general interpretation of ὑμᾶς as meaning simply “you Gentiles” is so easy, and the inclusion of the Galatians with the Gentiles in the class on behalf of whom Paul then took his stand is so natural, even though historically the Galatians only later participated in the benefit of his action, that it would be hazardous to lay any great weight on this word in the determination of chronological questions. The most that can safely be said is that διαμείνῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς receives its most obvious interpretation if the Galatians are supposed to have been already in possession of the gospel at the time here referred to. See Introduction, p. xlii.

6. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων εἶναί τι “And from those who were accounted to be something.” On τῶν δοκούντων, etc., cf. v. 2. The verb which this phrase was to have limited is left unexpressed, the construction being changed when the thought is resumed after the parenthesis οποῖοι, etc. The apostle doubtless had in mind when he began the sentence παρέλαβον οὐδέν (cf. 1:12) or some equivalent expression. The sentence seems not adversative, but continuative; to the statement that when the pillar apostles took up, in a sense, the cause of the false brethren, he did not for a moment yield to the latter, he adds as further evidence of his entire independence of the apostles that (in this discussion) they taught him nothing new.

—ὁποῖοί ποτε ἦσαν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει— “what they once were matters not to me.” ὁποῖοι, a qualitative word, meaning “of what kind” (cf. 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 1 Corinthians 3:13, Jam 1:24), here evidently refers not to personal character but to rank or standing, and doubtless specifically to that standing which the three here referred to had by reason of their personal relation to Jesus while he was in the flesh, in the case of James as his brother, in the case of Peter and John as his personal followers. This fact of their past history was undoubtedly appealed to by the opponents of Paul as giving them standing and authority wholly superior to any that he could claim. Cf. 2 Corinthians 5:16, 2 Corinthians 10:7. Paul answers here substantially as afterwards to the Corinthians in reply to much the same argument, that facts of this sort do not concern him, have no significance. Apostleship rests on a present relation to the heavenly Christ, a spiritual experience, open to him equally with them. The whole parenthetical sentence, though introduced without a conjunction, serves as a justification of the depreciation of the apostles which he had begun to express in the preceding clause—or perhaps more exactly as an answer in advance to the thought which the apostle foresaw would be raised by that statement when completed, viz.: But if you received nothing from them, that is certainly to your disadvantage; were they not personal companions of Jesus, the original and authoritative bearers of the gospel? What valid commission or message can you have except as you derived it from them?

With a verb of past time ποτέ (enclitic) may mean (a) “ever,” “at any time”; (b) “at some time,” “once,” “formerly”; (c) “ever,” with intensive force, like the Latin cunque, and the English “ever” in “whoever,” “whatever.” The last meaning is that which is preferred in RV.—“whatsoever they were.” But this use is unusual in classical Greek, and has no example in N. T. The second meaning, on the other hand, is frequent in N. T., especially in Paul (chap. 1:13, 23, Romans 7:9, etc.), and is appropriate in this connection, directing the thought to a particular (undefined but easily understood) period of past time referred to by ἦσαν. There can therefore be no doubt that it is the meaning here intended. The first meaning is not impossible, but less appropriate because suggesting various possible past periods or points of time, instead of the one, Jesus’ lifetime, which gives point to the sentence.

The above interpretation of ποτε and substantially of the sentence is adopted by Wies. Hilg. Ltft. and many others from the Latin Vg. down. Win. and Lip., though taking ποτε in the sense of cunque, by referring ἦσαν to the time of Jesus’ life on earth reach substantially the same interpretation of the clause. Ell. Sief., et al., take ποτε in the sense of cunque, and understand the clause to refer to the esteem in which these men were held at the time of the events spoken of; whatsoever they were, i. e., whatever prestige, standing, they had in Jerusalem at this time. Sief. supplies as subject for διαφέρει the thought “to obtain authorisation from them”; making the sentence mean: “whatever their standing in Jerusalem, it is of no consequence to me to secure their authorisation or commission.” But the clause ὁποῖοί ποτε ἦσαν (cf. 1 Corinthians 3:13) itself is a suitable subject, and the supplying of a subject unnecessary.

—πρόσωπον θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει—“God accepts not the person of man.” To accept the person—literally face—of one is to base one’s judgment and action on external and irrelevant considerations. Cf. Matthew 22:16, Mark 12:14, Luke 20:21. Such, in the judgment of Paul, were mere natural kinship with Jesus, such as James had, or personal companionship with him during his earthly life, such as the Twelve had. Cf. 2 Corinthians 5:12, where Paul uses ἐν προσώπῳ with reference to the realm of external things. This second parenthesis in its turn gives a reason justifying the statement of the first. The former advantages of these men signify nothing to me, for God takes no account of such external considerations. Concerning the emphasis on θεός see the textual note.

As between θεός and ὁ θεός external evidence alone is indecisive. אA P 33, 88, 103, 122,* 442, 463, 1912, Chrys. al. insert the article. BCDFGKL al. pler. Eus. Thdrt. Dam. omit it. Sheer accident would be as likely to operate on one side as on the other. At first sight intrinsic probability seems to make for the genuineness of the article, since the N. T. writers, and Paul in particular, rarely use θεός as subject without the article. Yet the use of θεός without the article, because employed with qualitative force with emphasis upon the divine attributes, especially in contrast with man, is an established usage of which there are numerous examples in Paul (see 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 1 Thessalonians 1:2:4, 1 Corinthians 2:5, 1 Corinthians 2:3:9, 1 Corinthians 2:16) and a few in the nominative (1 Thessalonians 2:5, Galatians 6:7, 2 Corinthians 5:19). Inasmuch, therefore, as there is in this passage just such a contrast, it would be in accordance with Pauline usage to omit the article, and the balance of intrinsic probability is apparently on this side. Transcriptional probability is also in its favour, since the scribe would be more likely to convert the unusual θεός into ὁ θεός than the reverse.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες οὐδὲν προσανέθεντο, “for to me the men of eminence taught nothing new.” In these words the apostle evidently says what he began to say in ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων, giving it now the specific form that the Jerusalem apostles imposed on him no burden (of doctrine or practice), or imparted nothing to him in addition to what he already knew. See discussion of προσανέθεντο below. γάρ may be justificatory, introducing a statement which justifies the seemingly harsh language of the two preceding statements, or explicative, the thought overleaping the parenthetical statements just preceding, and the new clause introduced by γάρ putting in a different form the thought already partly expressed in ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων. The latter is simpler and for that reason more probable.

The uses of the verb προσανατίθεμαι (Mid.) clearly attested outside of the present passage are three: (1) “To offer or dedicate beside”: Boeckh, C. I. G. 2782. (2) “To confer with”: Galatians 1:16 (q. v.); Diod. Sic. 17. 116:4; Luc. Jup. Trag. 1. (3) “To lay upon one’s self in addition, to undertake besides”: Xen. Mem. 2.1:8. Beside these there have been proposed for the present passage: (4) “To lay upon in addition” i. e. (3) taken actively instead of with a middle sense. Cf. Pollux, I 9:99. (5) (equiv. to προστίθημι) “To add,” “to bestow something not possessed before”: Chrys., et al.; (6) (adding to the sense of ἀνατίθεμαι in 2:2 and Acts 25:14, that of πρός in composition, “besides,” “in addition”), “To set forth in addition,” i. e., in this connection, “to teach in addition to what I had already learned.” The word “impart” in RV. might perhaps represent either (4), (5), (6), possibly even (2). The first meaning is evidently impossible here. The second can be applied only by taking οὐδέν as an accusative of respect, “in respect to nothing did they confer with me,” and then there still remains the fact that in the other instances of the verb used in this sense the conference is chiefly for the sake of learning, but here the reference must be to conferring for the purpose of teaching. This renders it very difficult, taking the word in the sense illustrated in 1:16, to find in οὐδὲν προσανατίθεσθαι, as Ltft. does, the sense “to impart no fresh knowledge,” or as Ell. does, taking πρός as directive only, the meaning “to communicate nothing,” “to address no communications.” Zahn, indeed, takes the verb as in 1:16, and interprets the sentence as meaning, “for they laid nothing before me for decision, they did not make me their judge.” This Zahn interprets as an explanation and justification of οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, in that it gives a reason why he did not regard their high standing as he might have been tempted to do if he had been acting as judge of their affairs. Vv. 7ff. then state that, on the contrary, they acted as his judges and pronounced favourable judgment on him. The interpretation is lexicographically possible, but logically difficult to the point of impossibility. It compels the supposition either that in ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱ, etc. Paul said the opposite of what he set out to say in ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων, or else that, having begun in the latter phrase to say that from the men of esteem he received a favourable judgment, he interrupted himself to belittle the value of their judgment. It makes the apostle, moreover, admit a dependence upon the pillar apostles which it is the whole purpose of 1:11-2:21 to disprove. The third sense is rendered impossible for the present passage by the presence of ἐμοί. “To lay no additional burden on themselves for me” is without meaning in this connection. The fourth meaning does not occur elsewhere, the voucher being only for the reflexive sense (3), “to lay a burden upon one’s self.” Sief. infers from the fact that ἀνατίθεμαι is found in the active sense (Xen. Cyr 8:5:4), as well as in the reflexive that the compound προσανατίθεμαι may also occur in the active sense. The fifth sense, though adopted by many interpreters, ancient and modern, seems least defensible, being neither attested by any clear instance (unless Chrysostom’s adoption of it constitutes such an instance) nor based on attested use of ἀνατίθημι. The sixth meaning is easily derived from ἀνατίθημι; the absence of any actual occurrence of it elsewhere renders it, like the fourth, conjectural, but not impossible, in view of the difficulty of all the well-attested senses. Our choice of interpretations must lie between the fourth, advocated by Sief. (who also cites for it Bretschn. Rück. Lechl. Pfleid. Zeller, Lip.), and the sixth. Both satisfy the requirements of the context—for the apostle is evidently here, as throughout the paragraph, presenting the evidence of his independence of the Jerusalem apostles. But the sixth is, on the whole, slightly to be preferred: it is more consonant with the thought of ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν δοκούντων, in which the apostle apparently began to say what he here expresses in a different syntactical form, and with the words πρόσωπον … λαμβάνει, which seem to have been written, as pointed out above, in anticipation of these words.

7. ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἰδόντες ὅτι πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας καθὼς Πέτρος τῆς περιτομῆς, “but on the contrary when they saw that I had been entrusted with the gospel to the uncircumcised as Peter with the gospel to the circumcised.” ἀλλὰ (Germ. “sondern”) introduces the positive side of the fact which is negatively stated in ἔμοὶ γάρ, etc. The participle ἰδόντες, giving the reason for the fact about to be stated, δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν, v. 9, implies that what they had learned led them to take this step, and so that they had in some sense changed their minds. There is an obvious relation between the words of this v. and v. 2. But whether the decision of the Jerusalem apostles to recognise Paul’s right of leadership in the Gentile field was based on his statement of the content of his gospel (v. 2), or on his story of how he received it (1:15), or on the recital of its results, or in part on the spirit which he himself manifested, or on all these combined, is not here stated. The last supposition is perhaps the most probable.*

That Paul regarded the distinction between the gospel of the uncircumcision entrusted to him and that of the circumcision entrusted to Peter as fundamentally not one of content but of the persons to whom it was addressed is plain from that which this verse implies and the next verse distinctly affirms, that the same God commissioned both Paul and Peter each for his own work. It is implied, moreover, that this essential identity of both messages was recognised by the Jerusalem apostles as well as by Paul; for it was their recognition of the divine source of Paul’s apostleship, which of course they claimed for their own, that, Paul says, led them to give to him and to Barnabas hands of fellowship. At the same time it is evident that Paul, contending for the right to preach this one gospel to the Gentiles without demanding that they should accept circumcision, and so to make it in content also a gospel of uncircumcision, expected that Peter also would preach it to the circumcised Jews without demanding that they should abandon circumcision. Thus even in content there was an important and far-reaching difference between the gospel that Paul preached and that which Peter preached, the difference, in fact, between a legalistic and a non-legalistic gospel. But even this difference, it is important to note, sprang from a fundamental identity of principle, viz., that the one message of salvation is to be offered to men, as they are, whether circumcised or uncircumcised. Whether this principle was clearly recognised by the Jerusalem apostles is not certain, but that it was for Paul not only implicit but explicit seems clear from chap. 5:6, 1 Corinthians 7:17-24. Thus for him at least the one gospel itself involved the principle of adaptation to men’s opinions and convictions, and consequent mutual tolerance. And for such tolerance he contended as essential. For differences of opinion and practice in the Christian community there must be room, but not for intolerance of such differences. That in other things as well as in circumcision there might be a difference of practice on the part of those who received the one gospel in accordance with the circumstances of those addressed and the convictions of those who preached, is logically involved in the decision respecting circumcision, and is clearly implied in the terms of v. 9 (q. v.). But there is nothing in the present passage (2:1-10) to indicate that other matters were explicitly discussed at this time or that the applicability of the principle to other questions, such, e. g., as clean and unclean foods, the Sabbath, and fasting, was explicitly recognised.

The genitives τῆς ἀκροβυστίας and τῆς περιτομῆς can not be more accurately described than as genitives of connection, being practically equivalent to τοῖς ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ (in uncircumcision) and τοῖς περιτετμημένοις. Cf. vv. 8, 9 and 1 Corinthians 7:18, Romans 4:9. Both nouns are used by metonymy, ἀκροβυστία by double metonymy, the word signifying, first, “membrum virile, ” then “uncircumcision,” then “uncircumcised person”; on the form of the word, see Th. and M. and M. Voc. s. v. The word εὐαγγέλιον, referring primarily, no doubt, to the content of the message (cf. on 1:7, 11, 2:2 and detached note on εὐαγγέλιον, p. 422), by the addition of the genitives denoting to whom the message is to be presented acquires a secondary reference to the work of presenting it.

For the construction of εὐαγγέλιον with πεπίστευμαι, see W. XXXII 5 (WM. p. 287), Butt, p. 190, and Romans 3:2, 1 Corinthians 9:17, 1 Timothy 1:11. The perfect tense has here—and appropriately—its regular force, denoting a past fact and its existing result. BMT 74. Its translation by the pluperfect is necessitated by the fact that it stands in indirect discourse after a past tense. BMT 353.

That in this verse and the following Paul speaks only of himself (as also in vv. 5, 6) and Peter, omitting mention of Barnabas on the one side and of James and John on the other, doubtless reflects the fact that Paul was recognised as the leader of the work among the Gentiles, and Peter as the leader, not indeed of the Jewish Christian church, but of the missionary work of the Jerusalem party. When in v. 9 the reference is again to the conference, Barnabas is again named, though after Paul, and James is named first among the three Jerusalem apostles.

8. ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας Πέτρῳ εἰς ἀποστολὴν τῆς περιτομῆς ἐνήργησεν καὶ ἐμοὶ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, “for he who wrought for Peter unto an apostleship to the circumcised wrought also for me unto an apostleship to the Gentiles.” This parenthetical v. is confirmatory of the implied assertion of v. 7, being intended either as a statement of the reasoning by which the pillar apostles reached their conviction there stated, or more probably of Paul’s own thought by which he supports and confirms their conclusion. Conceding without reserve Peter’s apostleship and its divine source, Paul justifies their recognition of his own claim to apostleship by appeal to his own equal and like experience of God.

Whether the appeal is to the inner experience of each by which they were endowed for their work, or to the known results, in the way of converts, etc., of his work and Peter’s, depends upon the precise sense in which Paul used the words ἐνεργήσας and ἐνήργησεν. The usage of ἐνεργέω in 1 Corinthians 12:6, 1 Corinthians 12:11, where it refers to the work of the Spirit of God in men, fitting and endowing each for his own work, suggests the first view. But Php 2:13, where in the second instance ἐνεργεῖν means specifically “to effect, to produce results,” shows that Paul might easily use the word here with reference to the divine activity in accomplishing results through himself and Peter, perhaps preferring it to κατεργάζομαι (see Romans 15:18) because it is intransitive and because it more distinctly suggests the divine energy by which the results were accomplished. The argument on this view would be similar to that of 1 Corinthians 9:1, but also wholly appropriate to the present connection, and more forcible than a reference to the inner experience of Peter and himself, which would be known only to each of them respectively.

In ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας, as in some other passages, Paul refers to God by a descriptive epithet without the insertion of the word θεός. See 1:6, 15 and notes; Colossians 3:10. To understand ὁ ἐνεργήσας of Christ rather than God, would not be consistent with Paul’s usual method of expression concerning the apostleship. Save where as in Galatians 1:1 the two ideas coalesce in the representation of God and Christ as immediate source, it is his habit to speak of God as its source and Christ as the agent or mediator of it (Romans 1:5, Romans 1:15:15, 1 Corinthians 15:10, Ephesians 3:2, Ephesians 3:7, Galatians 1:15; cf. also on his use of the verb ἐνεργέω 1 Corinthians 12:6, Php 2:13).

The dative Πέτρῳ is a dative of advantage, not governed by ἐν in composition, ἐνεργήσας not being a verb compounded with ἐν, but derived from ἐνεργής or ἐνεργός = ἐν ἔργῳ, “effective,” and meaning “to be operative, to work.”

Ἀποστολή, here as always in N. T. (see Acts 1:25, Romans 1:5, 1 Corinthians 9:2; it is otherwise in classical Greek and the Lxx) refers specifically to the office and work of an apostle of Christ; see on 1:1. The omission of the article gives the word qualitative force. The preposition εἰς expresses not mere reference but purpose or result, “for or unto the creation of,” i. e., “so as to make him an apostle.”

Τῆς περιτομῆς is here, as in v. 7, by metonymy for “the circumcised.” εἰς τὰ ἔθνη is manifestly a condensed expression equivalent to εἰς ἀποστολὴν τῶν εθνῶν, or the like, used for brevity’s sake or through negligence. That ἀποστολήν is omitted because of an unwillingness on Paul’s part to claim apostleship for himself is excluded alike by the whole thought of the sentence and by 1:1.

9. καὶ γνόντες τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι, Ἰάκωβος καὶ Κηφᾶς καὶ Ἰωάνης, οἱ δοκοῦντες στύλοι εἶναι, δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν ἐμοὶ καὶ Βαρνάβᾳ κοινωνίας, “and when, I say, they perceived the grace that had been given to me, James and Cephas and John, who were accounted to be pillars, gave to me and to Barnabas right hands of fellowship.” These words resume the thought of v. 7, virtually repeating ἰδόντες ὅτι πεπίστευμαι, etc., and completing what was there begun. It is an overrefinement to attempt to discover a marked difference between ἰδόντες and γνόντες. The “grace that was given to me” is manifestly the grace of God or Christ (on the word χάρις, see 1:3 and detached note p. 423), including especially the entrusting to him of the gospel to the uncircumcised (v. 7), but not necessarily excluding that manifested in the results which he had been able to accomplish. Cf. Romans 1:5, διʼ οὗ [sc. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] ἐλάβομεν χάριν καὶ ἀποστολὴν εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. See also 1 Corinthians 3:10, 1 Corinthians 15:10, Ephesians 3:2, Ephesians 3:7, Ephesians 3:8, Ephesians 3:4:7. On the question how the other apostles came to recognise that God had given him this grace, cf. on v. 7. The giving of right hands is in token of a mutual compact, while κοινωνίας defines that compact as one of partnership. See more fully below in fine print.

The placing of the name of James first is probably the reflection of a certain prominence of James in the action here spoken of and of his influence in the decision, even above that of Peter. Thus while Peter is mentioned in vv. 7, 8, as in some sense the apostle of the circumcision, i. e., as the leader in missionary work among the Jews, James was apparently the man of greatest influence in the settlement of a question of policy, involving one of doctrine in the more practical sense. Cf. on vv. 7, 8.

The substitution of Πέτρος for Κηφᾷ, and the placing of it before Ἰάκωβος (DFG d f g Vg. Syr. [psh. harcl.] Tert. Hier. al.) like the reading Πέτρον for Κηφᾶν in 1:18 (q.v.), and Πέτρος for Κηφᾶς in v. 11 and Πέτρῳ for Κηφᾷ in v. 14, is a Western corruption. In vv. 7, 8, on the other hand, Πέτρος and Πέτρῳ are undoubtedly the correct readings.

The custom of giving the hand as a pledge of friendship or agreement existed both among the Hebrews and the Greeks, though probably derived by the Hebrews from some outside source. Cf. the passages cited by Ltft., indicating its existence among the Persians (Corn. Nep. Dat. c. 10; Diod. Sic. 16.43:3; Justinus XI 15:13); and showing its prevalence among the Parthians and other adjacent peoples (Jos. Ant. 18.328 (9:3)); and notice in Genesis 24:2, Genesis 24:9, Genesis 24:25:33, 31:Genesis 24:45-49, Genesis 24:33:10, Genesis 24:11 other methods of confirming an agreement or expressing friendship. The Hebrew expression is “to give the hand,” נָתַן יָד: 2 Kings 10:15, Ezra 10:19, Ezekiel 17:18, 1 Chronicles 29:24, 2 Chronicles 30:8, Lamentations 5:6, in the last three instances implying submission. In Greek writers χείρ, χεὶρ δεξιτερή, or χεὶρ δεξιά, or δεξιά alone, are used with various verbs, such as λαμβάνω, ἐμβάλλω, δίδωμι, in speaking of pledges received or given: Hom. Il. VI 233: χεῖράς τʼ ἀλλήλων λαβέτην. Od. I 121: χεῖρʼ ἕλε δεξιτερήν. Soph. Ph. 813: ἔμβαλλε χειρὸς πίστιν. Tr. 1181: ἔμβαλλε χεῖρα δεξιάν. Xen. An. 1. 6:6: δεξιὰν ἔλαβον καὶ ἔδωκα. 2. 5:9, δεξιὰς δεδομένας. In a papyrus of the second century a. d. the expression μὴ φυλάσς[ι]ν σου τὴν δεξιάν, “not to keep your pledge” (Grenfell, Hunt, and Hogarth, Fayum Towns and their Papyri, 124:13), indicates that δεξιά had acquired the meaning “pledge.” In the Jewish Greek writings διδόναι δεξιάν (or δεξιάς) is a token of a friendly compact. See 1 Mac. 6:58, 11:50, 62, 66, 13:50, 2 Mac. 11:26, 12:11, 13:22; Jos. Ant. 18:328 (9:3), 20:62(3:2). In none of these cases does the giving of the hand indicate submission, but a pledge of friendship, in most cases from the superior power to the inferior. Notice esp. the use of δοῦναι and λαβεῖν in 1 Mac. 11:66, 13:50, 2 Mac. 12:11, 12, but also in 2 Mac. 13:22, where in the case of a mutual compact the same person both gives and receives δεξιάν. κοινωνίας, “fellowship, partnership,” implying a friendly participation in the same work (cf. Php 1:5) defines that which the giving of the right hands expressed, and to which the givers pledged themselves. It thus excludes the idea of surrender or submission which the phrase “to give the hand” without qualification (1 Chronicles 29:24) might suggest, or that of superiority which usually accompanies its use in 1 and 2 Mac. The genitive can hardly be defined grammatically more exactly than as a genitive of inner connection. WM pp. 235 ff.

On δοκοῦντες στύλοι εἷναι, see note on οἱ δοκοῦντες, v. 2. The term “pillars” as a designation of those upon whom responsibility rests, is found in classical, Jewish, and Christian writers. Thus in Eur. Iph. T. 57: στύλοι γὰρ οἴκων παῖδές εἰσιν ἄρσενες. Æsch. Ag. 898: στῦλον ποδήρη, μονογενὲς τέκνον πατρί. Cf. exx. from Rabbinic writings in Schöttgen, Horae Hebraicae, ad loc., and for early Christian writers, see Clem. Romans 5:2, οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ δικαιότατοι στύλοι, referring to the apostles, of whom Peter and Paul are especially named.

ἴνα ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, αὐτοὶ δὲ εἰς τὴν περιτομήν· “that we should go (or preach the gospel) among the Gentiles, and they among the circumcised.” A verb such as ἔλθωμεν or εὐαγγελισώμεθα is to be supplied in the first part, and a corresponding predicate for αὐτοί in the second part. On the omission of the verb after ἵνα, see Th. ἵνα II 4 c, and cf. Romans 4:16, 1 Corinthians 1:31, 2 Corinthians 8:13. The clause defines the content of the agreement implied in δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν … κοινωνίας. See BMT 217 (b) and cf. John 9:22. αὐτοί stands in antithesis to ἡμεῖς, and is thus slightly emphatic, but not properly intensive. See Butt. p. 107. The whole sentence of v. 9 marks the complete victory of the apostle on this memorable occasion, the significance of which lies not in that the apostles approved him, which of itself might signify dependence on them instead of the independence on which he has been insisting ever since his strong affirmation of it in 1:11, 12, but in that his view prevailed as against the opposition of the legalists and the timid compromise which the apostles themselves at first wished to follow.

Was the division of the field here described territorial or racial? Was it understood that Paul and Barnabas were to go to Gentile lands, and, though having it as their distinctive aim to reach the Gentiles, preach to all whom they found, while the other apostles took as their territory the Jewish home lands? Or were the Gentiles in any and every land or city assigned to Paul and Barnabas and the Jews in the same land and city to Peter, James, and John? The use of the terms ἔθνη and περιτομή, which designate the people rather than the territory, seems at first sight to indicate a personal, or rather racial, division. And no doubt it was this in a sense. The basis on which it rested was a difference between Jews and Gentiles as peoples, not between the lands in which they lived. Unquestionably, too, the mission of Paul and Barnabas was chiefly a mission to and for the Gentiles, and that of the others to and for the Jews. Yet on the other hand it must be observed that Paul has used not a simple dative or πρός with the accusative, but εἰς, and that, despite some apparent or even a few real exceptions to the general rule, the distinction between these constructions severally, whether we assume here an omitted ἔλθωμεν, εὐαγγελισώμεθα, or κηρύσσωμεν, is with a good degree of consistency maintained throughout N. T. The dative after verbs such as εὐαγγ. and κηρύς. (the rare cases after verbs of motion need not come into account here) is a dative of indirect object denoting the persons addressed. πρός with words denoting persons individually or collectively denotes personal approach or address; εἰς with names of places means “into” or “to”; with personal designations “among” (i. e., to and among), never being used with singular personal nouns (save in such special idioms as εἰς ἑαυτὸν ελθεῖν), but only with plurals or collectives. The use of the phrase εἰς τὰ ἔθνη rather than τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, therefore favours the conclusion that the division, though on a basis of preponderant nationality, was nevertheless territorial rather than racial. This conclusion is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that twice in this epistle (1:16, 2:2) Paul has spoken unambiguously of the Gentiles as those among (ἐν) whom he preached the gospel, and that he has nowhere in this epistle or elsewhere used the preposition εἰς after εὐαγγελίζομαι or κηρύσσω to express the thought “to preach to” (on 1 Thessalonians 2:9, the only possible exception, see below). The whole evidence, therefore, clearly indicates that the meaning of the agreement was that Paul and Barnabas were to preach the gospel in Gentile lands, the other apostles in Jewish lands. On the question whether the division of territory involved a difference in the content of the message, see on v. 7.

For instances of the dative after verbs of speaking, see 4:13, 1 Corinthians 3:1, 1 Corinthians 3:15:1, 1 Corinthians 3:2, 2 Corinthians 11:7, Romans 1:15, Romans 3:19, Romans 7:1, Acts 8:5, Acts 10:42. The dative is the most frequent construction with εὐαγγελίζομαι. For πρός with the accusative (occurring only Revelation 10:7 after εὐαγγελίζομαι, never after κηρύσσω, frequently after πορεύομαι and esp. ἔρχομαι), see 1:17ff. 1 Thessalonians 2:18, 2 Corinthians 1:15, 2 Corinthians 1:16, Romans 1:10, Romans 1:13, Romans 1:15:22, Romans 1:23, Romans 1:29, Romans 1:32, Matthew 10:6, Luke 16:30, Luke 18:16, John 14:12, John 14:28. For εἰς with personal nouns, see 1 Peter 1:25 (only instance after εὐαγγ. when the noun is personal, but cf. 2 Corinthians 10:16) Mark 1:39, Mark 13:10, Luke 24:47, 1 Thessalonians 2:9 (after κηρύσσω) Matthew 15:24, Luke 11:49, Acts 22:21, Acts 26:17 (after ἀποστέλλω and ἐξαποστέλλω) John 9:39, John 21:23, Acts 20:29 (after ἔρχομαι, ἐξέρχ. and εἰσέρχ.) John 7:35, Acts 18:6 (after πορεύομαι). The usage of ἐν after κηρύσσω (chap. 2:2, Acts 9:20, 2 Corinthians 1:19, Colossians 1:23, 1 Timothy 3:16), together with the use of distinctly local terms after εἰς (Mark 1:39, Luke 4:44), leaves no room for doubt that εἰς after κηρύσσω means “among” rather than “unto.” On 1 Thessalonians 2:9, see Bornemann ad loc. and on Mark 13:10, Luke 24:47, see WM p. 267. Similar reasoning based on the use of the dative after εὐαγγελίζομαι (chap. 4:13, 1 Corinthians 15:1, 1 Corinthians 15:2, 2 Corinthians 11:7, Romans 1:15) and the employment of the phrase εὐαγγελίζομαι ἐν in this epistle (1:16) and of εὐαγγ. εἰς (2 Corinthians 10:16; on 1 Peter 1:25, see WM p. 267) leads to a similar conclusion respecting εἰς after this verb. Concerning εἰς after verbs like πορεύομαι, etc., John 7:35, μὴ εἰς τὴν διασπορὰν τῶν Ἑλλήνων μέλλει πορεύεσθαι καὶ διδάσκειν τοὺς Ἑλληνας, is particularly instructive since the persons to be addressed are expressly distinguished from those among (εἰς) whom Jesus is supposed to be going. If in Acts 18:6 εἰς certainly verges towards the meaning “unto” (denoting address rather than location), yet the total evidence leaves no room for doubt that εἰς uniformly, or all but uniformly, retains its local sense after all the verbs here under consideration.

10. μόνον τῶν πτωχῶν ἵνα μνημονεύωμεν, “provided only that we should remember the poor.” ἐθέλησαν or some similar verb might be supplied before this clause. See GMT 332, Butt. p. 241. But it is better in the absence of a verb to make the clause co-ordinate in construction with the preceding ἵνα clause, ἵνα…περιτομήν, and dependent on the idea of agreement implied in δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν. On this understanding the clause is not a request added to the agreement, but a part of the agreement itself. μόνον limits the whole clause and indicates that it contains the only qualification of the agreement already stated in general terms. On the use of μόνον, introducing a qualification of a preceding statement or of its apparent implications, see 1:23, 5:13, and esp. 1 Corinthians 7:39. To the general agreement that the field be divided between them, each group maintaining entire independence in its own territory, there is added as the only qualification of this independence and separateness the specification that the apostles to the Gentiles shall continue to remember the poor, i. e., manifestly the poor among the Christians on the other side of the dividing line (cf. Sief. ad loc.). The tense of μνημονεύωμεν, denoting continued action (BMT 96), indicates either that the course of action referred to is one which having already been begun is to be continued, or that there is distinctly in mind a practice (not a single instance) of it in the future. The former as the more common implication of a present tense in the dependent moods is somewhat more probable.

ὃ καὶ ἐσπούδασα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. “which very thing I have also taken pains to do.” On the strengthening of ὅ by αὐτό, see Butt. p. 109. The verb σπουδάζω in N. T. signifies not simply “to be willing,” nor, on the other hand, “to do with eagerness,” but “to make diligent effort” to do a thing (1 Thessalonians 2:17 of unsuccessful effort; everywhere else in exhortations); cf. Jth. 13:1, 12, “to make haste” to do a thing. Apparently, therefore, it can not refer simply to the apostle’s state of mind, but either to a previous or subsequent activity on his part. Against the supposition that the reference is to an effort in which Paul and Barnabas had jointly taken part (cf. Acts 11:30) is the singular number of ἐσπούδασα. A reference to an effort on behalf of the poor at that very time in progress is impossible in view of the meaning and tense of ἐσπούδασα, to which also its singular number adds further force. This would have required an imperfect tense, and in all probability, since Barnabas was with Paul at the time, the plural number (notice the number of μνημονεύωμεν)—ἐσπουδάζομεν ποιεῖν or ἐποιοῦμεν. There is apparently a slight hint in the present tense of μνημονεύωμεν of a previous remembrance of the poor on the part of one or both of them (it would be overpressing the plural to say both of them), in ἐσπούδασα a reference to Paul’s subsequent diligence in fulfilling the stipulation then made.

Respecting the argument of the whole paragraph, it should be noticed that while the apostle’s objective point is precisely not to prove that he was in agreement with the Twelve, but independent of them, yet by the facts which he advances to prove his independence he at the same time excludes the interpretation which his judaistic opponents would have been glad to put upon his conduct, viz., that he was in disagreement with the Twelve, they right and he wrong, and shows that, though they at first disagreed with him as to what was expedient to do, in the end they cordially admitted that he was right.

f. Evidence of his independence of all human authority drawn from his conduct in resisting Peter at Antioch (2:11-14)

In this passage the apostle relates one of the most significant incidents of the whole series from the point of view of his independence of the apostles. Peter, coming down to Antioch evidently with no hostile intent or critical spirit, and probably arriving in Paul’s absence, is attracted by the spectacle of Jewish and Gentile Christians living together in harmony in one community, joins himself for the time to this community and, following the practice of the Jews of the church, eats with the Gentile members. Presently, however, there appeared at Antioch certain men who came from Jerusalem as the representatives of James. These men, doubtless contending that Peter’s conduct in eating with the Gentiles was not only not required by the Jerusalem agreement, but was in fact contrary to it, since it involved disregard of the law by Jewish Christians, brought such pressure to bear upon Peter that he gradually discontinued his social fellowship with the Gentile Christians. So influential was this change in Peter’s practice that all the Jewish members of the church ceased to eat with their Gentile fellow-Christians, and as a result of this even Barnabas, who at Jerusalem had with Paul championed the freedom of the Gentiles, also followed Peter’s example. Thus the church was divided, socially at least, into two, and by this fact pressure was brought upon the Gentiles to take up the observance of the Jewish law of foods, since so only could the unity of the church be restored. At this point Paul, perhaps returning from an absence from Antioch, for it is difficult to suppose that matters would have reached this pass while he was present, or possibly delaying action so long as the question pertained to the conduct of the Jews only, and interfering only when it became also a question of the subjection of the Gentiles to the Jewish law—at this point, at any rate, Paul boldly rebuked Peter, claiming that Peter’s own previous conduct showed that he recognised that the law was not binding even upon Jewish Christians, and that it was therefore unjustifiable and hypocritical for him, by refusing to eat with the Gentiles, in effect to endeavour to bring them under the law. By this incident a new phase of the question discussed at Jerusalem was brought to the front, viz.: whether the Jewish Christian was also released from the obligation to keep the law, as well as the Gentile; and, by the inclusion of foods as well as circumcision among the matters brought into controversy, the question of the obligation of statutes in general was raised. The essentially contradictory character of the compromise reached at Jerusalem having also in this way been brought to light, Paul, so far from recognising the authority of Peter as the representative of the Jerusalem apostles to dictate his course of action, resisted him openly, and following out the logic not of that to which he had consented at Jerusalem, viz., the continuance of legal practices by the Jewish Christians, but of that for which he had contended, viz., the freedom of the Gentiles from obligation to conform to the statutes of the law, boldly claimed that even Jewish Christians were not under law, and must not obey its statutes when such obedience involved compulsion of the Gentiles to do the same. In no way could he more effectively have affirmed his independence as a Christian apostle of all human authority.

11 And when Cephas came to Antioch I resisted him to the face, because he stood condemned. 12For before certain came from James he was eating with the Gentiles. But when they came he gradually drew back and separated himself, fearing the circumcised. 13And there joined him in the hypocrisy the rest of the Jews also, so that even Barnabas was carried along with their hypocrisy. 14But when I saw that they were not pursuing a straightforward course in relation to the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas in the presence of everybody, If thou, though a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles and not after that of the Jews, how is it that thou dost constrain the Gentiles to live after the Jewish manner?

11.Ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν Κηφᾶς εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν, κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ ἀντέστην, ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν· “And when Cephas came to Antioch, I resisted him to the face, because he stood condemned.” The antithesis between the right hands of fellowship (v. 9) and Paul’s resistance of Peter at Antioch suggests the translation of δέ by “but.” But the paragraph is simply continuative of the argument begun in 1:11, and extending to and through this paragraph. By one more event in which he came into contact with the Jerusalem leaders he enforces his argument that he had never admitted their authority over him, but had acted with the consciousness of having independent guidance for his conduct.

The Antioch here referred to is unquestionably not the Pisidian Antioch, but the more famous Syrian city, which is regularly spoken of simply as Antioch, without further title to designate it. See Acts 11:19 et freq. Cf. Acts 13:14. This temporal clause evidently denotes the time of the fact about to be stated, only in a general way, not as if it occurred immediately upon Peter’s arrival; for the following verses show that in fact a considerable series of events must have elapsed before Paul took his stand against Peter. Concerning the time of the whole incident, see Introd. pp. 1 f.

The phrase κατὰ πρόσωπον conveys in itself no implication of hostility, but only of “face to face” encounter (Acts 25:16, 2 Corinthians 10:1). ἀντέστην reflects the fact that to Paul Peter seemed to have made the initiative aggression. For while the verb is used both of passive resistance (lit. “to stand against”) and active counter opposition (cf. Acts 13:8, 2 Timothy 3:8), yet it usually or invariably implies an initiative attack in some sense from the other side. This was furnished in the present instance by the conduct of Peter, which though not necessarily so in intention was in effect an attack on the position which Paul was maintaining at Antioch.

Of the various senses in which the verb καταγινώσκω is used by classical writers, two only can be considered here: (a) “to accuse,” (b) “to condemn.” Of these the latter is evidently much more appropriate in a clause in which Paul gives the reason for resisting Peter. The participle is predicative, and best taken as forming with ἦν a pluperfect of existing state (BMT 90, 91, 430; Galatians 4:3, Matthew 9:36, Matthew 26:43, Mark 1:6, Luke 1:7). It comes to practically the same thing to take κατεγνωσμένος as having the force of an adjective meaning “guilty” (Sief. cites Herodian, 5, 15:1, ἐλέγχειν ἐπειρᾶτο εἰκότως κατεγνωσμένην, Luc. De salt. 952; Clem. Hom. 17:13; with which compare also, as illustrating the adjectival use of participles in N. T., Acts 8:7, Galatians 1:22, Ephesians 2:12, Ephesians 4:8, Colossians 1:21; BMT 429). A phrase of agency denoting by whom he had been condemned is not in any case necessary, nor is it necessary definitely to supply it in thought. Probably Paul’s thought is that Peter’s own action condemned him. Notice the following clause introduced by γάρ. The perfect is used with similar implication in Romans 14:23, John 3:18; Jos. Bell. 2.135 (8:6), cited by Ltft. To supply “by the Gentile Christians in Antioch” is to add to the text what is neither suggested by the context nor appropriate to it. For since the purpose of the apostle in narrating this event is still to show his own independence of the other apostles, a condemnation of Peter’s action by the Gentile Christians in Antioch is an irrelevant detail, and especially so as the reason for Paul’s action in rebuking Peter.

12. πρὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἐλθεῖν τινὰς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν συνήσθιεν. “For before certain came from James he was eating with the Gentiles.” Not this clause alone but the whole sentence (v. 12) gives the reason why Peter stood condemned, and so the proof (γάρ) of κατεγνωσμένος. ἐθνῶν refers, of course, chiefly or exclusively to the Gentile Christians, as in Romans 15:16, Romans 16:4, and in v. 14 below, and συνήσθιεν, without doubt, to sharing with them in their ordinary meals, as in Luke 15:2, Acts 11:3. The imperfect tense implies that he did this, not on a single occasion, but repeatedly or habitually. The significance of the act lay in the fact that he thereby exposed himself to the liability of eating food forbidden by the O. T. law of clean and unclean foods (Lev. chap. 11), and thus in effect declared it not binding upon him.* The question thus brought to the front was, it should be clearly observed, quite distinct from that one which was the centre of discussion at Jerusalem. There it was the obligation of the Gentile Christian to observe the law, and particularly in the matter of circumcision; here it involves the obligation of the Jewish Christian to keep the law, and particularly in the matter of food. By his action in eating with Gentile Christians, whose freedom from the law had been expressly granted at Jerusalem so far as concerned circumcision, and who had doubtless exercised a like freedom in respect to foods, Peter went beyond anything which the action at Jerusalem directly called for, and in effect declared the Jew also, as well as the Gentile, to be free from the law. It does not indeed follow that he would have been prepared to apply the principle consistently to other prescriptions of the law, and to affirm, e. g., that the Jewish Christian need not circumcise his children. Nevertheless, the broad question whether any statute of the law was binding upon Gentile or Jew was now brought out into clear light, and on this question Peter by his conduct took a position which was of great significance.

Yet it can scarcely have been Peter’s conduct that first raised the question. The custom of Jewish Christians eating with Gentiles he no doubt found in existence when he came to Antioch and fell in with it because it appealed to him as right, although contrary to his previous practice. It is wholly improbable probable that not finding it in existence he himself suggested it, or that if he had already been in the habit of eating with Gentiles in Judea, he would have been deterred from continuing to do so in Antioch by the arrival of the messengers from James. The Antioch practice was clearly an expression of the “freedom in Christ Jesus” which Paul advocated, but in all probability a new expression, developed since the conference at Jerusalem (vv. 1-10). It was probably only after that event, in which the full Christianity of the Gentile Christians was recognised even at Jerusalem, that the Jewish Christians at Antioch gained courage to break over their scruples as Jews, and eat with their Gentile brothers in the church. Nor is there any special reason to think that Paul would have pressed the matter at the beginning. Concerning, as it did, not the freedom of the Gentiles, but the adherence of the Jews to their own ancestral custom enforced by O. T. statute, in consistency with his principles (1 Corinthians 7:14ff.) and the course he pursued at Jerusalem, where he stood for the freedom of the Gentiles but assumed apparently without demurrer that the Jews would continue to observe the law, it would probably seem to him not a matter to be pressed, but left to the gradual enlightenment of the Jewish Christians themselves. It is difficult to see, moreover, how, if the Jewish Christians in Antioch had before the conference at Jerusalem already begun to disregard the Jewish law of foods, this should not have been even more a burning question at Jerusalem than the circumcision of the Gentiles. Certainly it would have been more difficult for the legalistic party to yield in the former than in the latter matter. Probability, therefore, points to the time between Paul’s return to Antioch and Peter’s arrival there as that in which the Jewish Christians at Antioch began to eat with their Gentile brethren.

If this is correct it furnishes, moreover, a natural explanation of the visit to Antioch both of Peter and of the representatives of James. If news of this new departure at Antioch had come to Jerusalem it might easily seem to Peter that inasmuch as it affected not simply the Gentiles, but also the Jewish Christians, it concerned him as the apostle of the latter to know what was going on. Especially would this be the case if there was any uncertainty in his mind as to whether the division of the field agreed to at Jerusalem assigned to him the Jews, or Jewish lands. See on 2:9. Even if he had come expecting to disapprove what he found, it would be by no means uncharacteristic of him that, captivated with the picture of Christian unity which he saw, he should, instead of reproving, have himself adopted the new custom. And if in turn news of this state of affairs, including Peter’s unexpected conduct, reached Jerusalem, this would furnish natural occasion for the visit of the representatives of James; for to James as well as to the more extreme legalists such conduct might seem not only to violate the Jerusalem agreement, but to create a most serious obstacle to the development of the Christian faith among the Jews.

And this in turn makes clear the important fact that the situation at Antioch was not the result of repudiation of the Jerusalem agreement by any of the parties to it, but was simply the coming to the surface of the contradictory convictions which were only imperfectly harmonised in the compromise in which the Jerusalem conference issued. A new aspect of the question which underlay the discussion at Jerusalem had now come to the front and raised a question concerning which precisely opposite decisions might easily seem to different persons to be involved in the Jerusalem decision. The brethren at Antioch might naturally seem to themselves to be only following out what was logically involved in the Jerusalem decision, when they found in the recognition of uncircumcised Gentile believers as brethren the warrant for full fellowship with them on equal terms, and, in the virtual declaration of the non-essentiality of circumcision, ground for the inference that the O. T. statutes were no longer binding, and ought not to be observed to the detriment of the unity of the Christian community. The Jerusalem brethren, on the other hand, might with equal sincerity maintain that they had never expressed or intimated the belief that the Jews could disregard the statutes of the law, and that the tacit understanding of the Jerusalem decision was that these statutes should be regarded as still in force for the Jews, whatever concessions were made in respect to the Gentiles. It was this derivation of contrary conclusions from the Jerusalem compromise and Peter’s wavering between the two interpretations that created the Antioch situation.

Whether ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου limits τινάς or ἐλθεῖν it is impossible to determine with certainty. The fact that the subject of an infinitive somewhat more frequently precedes it than follows it (see Votaw, Inf. in Bib. Gr. p. 58; cf. Matthew 6:8, Luke 22:15; contra Luke 2:21, Galatians 3:23) slightly favours explaining the position of τινάς as due to the desire to bring it into connection with ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου. Yet the rarity of any limitation of an indefinite pronoun by any phrase except a partitive one is against this construction. In either case the mention of the personal name, James, the same, of course, who is named in v. 12 and in 1:19, implies that the persons spoken of were sent by him or in some sense represented him. That they did not belong to those whom in v. 4 Paul calls “false brethren” is probable not only from the fact that Paul does not so describe them, but designates them as representing James, who was of the mediating party, but also from the fact, brought out above, that these messengers of James to Antioch probably contended not for obedience to the Jewish law by Gentile Christians, but for the keeping of the Jerusalem compact as they not unnaturally interpreted it.

ὅτε δὲ ἦλθον, ὑπέστελλεν καὶ ἀφώριζεν ἑαυτόν, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς. “But when they came, he gradually drew back and separated himself, fearing the circumcised.” The verb ὑποστέλλω, used, especially by Polybius, of the drawing back of troops in order to place them under shelter, itself suggests a retreat from motives of caution; ἑαυτόν is the object of both verbs. The imperfect tense is very expressive, indicating that Peter took this step not at once, immediately on the arrival of the men from James, but gradually, under the pressure, as the next phrase implies, of their criticism. The force of the tense can hardly be otherwise expressed than by the word “gradually.” For a possible parallel instance of the use of the tense, see Acts 18:5. The circumcised from fear of whom Peter reversed his course of action are manifestly those Jewish Christians who came from James. That Peter should have been to such an extent under their domination illustrates both his own instability and the extent to which the legalistic party had developed and acquired influence in the Jerusalem church and Jewish Christianity generally. In view of this statement it is by no means incredible that at that later time referred to in Acts 21:20 such a situation as is there described should have developed. Cf. on 1:24.

Ἠλθεν (understood by Origen (1:386) to refer to James, ἐλθόντος Ἰακώβου) though supported by אBD*FG 39, 442, and the old Latin must be either a primitive error or a Western corruption. See WH. Introd. p. 224, and App. p. 121. The reading ἦλθον is supported by ACDb et cEHKLP, the great body of later manuscripts and the ancient versions with the exception of the old Latin.

Περιτομή is probably not used here as above, by metonymy for “the circumcised”—observe the presence of the article there and its omission here—but in its proper sense. The preposition expresses source, i. e., not of existence but of standing and character (cf. Th. ἐκ, II 7, though the characterisation of the use is not quite broad enough), and the phrase means simply “the circumcised,” “the Jews.” This rather than “converts from Judaism” (Ltft.) seems to be the regular sense of this phrase, found also in Romans 4:12, Colossians 4:11, Acts 10:45, Acts 11:2. Cf. the expression ὁ ἐκ πίστεως, chap. 3:7, 9, Romans 3:26, Romans 3:4:16; ὁ ἐκ νόμου, Romans 4:13; see also Galatians 3:10.

13. καὶ συνυπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Ἰουδαῖοι, ὥστε καὶ Βαρνάβας συναπήχθη αὐτῶν τῇ ὑποκρίσει· “And there joined him in the hypocrisy the rest of the Jews also, so that even Barnabas was carried along with their hypocrisy.” Hypocrisy, consisting essentially in the concealment of one’s real character, feelings, etc., under the guise of conduct implying something different (ὑποκρίνεσθαι* is “to answer from under,” i. e., from under a mask as the actor did, playing a part; cf. Luke 20:20), usually takes the form of concealing wrong feelings, character, etc., under the pretence of better ones. In the present case, however, the knowledge, judgment, and feelings which were concealed were worse only from the point of view of the Jews of whom Peter and those who joined with him were afraid. From Paul’s point of view it was their better knowledge which they cloaked under a mask of worse, the usual type of hypocrisy which proceeds from fear. By the characterisation of this conduct as hypocrisy Paul implies that there had been no real change of conviction on the part of Peter and the rest, but only conduct which belied their real convictions. “The rest of the Jews” are manifestly the other Jewish Christians in Antioch, from which it is evident that it was not Peter only who had eaten with the Gentile Christians but the Jewish Christians generally. That even Barnabas, who shared with Paul the apostleship to the Gentiles, yielded to the pressure exerted by the brethren from Jerusalem shows again how strong was the influence exerted by the latter.

Καί (after αὐτῷ) is the reading of אACDFGHKLP al. pler. d g Syr. (psh. harcl.) Arm. Aeth. Victorin. Ambrst. Hier. Or. It is omitted by B f Vg. Boh. Goth. Or. (Sout.). Neither external nor internal evidence is decisive; but its omission from the small number of authorities which do not contain it, either from pure inadvertence or from a feeling that it was superfluous, seems somewhat more probable than its addition to the great body of authorities.

Τῇ ὑποκρίσει may be either a dative of accompaniment—“swept along with their hypocrisy”—dependent on the σύν in composition (cf. Ephesians 5:11, Php 4:14, Romans 12:16 et freq.) or perhaps, a little more probably, a dative of agent, “by their hypocrisy,” “with them” being implied in σύν. On the use of the verb συναπάγω, found also in Xen. and Lxx, cf. esp. 2 Peter 3:17.

14. ἀλλʼ ὅτε εἶδον ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθοποδοῦσιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, “But when I saw that they were not pursuing a straightforward course in relation to the truth of the gospel.” The natural implication of this sentence and indeed of the preceding narrative is that all the events thus far related, the coming of the emissaries of James, the retreat of Peter from his first position, the like action of the rest of the Jewish Christians and even of Barnabas, took place before Paul himself took a position of open opposition to Peter. Had Paul, then, been in Antioch all this time, either holding his peace while the whole Jewish element in the church took a position which he judged to be wrong, or unable, without open opposition to Peter, to stem the tide, and reluctant to resort to this? The latter alternative is the more probable, if he was actually present. But the most probable explanation of the facts, neither directly supported nor opposed by anything in the passage itself, is that Paul was absent during the early part of Peter’s stay in Antioch.

It is indeed possible to suppose that Paul’s activity in the matter was due not to his arrival in Antioch but to a new perception (note the word εἶδον) of the significance of the question at issue. Possibly he himself had not, till this controversy cleared the air, seen how far the principles of the gospel that he preached must carry him in his antilegalism, had offered no active opposition to Peter’s attempt to bring the Jewish Christians under the law, and only when the movement began to spread to the Gentile Christians (see v. 14 fin.) saw clearly that the only position consistent with the gospel was that if the law was not binding upon the Gentile, neither could it be really so upon the Jew, and that when obedience to it by Gentile or Jew became an obstacle in the way of the gospel, then both Jew and Gentile must cease to obey its statutes. But on this hypothesis Paul himself was involved only less deeply than Peter in the latter’s confusion of thought and it is therefore hardly likely that he would have spoken in the words of sharp condemnation of Peter which he employs in v. 11 and in this verse.

The verb ὀρθοποδέω, used only here (and in later eccl. writers where its use may be traced to this passage, Ltft.), means “to make a straight path” rather than “to walk erect.” Cf.. ὸρθόποδες βαίνοντες, Nicander, Al. 419; and Sophocles, Greek Lexicon of Rom. and Byz. Period. Cf. Paul’s frequent use of περιπατέω, “to walk,” as a figure for moral conduct, chap. 5:16, Romans 6:4, Romans 8:4, etc. The present word is apparently not simply a general ethical term for doing right, but, as the context implies, denotes straightforward, unwavering, and sincere conduct in contrast with the pursuing of a crooked, wavering, and more or less insincere course, such as Paul has just attributed to Peter and those. who followed him. The present tense describes the fact from the point of view of Paul’s original perception of it—“they are not acting straightforwardly.” It is not, however, a historical present (Sief.) but the present of the direct form retained in indirect discourse even after a past tense (BMT 341 [b]). The preposition πρός probably means “towards,” “in relation to” (chap. 6:10, 2 Corinthians 1:12, Colossians 4:5), and the phrase πρός … εὐαγγ· constitutes a definitive limitation of ὀρθοποδοῦσιν, yielding the sense “pursue a straight course in relation to the truth of the gospel,” “to deal honestly and consistently with it, not juggling, or warping, or misrepresenting it.” πρός may indeed mean “in conformity with” (Luke 12:47, 2 Corinthians 5:10, Ephesians 3:4; so Th. Ltft. Ell. Sief.), and the phrase constitute an epexegesis of ὀρθοποδοῦσιν, yielding the sense “pursuing a straightforward (righteous) course, viz., one in accordance with the truth of the gospel.” But the fact that Paul regularly employs κατά with περιπατέω in the sense “in conformity to” (2 Corinthians 10:2, 2 Corinthians 10:3, Romans 14:15 etc.) is against this latter view, while the former is more in accordance with the context, which refers not so much to conformity to the truth of the gospel as to an attitude (of straightforwardness or crookedness) towards it. The interpretation of πρός in the sense of (motion) towards, making the truth of the gospel the goal of their action, involves a sense possible to πρός, but out of harmony with the context. The phrase, “the truth of the gospel,” is doubtless used here in the same sense as in v. 5, q. v.

εἶπον τῷ Κηφᾷ ἔμπροσθεν πάντων “I said to Cephas in the presence of everybody.” The omission of the article before πάντων makes the statement very general, not simply before those who have just been mentioned (τῶν πάντων) but when all the members of the church were present. Cf. 1 Corinthians 11:18, 1 Corinthians 14:23, and esp. 1 Timothy 5:20.

How much of what follows was actually uttered on this occasion it is impossible to say with certainty. Only the first sentence (v. 14b) contains unmistakable evidence of having been addressed to Peter, and the absence of any direct address in the remainder of the chapter makes it unlikely that through the whole of it Paul is still quoting what he said to Peter. Yet on the other hand it is improbable that he intends to limit his report of his words on that occasion to a single sentence. He passes imperceptibly from the report of his former words into argument on the theme itself, and the line between the two can not be detected.

Εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων ἐθνικῶς καὶ οὐχὶ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις Ἰουδαΐζειν; “If thou, though a Jew, livest after the manner of the Gentiles, and not after that of the Jews, how is it that thou dost constrain the Gentiles to live after the Jewish manner?” The terms ἐθνικῶς and Ἰουδαϊκῶς manifestly refer to the living according to Gentile and Jewish customs respectively, especially in the matter of foods. The conditional clause evidently refers, as is often the case with a simple present supposition, to an admitted fact. (BMT 244.) It is an overpressing of the present tense to maintain that it must refer to an act at that very time in progress, which is plainly excluded by the preceding narrative. Grammatically it is doubtless to be taken not as a present for an imperfect, but as a general present, describing a habit or mental attitude which, being illustrated by a recent act, may itself be assumed to be still in force (cf. Mark 2:7, Matthew 12:26 ff. Acts 22:7, Acts 22:8, Acts 22:23:3, Acts 22:4, Psalm 89:42, Psalm 89:43). The use of it implies that Peter had not really in principle abandoned the Gentile way of life, though temporarily from fear returning to the Jewish way of living. In English we should probably say in such a case, “If you can live,” or “If your convictions permit you to live.” Over against this recent practice Paul forcibly sets forth Peter’s inconsistency in compelling the Gentiles to follow the Jewish mode of life. The words ἀναγκάζεις Ἰουδαΐζειν are of crucial importance for the understanding of Paul’s position. They show what he regarded as the significance if not the deliberate intent of Peter’s conduct in refusing longer to eat with the Gentile Christians. Under the circumstances this amounted not simply to maintaining the validity of the Jewish law for Jewish Christians, but involved the forcing of Jewish practices upon the Gentile Christians. By his refusal any longer to eat with them and by the adoption under his influence of the same course on the part of the Jewish members of the Antioch church, he left to the Gentiles no choice but either to conform to the Jewish law of foods, or suffer a line of division to be drawn through the church. It was this element of coercion brought to bear on the Gentile Christians that made the matter one of direct concern to Paul. Against efforts to maintain the observance of the Jewish law on the part of Jewish Christians, he would doubtless have had nothing to say so long as they were confined to Jewish communities, concerned the Jews only, and did not affect the Gentiles. Had Peter, when he came to Antioch, chosen from the first to abstain from eating with the Gentiles on the ground that his relation to the Jewish Christians made it inexpedient, Paul would probably have made no objection. But when Peter, having first associated freely with the Gentiles, afterwards under pressure from the men that came from James, drew back, carrying all the other Jewish Christians with him, and forcing the Gentile Christians to choose between subjection to the Jewish law and the disruption of their church, this conduct involved an interference with the freedom of the Gentiles which was of most vital concern to Paul as the apostle of the Gentiles and defender of their freedom. That he interpreted the creation of such a situation as a forcing of the Gentile Christians to judaise, ignoring the possibility of escape from this by creating a division of the church, is itself of significance as showing how important to him was the maintenance of the unity of the church as against any division into Jewish and Gentile wings, and confirms the interpretation given above to μή πως … ἔδραμον (v. 2), and of εἰς τὰ ἔθνη (v. 9).

To the men who came from James it might have seemed an entirely feasible course that the Gentiles should constitute a separate—from their point of view a second-rank—Christian body. Has not a similar thing sometimes happened for other reasons on a modern mission field? They might have justified their course in the matter on the ground that they were not dictating to the Gentile Christians what course they should pursue; it did not concern them which horn of the dilemma the Gentiles chose, whether they elected to observe the Jewish law, or to constitute a separate body from the Jewish believers; they were concerning themselves only with the conduct of Jewish Christians. Even Peter might have assumed somewhat the same position, maintaining that he was dealing only with the question of the obligation of the Jews in the matter of foods; for the action of the Gentiles the latter were themselves responsible. To Paul the matter did not appear thus. To a territorial division of the field he had indeed consented at Jerusalem; but the creation of a division between the Jewish and Gentile Christians in the Gentile territory was evidently to him intolerable and out of the question.

Thus in the maintenance of the freedom of the Gentiles Paul was forced to take a position respecting the validity of the law for the Jews and concerning the unity of the Christian community in Gentile cities. The former at least was decidedly in advance of the position taken at Jerusalem, though logically involved in it. The Jerusalem decision was essentially a compromise between contradictories, the validity of the law, and its non-validity. The practical decision that the Jewish Christians should continue to observe the law and the Gentiles be free from it left it undecided which of these principles should take precedence over the other when they should come into that conflict which was sooner or later inevitable. The visit of Peter to Antioch and the subsequent arrival of the men from James precipitated the conflict. The Jerusalem brethren practically took the position that the first half of the Jerusalem agreement must be kept at any cost—the Jewish Christian must keep the law whatever the effect in respect to the Gentile Christians. Paul, carrying to its logical issue the principle which underlay the position which he had taken at Jerusalem, maintained that the Gentile Christians must not be forced to keep the law, even if to avoid such forcing the Jews themselves had to abandon the law. In Antioch much more clearly than at Jerusalem the issue was made between legalism and antilegalism. It was incidental to the event at Antioch, but from the point of view from which Paul introduced the matter here, a matter of primary importance that on this occasion more decisively than ever before he declared his independence of Jerusalem and her apostles.

The oldest and most trustworthy mss. are divided between οὐχ and οὐχί before Ἰουδαϊκῶς, the former being the reading of א*ACP 31, 33, the latter that of אcBD* and a few cursives. Db et c FGKsil L and most of the cursives read οὐκ. WH., adopting οὐκ with the margin: “οὐχ MSS.” apparently judge that οὐχ is a primitive error and οὐχί a derivative from it. But the grounds of this decision are not easy to discover. In view of Acts 2:7, Romans 3:27, οὐχί can not be judged to be impossible, and in view of its strong attestation is probably to be accepted as the original reading, of which οὐχ is a corruption arising from the accidental omission of one ι, or from the substitution of the more familiar for the less familiar form.

Πῶς used as here in the sense of “how is it that,” nearly equivalent to “why,” expressing surprise or displeasure, is of not uncommon occurrence both in classical and biblical writers. See Hom. Il. IV 26; Aesch. Pers. 798; Soph. El. 407; Matthew 22:12, John 4:9, Acts 2:8, etc.

Ἀναγκάζεις is undoubtedly conative, referring not to an accomplished result, but to the intention or tendency of Peter’s action. BMT 11.

Ἰουδαΐζειν, “to follow the Jewish way of life”; i. e., to observe the Jewish law, occurs in the same sense in the Lxx of Esther 8:17: καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν περιετέμνοντο καὶ ἰουδάΐζον διὰ τὸν φόβον τῶν Ἰοὐδαίων, in Ignat. Mag. 10:3: ἄτοπόν ἐστιν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν λαλεῖν καὶ ἰουδαΐζειν, and in Ev. Nic. 2; Plut. Song of Solomon 7:3. In the sense “to favour the Jews,” it is found in Jos. Bell. 2. 463 (18:2).

Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων, standing in opposition to ἐθνικῶς ζῆς, is concessive. The view of Ltft. that ὑπάρχων has reference to the original, natural state, being nearly equivalent to φύσει ὤν, is but slenderly supported by evidence. Certainly this is not the invariable force of ὑπάρχω in N. T. Cf. chap. 1:14, Acts 2:30, Acts 4:34, etc.

The term ἐθνικῶς occurs here only in Bib. Gr.; elsewhere only in later writers; cf. ἐθνικός, Matthew 5:47, Matthew 5:6:7, Matthew 5:18:17, Matthew 5:7. Ἰουδαϊκῶς occurs here only in Bib. Gr.; elsewhere in Jos. Bell. 6. 17 (1:3); cf. Ἰουδαϊκός, Titus 1:14, Titus 1:2 Mac. 13:21; Jos. Ant. 20. 258 (11:1). On the meaning of ζῇς, see note on ζάω, p. 134.

Galatians 2:1-14 AND ACTS, CHAPS. 10, 11, 15

The discussion of the bearing of the historical data furnished by this chapter on the interpretation and criticism of the narrative of Acts belongs rather to the interpretation of the latter book than to the present task. It may not be amiss, however, to point out certain results of the interpretation of Galatians which are of concern to the student of the life of Paul.

1. A visit to Jerusalem between that of Galatians 1:18 and that of 2:1 is rendered improbable by the constant implication of the apostle that Jerusalem was the headquarters of the Jewish church and its leaders, combined with his implied assertion that he is enumerating in succession the occasions of his contact with these leaders. See more fully on 2:1, and contra, Steinmann, Abfassungszeit des Galaterbriefes, pp. 127 ff.

2. That the visit to Jerusalem recorded in 2:1-10 was for the purpose of relieving the poor of Jerusalem is excluded by the aorist tense of ἐσπούδασα in 2:10. Cf. on v. 3.

3. The subject for the discussion of which Paul went to Jerusalem on the occasion recorded in 2:1 was specifically the necessity of circumcising Gentiles who believed in Christ and wished to join the Christian community. Cf. on vv. 2, 3, pp. 69, 75

4. The defenders of the freedom of the Gentiles were Paul and Barnabas, Titus being present also as a representative of the Gentile element in the church from which Paul and Barnabas came, presumably Antioch.

5. Paul presented the matter in Jerusalem both publicly, and privately before the eminent men of the church, James and Peter and John. Cf. on v. 2.

6. These latter at first, for the sake of certain extreme legalists who had recently come into the church, desired that Titus should be circumcised, but finally, convinced by Paul’s presentation of his gospel, yielded and gave their cordial assent to the prosecution of the Gentile mission according to the convictions of Paul, reserving to themselves the work among the Jews. Cf. on vv. 4, 7, 9.

7. Of any discussion at Jerusalem of the question of the obligation of the Gentile Christians in respect to foods there is no intimation in Paul’s narrative; and any decision restricting their liberty in this matter is decisively excluded by the statement that the only qualification of the entire and strict division of the field between himself and Peter, with implication that each was to follow his own conviction in his own field (since without this implied provision the question that was raised was still as much unsettled as ever), was that he and Barnabas should remember the poor of the Jewish Christian community. Cf. p. 99.

8. Paul’s account of the subsequent incident at Antioch also excludes the possibility of fellowship between Jews and Gentiles in the church having been agreed to at Jerusalem either on the basis of the Gentiles conforming to the Jewish law of foods or of the Jews disregarding their law. It is practically certain, therefore, that the practice of Jewish and Gentile Christians eating together in disregard of the Jewish law arose at Antioch, independent of any decision at Jerusalem, and probably subsequent to the Jerusalem conference. Cf. on v. 12, p. 105.

9. What the previous practice of the Gentile Christians at Antioch was is nowhere explicitly stated. It is highly improbable, however, that the silence of the Jerusalem conference with reference to food was due to the Gentiles having already adopted the Jewish law of food. Having refused to be circumcised, as the case of Titus shows they had, it is not likely that they conformed to the law in respect to food. But if not, the Jerusalem legalists, since they did not press the question of food in the Jerusalem conference, were less insistent on conformity to the law in respect to this matter than in reference to circumcision, or in respect to the former matter were unable to gain from the pillar apostles the measure of support that they obtained in respect to the latter. In either case it is evident that the Jerusalem church did not in the early days insist upon the Gentile Christians practising a thoroughgoing and consistent legalism.

10. The reference of Paul to the recent incoming of the extreme legalistic element into the Jerusalem church, and the evidence of 1:24. (q. v.) also indicate that the Jerusalem church was at first disposed to be hospitable towards the acceptance of Gentiles as Christians, and that the question was not an acute one until it became so through the incoming of the legalistic element. When this occurred the Jerusalem apostles endeavoured to conciliate the legalists, but by conviction at first, and at length on the practical question also, sided with Paul so far as concerned the freedom of the Gentiles. Cf. pp. 77, 97.

11. This being the case, though Paul does not specifically mention the coming of the legalists to Antioch, such a visit is the most probable explanation of his coming to Jerusalem.

12. The presence of these men in the private conference at Jerusalem is excluded by the very assertion that it was private, but there is nothing in it either to prove or disprove their presence in the public conference.

13. The impossibility of identifying the event which Paul narrates in 2:1-10 with the visit of Acts 11:27-30 (cf. 2 above), and the many similarities between Paul’s narrative in 2:1-10 and that of Act_15 make it necessary to suppose that these latter both refer to the same event; while the differences between the two accounts (cf. 7 and 8, above) compel the conclusion that the Acts narrative is inaccurate as to the result of the conference; it has perhaps introduced here an event that belongs somewhere else. From the argument of Galatians 1:11-21 (cf. 1 above) it also follows that Acts 11:27-30 is inaccurate.

14. From 8 and 10 it follows that before the events of Galatians 2:1-10 the apostles at Jerusalem might have looked with favour upon the conversion of Gentiles to Christianity without the full acceptance of the Jewish statutes, and might have interpreted such an experience as that narrated of Peter in Acts, chap. 10, symbolically, as indicating that Gentiles to whom God gave his Spirit could not be rejected by them; yet that it is wholly improbable, not to say impossible, that they should also have interpreted it as indicating the abolition of the Jewish law of foods for themselves. Cf. Acts 11:3, and p. 105 above.

g. Continuation and expansion of Paul’s address at Antioch, so stated as to be for the Galatians also an exposition of the gospel which he preached (2:15-21)

Having in the preceding verses, 11-14, narrated the incident of his controversy with Peter in Antioch, he passes in these to discuss the question on its merits, yet at first having still in mind the Antioch situation and mentally addressing Peter, if not quoting from what he said to him. When he leaves the Antioch situation behind, or whether he really does so at all, it is impossible to say. The argument is at first an appeal to the course which both he and Peter had followed in seeking justification in Christ, whereby they confessed the worthlessness of works of law. He then raises and answers the objection to his position that since his premises had led him and Peter to abandon and disregard the statutes of the law, they had made Christ a minister of sin, denying the premise of this objection that violation of law is sin, and affirming, on the contrary, that one becomes a transgressor by insisting upon obedience to the statutes of the law. This paradoxical statement he in turn sustains by the affirmation that he—speaking now emphatically of his own experience—through law died to law, i. e., by his experience under law was forced to

abandon it, in order to live to God. The legitimacy of his anti-legalistic course he still further defends by maintaining that in his death to law he became a sharer in the death of Christ, and that in his new life Christ lives in him, his own impulses and will being displaced by those of the Christ, and his life being sustained by faith upon the Son of God who loved him and gave himself for him. Finally he denies that in so doing he is making of no account the grace of God manifest in giving the law, pointing out that the premise of this objection that God intended law as the means of justification makes the death of Christ needless, a thing which no believer in Christ would affirm or admit.

15 We though Jews by nature and not sinners of Gentile origin, 16 yet knowing that a man is not justified by works of law, but only through faith in Christ Jesus, even we believed in Christ Jesus, that we might be justified by faith in Christ and not by works of law, because by works of law “shall no flesh be justified.” 17 But if through seeking to be justified in Christ, we ourselves also were found to be sinners, is Christ therefore a minister of sin? By no means. 18 For if the things that I broke down, these I build up again, I show myself a transgressor. 19 For I through law died to law that I might live to God. 20 I have been crucified with Christ, and it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me, and the life that I now live in the flesh, I live in faith, faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me. 21 I do not make of no effect the grace of God; for if righteousness is through law, Christ died needlessly.

15. Ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί, “We though Jews by nature and not sinners of Gentile origin.” The clause is concessive in relation to καὶ ἡμεῖς … ἐπιστεύσαμεν, etc., below: though possessing by virtue of birth all the advantages of knowledge of law (cf. Romans 3:1, Romans 3:2), and hence of opportunity of obeying it and achieving righteousness through it (cf. Php 3:5, Php 3:6), and not men born outside the law, and hence in the natural course of events possessing none of the advantages of it.

On the use of φύσει, cf. Romans 2:27, Romans 11:21-24. ἐξ ἐθνῶν (note the omission of the article) is qualitative in force. The phrase is one of origin, exactly antithetical in thought, though not perfectly so in form to φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι. ἁμαρτωλοί is evidently used not in its strict sense denoting persons guilty of sin, not perfectly righteous (see detached note on Ἁμαρτία p. 436), but, as often in N. T., “persons (from the point of view of the speaker or from that which he for the moment adopts) pre-eminently sinful,” “sinners above others,” “habitual transgressors of law.” So of the publicans and other Jews, who at least from the Pharisaic point of view were guilty of specific violation of the law, Luke 7:34, Luke 7:37, Luke 7:15:1, Luke 7:2, etc., and of the Gentiles, like our word “heathen,” Mark 14:41, Luke 24:7; cf. 1 Mac. 1:34: καὶ ἔθηκαν ἐκεῖ ἔθνος ἁμαρτωλόν, ἄνδρας παρανόμους. Tob. 13:6: δεικνύω τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν μεγαλωσύνην αὐτοῦ ἔθνει ἁμαρτωλῶν.

16. εἰδότες δὲ ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου “yet knowing that a man is not justified by works of law.” In antithesis to the preceding concessive phrase this is causal, giving the reason for the ἐπιστεύσαμεν of the principal clause. To be justified, δικαιοῦσθαι, is to be accounted by God acceptable to him, to be approved of God, accepted as being such as God desires man to be. In the word δικαιόω we have one of those great words of the Pauline vocabulary, a right understanding of which is of the highest importance for the interpretation of this letter and of the Pauline theology. But an adequate conception of its meaning can hardly be conveyed in a phrase; still less can the definition of it be justified in a sentence. For a fuller discussion intended to set the word in its true historic light and to present the evidence which sustains the definition thus reached, see the detached note on Δίκαιος, Δικαιοσύνη, and Δικαιόω, p. 460, in particular under VI, N. T. usage, C. 2 (b), p. 473. ἄνθρωπος is used in its wholly indefinite sense, as equivalent to τὶς. Cf. Romans 3:28, 1 Corinthians 4:1, 1 Corinthians 11:28.

We meet here for the first time in this letter the phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, which in this letter and in the epistle to the Romans plays so important a part in the apostle’s discussion of the basis of acceptance with God. Like δικαιόω, the phrase calls for an extended historical investigation, for which see detached note on Νόμος, p. 443. νόμου is here evidently used qualitatively, and in its legalistic sense, denoting divine law viewed as a purely legalistic system made up of statutes, on the basis of obedience or disobedience to which men are approved or condemned as a matter of debt without grace. This is divine law as the legalist defined it. In the apostle’s thought it stands for a reality only in that it constitutes a single element of the divine law detached from all other elements and aspects of divine revelation; by such detachment it misrepresents the will of God and his real attitude towards men. By ἔργα νόμου Paul means deeds of obedience to formal statutes done in the legalistic spirit, with the expectation of thereby meriting and securing divine approval and award, such obedience, in other words, as the legalists rendered to the law of the O. T. as expanded and interpreted by them. Though νόμος in this sense had no existence as representing the basis of justification in the divine government, yet ἔργα νόμου had a very real existence in the thought and practice of men who conceived of the divine law after this fashion. The preposition ἐξ properly denotes source, in this case the source of justification. Since, however, justification is an act of God, while ἔργα νόμου are deeds of men, the preposition in effect marks its object as a conditioning cause, whose inadequacy for the justification of men the apostle says he and Peter already knew. The translation of this phrase here and constantly in RV. by “the works of the law,” retained also in ARV, and in general the ignoring of the qualitative use of νόμος and other like terms, is a serious defect of these translations. Cf. Slaten, Qualitative Nouns in the Pauline Epistles, pp. 39 f.

ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, “but only through faith in Christ Jesus.” ἐὰν μή is properly exceptive, not adversative (cf. on 1:19), but it may introduce an exception to the preceding statement taken as a whole or to the principal part of it—in this case to οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου or to οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος alone. The latter alternative is clearly to be chosen here, since the former would yield the thought that a man can be justified by works of law if this be accompanied by faith, a thought never expressed by the apostle and wholly at variance with his doctrine as unambiguously expressed in several passages. See, e.g., the latter part of this verse and 3:10-14, where faith and works of law are set in sharp antithesis with one another. But since the word “except” in English is always understood to introduce an exception to the whole of what precedes, it is necessary to resort to the paraphrastic translation “but only.”

In πίστις, as in δικαιόω and νόμος, we have a word of central importance in the vocabulary of Paul. It signifies an acceptance of that which accredits itself as true, and a corresponding trust in a person which dominates the life and conduct. Its personal object is God, or especially Christ as the revelation of God. For fuller discussion, see detached note on Πίστις and Πιστεύω, p. 475, esp. V B. II 2 (e), p. 482. The following clause by its relation to the present clause evidently defines both the specific nature of the faith here referred to and the relation of Christ Jesus to it. Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ is therefore to be taken as an objective genitive, expressing substantially the same relation to πίστις which is expressed after the verb by εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν.

On the view of Haussleiter, Der Glaube Jesu Christi u. der christliche Glaube, Leipzig, 1891, that the genitive in such cases is subjective, the phrase denoting the faith which Christ exercised, see the brief note in S. and H. on Romans 3:22. The evidence that πίστις like ἐλπίς and ἀγάπη may take an objective genitive is too clear to be questioned (cf. Mark 11:22, Acts 3:16, Colossians 2:12, 2 Thessalonians 2:13). This once established, the context in the present case (see esp. the phrase εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν) is decisive for its acceptance here; and the meaning here in turn practically decides the meaning of the phrase throughout this epistle. See 2:20, 3:22.

The preposition διά, properly denoting channel and then means, here marks its object as the means through which one secures justification, and so, in effect, the conditioning cause, that in man by virtue of which he is justified by God. To draw any sharp distinction between διά as here used and ἐκ in ἐξ ἔργων νόμου above or in ἐκ πίστεως below is unjustifiable refinement, not legitimate exegesis.

After διὰ πίστεως אCDFGKLP al. pler. It. Vg. al. read Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, on the other hand, is the reading of AB 33, some mss. of Vg. Victorin. Aug. An examination of all the occurrences of the title Χριστός, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, or Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς in this epistle indicates a preference of the scribes for the form Χρ. or Χρ. Ἰης. after ἐν, but elsewhere for Ἰης. Χρ. rather than Χρ. Ἰης.; thus in 1:1, 12, 3:1, 22, 6:14, 18 Ἰης. Χρ. occurs (not after ἐν) without variant or with unimportant variation. In 1:22, 2:4, 17, 3:26, 28, 5:6 ἐν Χριστῷ or ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ occurs without important variation. Cf. also 6:15, where ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ is doubtless an addition to the original text, but attested by a large number of authorities without variation in the form of the name. In 3:22, where the correct text is undoubtedly Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, L reads ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. On the other hand, there are exceptions: in the present passage, 2:16a, after διὰ πίστεως there is, as shown above, good authority for both Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ and Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; in 2:16b, after εἰς most authorities read Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, but B 322, 429, Syr. (psh. harcl.) Boh. Aeth., etc., read Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, which Tdf. adopts and WH. prefer; in 5:24 τοῦ χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ is doubtless the original reading, but many authorities omit Ἰησοῦ; in 3:14 authorities are divided between ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ and ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. Only in 4:14 has Χρ. Ιη. not after ἐν been allowed to stand without variation; in 6:12 only B 31 are cited for Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, all others reading τοῦ Χριστοῦ. The evidence of the other Pauline epistles points in the same direction. ἐν Χριστῷ and ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ occur often, with frequent variations in the mss. between the two forms, but in no Greek ms. of these epistles has the form ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ been noted. In 2 Thessalonians 1:1 occurs the form ἐν … κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. Some authorities omit κυρίῳ and transpose to Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. In Php 3:14 to ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ some Western authorities add κυρίῳ after ἐν and then transpose to Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ. See also Romans 14:14, Php 2:19 where numerous authorities convert ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ, into ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. In other words, while this evidence shows that it was the apostle’s usual habit to write Χριστῷ or Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ after ἐν and to prefer the form Ἰης. Χρ. rather than Χρ. Ἰης. in other positions, yet it also shows (a) that he allowed himself a certain liberty in the matter, and (b) that the tendency of the scribes was (as was natural) to conform his text to his usual habit. The evidence therefore tends to confirm the general estimate of the testimony of AB and points to the conclusion that in such cases as the present passage (2:16a and b) 3:14 (q. v.) 5:24, it is the apostle who has departed from his usual habit; most of the scribes have conformed the text to it.

καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐπιστεύσαμεν, ἵνα δικαιωθῶμεν ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, “even we believed in Christ Jesus, that we might be justified by faith in Christ and not by works of law.” On the significance of the individual words, the qualitative force of the anarthrous nouns and the force of the genitive after πίστεως, see comment on the former part of the verse. καί, throwing its emphasis on ἡμεῖς, itself emphatic by the very fact of being expressed, especially after having already been expressed at the beginning of the sentence, serves to recall ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι of v. 15. ἐπιστεύσαμεν εἰς expresses in its fullest and most definite form the act of Christian faith, the committal of one’s self to Christ on the basis of the acceptance of the message concerning him. See the detached note on Πίστις and Πιστεύω, pp. 475-485, esp. V A. 2, p. 480.

The emphasis of ἵνα … νόμου, which expresses the purpose of ἐπιστεύσαμεν, is evidently upon the verb, not upon its limitations; the latter ἐκ πίστεως, etc., are in effect a re-assertion of the condition on which alone justification is possible. For a somewhat similar instance of emphasis upon one element of a clause, see Romans 6:17. ἐκ πίστεως differs from διὰ πίστεως in the former clause rather in the form than in the substance of the thought expressed, διά denoting the means by which, ἐκ that in consequence of which, one is justified. Cf. Th. ἐκ II 6, and for examples indicating the practical equivalence of the two expressions, see (for διά) chap. 3:26, Romans 3:22, Romans 3:25, Ephesians 2:8, Ephesians 2:3:12, Ephesians 2:17; (for ἐκ) chap. 3:7, 8, 9, Romans 1:17, Romans 1:3:26, Romans 1:4:16, Romans 1:5:1, Romans 1:9:30, Romans 1:32; and especially Romans 3:30, where, as here, the two prepositions occur in adjacent clauses.

On the reasons for preferring the reading, εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, see on Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ above.

ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου “οὐ δικαιωθησεται πᾶσα σάρξ.” “because by works of law shall no flesh be justified.” This clause, added at the end of a verse which has already twice expressed in effect the same thought, is evidently intended to confirm what has been said by the authority of scripture. The words οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ are from Psalm 143:2, following substantially the Lxx (which itself renders the Hebrew exactly) except that ἐνώπιόν σου, “before thee,” is omitted and πᾶσα σάρξ substituted for πᾶς ζῶν of the Lxx. The word σάρξ, here used by metonymy for a materially conditioned being, is practically equivalent to ἄνθρωπος. See detached note on Πνεῦμα and Σάρξ, p. 486, esp. p. 492. The words ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, which are essential to the apostle’s purpose, are not in the psalm. There is, however, a basis for them in the preceding line, “Enter not into judgment with thy servant,” which gives to the words that Paul has quoted the sense, “no man can be justified if judged on a basis of merit, all grace and mercy on God’s part being excluded.” The words added are therefore a correct interpretative gloss. Indeed, the teaching of the apostle on this point is a re-exposition in clearer form of a doctrine already taught by the Hebrew prophets.

17. εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ “But if through seeking to be justified in Christ.” The most frequent use of this oft-recurring Pauline phrase ἐν Χριστῷ is that by which, representing Christ as the sphere within which the Christian lives, it expresses the intimate fellowship of the believer with Christ. See Th. ἐν, I 6 b. Cf. Frame on 1 Thessalonians 1:1 and literature there referred to, esp. Deissmann, Die neutestamentliche Formel “In Christo Jesu.” But this can be adopted here only by assuming that by an ellipsis of some such words as διὰ τὸ εἶναι the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ really stands for “by virtue of being in Christ.” For this reason and because ἐν with δικαιόω usually has its causal and basal sense (see Th. ἐν I 6 c) it is best to give it the latter force here. Cf. for this use of ἐν 3:11: ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται. Romans 3:24, διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Romans 5:9, δικαιωθέντες νῦν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ. Acts 13:39: ἀπὸ πάντων ὧν οὐκ ἠδυνήθητε ἐν νόμῳ Μωυσέως δικαιωθῆναι ἐν τούτῳ πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιοῦται. Thus interpreted the expression ἐν Χριστῷ is in a sense the complement of διὰ πίστεως or ἐκ πίστεως of the preceding v., the former expressing that on which justification rests, that which renders it possible, the latter the subjective conditioning cause.

εὐρέθημεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτωλοί, “we ourselves also were found to be sinners.” The emphatic pronoun αὐτοί, indicating that the apostle has definite persons or a definite class in mind, is most naturally understood to refer to Paul and Peter, and indicates that Paul is still maintaining the point of view of his address to Peter. The addition of καί in connection with αὐτοί and ἁμαρτωλοί carries the thought back to the expression οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἀμαρτωλοί in v.15 and indicates that ἁμαρτωλοί is to be taken here in the sense suggested by that verse, “men outside of the law,” “violators of the law,” having reference to the disregard of the statutes of the law, especially those concerning clean and unclean meats, which statutes Paul, and for a time Peter also, had violated, and which Paul maintained ought not under the circumstances existing at Antioch to be kept. That they had become sinners by seeking to be justified in Christ, Paul would admit in the sense that they had become violators of law, but deny what the judaisers would affirm, that this was equivalent to saying that they had become actual sinners, wrongdoers, violators of God’s will. The supposed case, ζητοῦντες…ἀμαρτωλοί, Paul probably takes from the mouth of an actual or supposed objector, and accepts it as a correct statement of the situation in a sense of the words which he recognises as current. For confirmation of this interpretation, see on μὴ γένοιτο below.

The passive force of εὐρέθημεν “were discovered” [by some one] can not be pressed. Not only is it true in general that many passives have in later Greek a middle or intransitive force (Butt. p. 52), so that εὑρέθημεν might easily mean, “we found ourselves,” but it is clear from N. T. examples that εὐρέθην in particular had the sense “prove to be,” “turn out to be,” almost “to become,” without special thought of the discovery of the fact. See 1 Corinthians 4:2, 2 Corinthians 5:3, Acts 5:39, etc. Yet it is also possible that the apostle has in mind, and is in a measure quoting here the language of his opponents, who, referring to his violation of the statutes of the law, would put their charge in the form: “You who profess to be seeking to be justified in Christ are found sinners.” Cf. Romans 7:10, 1 Corinthians 15:15, 2 Corinthians 11:12, 1 Peter 1:7.

ἄρα Χριστὸς ἁμαρτίας διάκονος; “is Christ therefore a minister of sin?” The sentence is to be taken as a question rather than an assertion because of the following μὴ γένοιτο, which in Paul regularly follows a rhetorical question.* ἁμαρτίας διάκονος is not ἁμαρτίας δοῦλος, “one who is in bondage to sin” (cf. John 8:34), but “one who ministers to sin,” one who furthers the interests of sin, promotes, encourages it. Cf. Romans 15:8, 2 Corinthians 3:6, 2 Corinthians 11:15. Whatever the meaning of ἁμαρτωλοί above (on this, as will appear below, interpreters disagree), the noun ἁμαρτία is doubtless to be taken here in its proper sense, “conduct which is not in accordance with true righteousness.” The noun ἁμαρτία is apparently never used in the formal sense, violation of law, in N. T., and though in view of the use of ἁμαρτωλός the possibility of it could not be denied, yet the absence of any example of it is against it and the nature of the argument here even more decisively so. The conclusion which Paul by μὴ γένοιτο emphatically rejects manifestly pertains not to sin in any formal or Pharisaic sense, but to veritable guilty wrong-doing. The whole speciousness of the objection which Paul is answering turns on the seeming identity, the real diversity, of the conceptions of sin implied in ἁματωλοί and ἁμαρτίας respectively. See detached note on Ἀμαρτία, p. 436.

μὴ γένοιτο· “by no means,” lit. “let it not be.” This phrase used in N. T. almost exclusively by Paul (elsewhere in Luke 20:16 only) is uniformly employed by him to repel as abhorrent to him a suggested thought. When standing alone (it is otherwise only in 6:14) it invariably follows a rhetorical question and rejects the suggested thought as one which the previous premises, themselves accepted as true, do not justify; and usually (1 Corinthians 6:15 and possibly Romans 11:1 are the only exceptions), a conclusion which may be speciously but falsely deduced from his own previous statements. See chap. 3:21, Romans 3:4, Romans 3:6, Romans 3:6:2, Romans 3:15, Romans 3:7:7, Romans 3:13, Romans 3:9:14, Romans 3:11:11. These facts concerning Paul’s usage of this phrase are important. They not only show that the preceding words must, as stated above, be taken as a question, but make it practically certain that what μὴ γένοιτο denies is not the supposition εἰ … ἁμαρτωλοί and with it the conclusion based upon it, but the validity of the deduction of the conclusion from the premises. The apostle accepts the premises; denies that the conclusion follows. In other words, he admits that they became sinners, violators of law, by seeking to be justified in Christ, but denies that from this fact one can legitimately draw the conclusion which his opponents allege to follow and by which they seek to discredit his position, viz., that Christ is therefore a minister of sin.

Of this sentence as a whole there have been very many interpretations. It will be sufficient here to direct attention to a few. The differences between them may be most easily made clear by setting down the three propositions which are involved in the verse: (1) We are seeking to be justified in Christ. (2) We were found sinners. (3) Christ is a minister of sin. Proposition (1) Paul undoubtedly accepts; proposition (3) he undoubtedly denies. All interpretations agree that “sin” is used in proposition (3) in its strict and proper Pauline sense, veritable wrong-doing. The differences of interpretation turn mainly upon two questions: What is the sense of the word “sinners,” ἁμαρτωλοί, in prop. (2)? Is (2) admitted or denied?

According to the view of many commentators, both ancient and modern,* ἁμαρτωλοί is used in a sense corresponding to that of ἁμαρτίας in the next clause, “sinners” in the proper sense of the word, and μὴ γένοιτο denies both (2) and (3); it is tacitly assumed that they stand or fall together, as must indeed be the case if ἀμαρτωλοί and ἁμαρτίας correspond in meaning. This interpretation takes on two slightly different forms, according as εἰ … διάκονος is supposed to be an affirmation of an objector quoted by Paul, or a question put by Paul himself. In the former case the objector, a legalist Jewish Christian, tacitly assuming that violation of law is sin, reasons that by their abandonment of law in their effort to obtain justification in Christ the Jewish Christians have themselves become sinners and thus have made Christ a minister of sin, from the objector’s point of view a reductio ad absurdum which discredits the whole Pauline position. To this Paul replies denying that (by violating law) they have been found sinners, and denying therefore that there is any ground for affirming that they have made Christ a minister of sin. If on the other hand the sentence is a question, Paul himself asks whether in seeking to be justified in Christ (without law) they have become veritable sinners, and thus made Christ a minister of sin, and as before by μὴ γένοιτο denies that they have (by abandoning law) become sinners, and hence that there is any ground for saying that they have made Christ a minister of sin. In either case Paul uses ἁμαρτωλοί in the sense of real sinners, admits that premise and conclusion go together, and denying (on the unstated ground that abandonment of law is not sin) that they are found sinners, with it denies the conclusion. It is an objection to this interpretation in all of its forms that it disregards both the obvious force of μὴ γένοιτο in relation to the preceding sentence and the apostle’s regular usage of it. As Zahn well points out, the question which μὴ γένοιτο answers (that it is a question, see above on μὴ γένοιτο) is by its very terms not an inquiry whether the premises are true, but whether the alleged conclusion follows from the premise. The placing of εὑρέθημεν in the conditional clause along with the unquestionably admitted ζητοῦντες etc., implies that it is only Χριστὸς ἁμαρτίας διάκονος that is called in question. If εὑρέθημεν … ἁμαρτωλοί were also disputed the sentence ought to have been as follows: “Seeking to be justified in Christ, were we ourselves also found to be sinners, and is Christ accordingly a minister of sin?” This conclusion as to the meaning of the sentence is still further confirmed by the fact that by μὴ γένοιτο, as stated above, Paul regularly negatives a false conclusion from premises which he accepts.

Of the interpretations which, giving the necessary weight to the usage of μὴ γένοιτο, find in it a denial not of prop. (2) and a consequent denial of (3), but of the legitimacy of the deduction of the conclusion (prop. 3) from the premise (2) the correctness of which is thereby implied, the following types may be mentioned:

Wies., et al., understand ἀμαρτωλοί as meaning sinners in the strict sense, and make εὑρέθημεν…ἁμαρτωλοί refer to the sins which even the justified is found to commit. This view manifestly involves an idea remote from the context, and is generally regarded as incorrect by modern interpreters.

Several modern interpreters take ἁμαρτωλοί in the sense suggested by ἁμαρτωλοί in v. 15, sinners in that like the Gentiles they are outside of law, find in εὑρέθἡμεν … ἀμαρτωλοί, a consequence which Paul admits follows logically from the attempt to be justified in Christ, and in Χριστὸς ἀμαρτίας διάκονος an inference, the legitimacy of which Paul denies in μὴ γένοιτο. Thus it may be supposed that Paul has in mind an objector who alleges that, inasmuch as the apostle’s own reasoning is to the effect that to make faith in Christ the basis of justification involves for the Jew putting himself on the plane of the Gentile, therefore he makes Christ the minister of sin; to which Paul, in reply, admits that this is his reasoning so far as the relation of the believer to law is concerned, but denies that the conclusion that Christ is the minister of sin legitimately follows. So clearly Ltft., who states his view thus: “Seeing that in order to be justified in Christ it was necessary to abandon our old ground of legal righteousness and to become sinners (i. e., to put ourselves in the position of heathen), may it not be argued that Christ is thus made a minister of sin?” So also substantially Zahn, who definitely maintains that the being found sinners took place in the very fact of conversion, and that ζητοῦντες… χριστῷ is practically equivalent to πιστεύοντες; and Sief., who paraphrases thus: “In that we Christians, however, on our part sought to be justified not by works of the law but in Christ only, it is proved that we, just like the heathen, are sinners; this, in fact, follows from what was just said (v. 16). This being the case is not Christ, then, with whom confessed sinners can, repudiating the righteousness based on works of law, seek justification, a promoter of sin?” In favour of this general interpretation it is to be said that it recognises the significance of μὴ γένοιτο and of the structure of the sentence, takes ἁμαρτωλοί in a sense suggested by καὶ αὐτοί, explains the introduction of παραβάτης below, which is brought in when Paul leaves behind the ambiguity of ἁμαρτωλοί, and does not make the argument turn on remote and unsuggested premises. It may be doubted, however, whether it does not err in that it goes too far afield for its explanation of the word ἁμαρτωλοί, detaches the argument too much from the situation at Antioch as depicted in vv. 11-14, and finds the occasion for the apostle’s question in a supposed logical inference from the doctrine of justification in itself rather than in the actual and recent conduct of Peter and Paul. Whether these words were actually uttered in substance at Antioch or not, the Antioch incident furnishes their background. It is probable, therefore, that the question there at issue is still in mind, and that in εὑρέθημεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτωλοί he refers to himself and Peter, or possibly to the Jewish Christians who had associated themselves with his movement, and describes them as becoming, or as being discovered to be, violators of the Jewish law. The sentence thus takes on a definite and concrete meaning appropriate to the context.

But this interpretation again assumes two forms, according as one supposes Paul to be replying to an objection, or himself presenting to Peter’s mind an inference from his recent conduct in ceasing to eat with the Gentile Christians. In the former case the sentence means: “If, then, our seeking to be justified in Christ issued in our becoming like the Gentiles, violators of law as was the case at Antioch, and in that sense sinners, does it follow, as my critics allege, that Christ becomes a minister of sin?” In the latter case it means: “You will admit, Peter, that it was while seeking to be justified in Christ that we were led to become violators of law at Antioch; are you willing, then, to admit that Christ is a minister of sin, as would follow from what was implied in your conduct in refusing to eat with the Gentiles, viz.: that not to obey the statutes of the law is sin?” Either of these interpretations is possible. They are alike in that they connect the thought with the Antioch event and that, recognising the usage of μὴ γένοιτο, they make the sentence a question and μὴ γένοιτο a denial of the conclusion, not of the expressed premise, and base the denial on the rejection of the suppressed premise that violation of the statutes of law is (real) sin. But it is in favour of the form which finds in them an answer to an objection that εὑρέθημεν is more suggestive of the attitude of a critic than of an original statement of Paul (see above on εὐρεθ.), and especially that μὴ γένοιτο is more naturally understood as repudiating the conclusion and false reasoning of an objector, than as a comment of the apostle on his own argument addressed to Peter. To combine the two interpretations, as Bous. apparently attempts to do, is impossible, because in the one case it is the critic of Paul’s position who is supposed to allege that Paul’s view makes Christ a minister of sin, and in the other case it is Paul who points out to Peter that his recent conduct issues in this impossible conclusion.

18. εἰ γὰρ ἃ κατέλυσα ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω, “for if the things that I broke down, these I build up again, I show myself a transgressor.” By this statement the apostle sustains his μὴ γένοιτο, in which he denied the validity of the argument that by becoming a violator of law he had made Christ a minister of sin, the suppressed premise of which was that violation of law was sin. By ἃ κατέλυσα is obviously meant the statutes of the law which Paul had by his conduct declared to be invalid. The reasoning of this sentence is of the type e contrario. So far from its being the case that I commit sin by violating statutes of the law, it is, on the contrary, the fact that if I build up again those commands of the law which I broke down, I show myself therein a transgressor. This was precisely what Peter had done by his vacillating conduct; but Paul instead of saying either “thou” or “we,” tactfully applies the statement to himself. That he uses the form of conditional sentence expressive of simple supposition, not that of condition contrary to fact, is probably due to his really having in mind Peter’s conduct in building up the wall he had before broken down. The statement that not by disobeying but by obeying the statutes of the law he becomes a transgressor is, of course, obviously paradoxical and itself requires proof; this is furnished in v. 19.

On καταλύω and οἰκοδομῶ in their literal sense, cf. Mark 15:29, ὁ καταλύων τὸν ναὸν καὶ οἰκοδομῶν. But as applied to a law or the like, καταλύω means “to deprive of force,” “to abrogate” (cf. Matthew 5:17: μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας), and οἰκοδομῶ as the antithesis of καταλύω in this sense means to “give force to,” “to render or declare valid.”

The word παραβάτης is doubtless chosen instead of ἀμαρτωλός in order to get rid of the ambiguity of this latter term, which lay at the basis of the opponent’s fallacious reasoning. The παραβάτης is a violator of the law, not of the statutes, but of its real intent. To have added τοῦ νόμου would have been correct, but confusing as introducing a sense of νόμος quite contrary to that in which it occurs throughout the context. The apostle might naturally have precisely reversed this usage, employing παραβάτης for the technical violator of the statute, and ἁμαρτωλός for the real sinner, the man who was not acting according to God’s will, and had he been quite free in the matter it is not improbable that he would have done so. But the usage of his opponents, who employed ἀμαρτωλός rather than παραβάτης for the Gentiles and those who like them did not observe the requirements of the law, compelled him to use this as the ambiguous term, and to resort to παραβάτης when he wished a strictly moral and unambiguous term. It is noticeable, however, that in the only other passage in which he uses the latter word (Romans 2:25, Romans 2:27), it has substantially the same sense as here, designating not one who disregards the letter of the law, but one who is disobedient to its essential ethical spirit, and the passage gains in point and force by applying this forceful term to one who, obedient to the statutes, misses the real meaning of the law.

The verb συνιστάνω, late form of συνίστημι, lit. “to set together,” is in N. T. employed in its active tenses with the meanings “to prove,” and “to commend,” in the former case usually to prove by one’s action, to exhibit in one’s conduct. Thus in Romans 5:8: συνίστησιν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἔτι ἀμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανεν. See also 2 Corinthians 6:4, 2 Corinthians 6:11. There is therefore nothing in the force of the verb that requires the interpretation, “I prove that I was (in that former breaking down) a transgressor,” or that opposes the interpretation, “I show myself therein (i. e., in the present building up) a transgressor.” There are indications that the verb sometimes meant “to establish” (see Numbers 27:23, Numbers 27:2 Mac. 14:15, 3 Mac. 1:19, 2:26, though in no case with two accusatives); but this usage does not occur in N. T., and though appropriate to the present passage is not demanded by it.

On the paradox involved in the statement of this verse, see Romans 3:31, where the apostle maintains, and in chap. 4 endeavours to prove, that the principle of faith, rejecting law, is not hostile to law but consonant with it; Romans 8:1-4, where he declares in effect that the law is done away that the requirements of the law may be fulfilled; and Gal. chap. 5, where having in v. 1 insisted upon freedom from the law, he nevertheless in v. 14 distinctly implies the necessity of fulfilling the law.

19. ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, “for I through law died to law.” The use of the first person, which in the preceding verse was unemphatic because Paul was speaking of what would be equally true of any Christian, e. g., of Peter, and applied to himself only hypothetically, becomes now emphatic. Note the expressed ἐγώ, which together with the use of direct assertion indicates that the apostle is now speaking of his own personal experience. In the usage of Paul, “to die to” a thing is to cease to have any relation to it, so that it has no further claim upon or control over one. See Romans 6:2, Romans 6:10, Romans 6:11, Romans 6:7:6. That to which Paul here refers in νὀμου and νόμῳ is evidently law in some sense in which it has played a part in the preceding discussion, and most obviously divine law as a legalistic system, a body of statutes legalistically interpreted (see detached note on Νόμος, pp. 443-460, esp. V 2 (c), p. 457). Paul would certainly not say that he had died to law conceived of as consisting in the ethical principle of love (V 2 (d)), nor to law conceived of in the broad inclusive sense of the word (V 2 (b)). Law as a concrete historic fact without reference to the distinction between the legalistic and ethical interpretation would be a suitable meaning of διὰ νόμου, but could apply to νόμῳ only if we suppose that Paul thinks of dying to it not in every respect, but as respects subjection to its statutes. On the other hand, the legalistic meaning meets all the conditions of this verse and the context. It was on the basis of law in this sense that it was demanded that the Gentiles should be circumcised, and the Jewish Christians continue to obey the law of foods. It was this to which Paul refers in v. 16 in the phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. It was under this that he had lived in his Pharisaic days, and under which he had ceased to live (died to it), and to this he may well have referred as that through which he had been led to take this step.

How the necessity of abandoning law was made evident to him by law, Paul does not here state. But there is no more probable explanation of his language here than that he has in mind the experience under the law to the result of which he refers in v. 16 and which he describes at length in Rom., chap. 7. There he tells how the law—by ὁ νόμος he doubtless means the Mosaic law in its legalistic interpretation—had by his experience under it taught him his own inability to meet its spiritual requirements and its own inability to make him righteous, and thus led him finally to abandon it and to seek salvation in Christ. Cf. also Php 3:5-9.

The sentence does indeed become somewhat more forcible, especially as more directly suggesting that he has divine authority for his repudiation of law, if νόμος be supposed to refer to divine law in a general sense (qualitatively considered, as is shown by the omission of the article), but with a constant shifting of emphasis from one phase to another. We may then mentally supply νόμου in this general sense after παραβάτην and read: “But if I build up again the authority of those statutes of the law which I broke down, i. e., insist again upon the obligation to obey them, I become a transgressor of divine law (in its deepest meaning), for through my experience in seeking justification under it interpreted as a legalistic system, divine law itself taught me to abandon it, as a body of statutes to be obeyed.” But the very complexity of the thought thus yielded is an objection to this interpretation, and the simpler, more direct and self-consistent one is probably, therefore, to be preferred.

The interpretation of διὰ νόμου according to which it refers to the fact expressed by the words διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ in Romans 7:4: ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ, and which assumes a reference to the curse of the law which falling upon Christ is thereby exhausted, leaving the believer in Christ free, is far less probably correct than the one proposed above. διὰ νόμου is by no means obviously equivalent to διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ in Romans 7:4. The words are different and the connection is different. There Paul is stating the objective grounds for freedom from the law; here, as the emphatic ἐγώ implies, he is appealing to personal experience. Had his thought been what this interpretation supposes, it would certainly have been more natural that he should write, ἡμεῖς διὰ (τοῦ) νόμου (τῷ) νόμῳ ἐθανατώθημεν. Moreover, it is by no means clear that Paul conceived of the law as demanding and causing the death of Christ. In chap. 3:13 he expresses the thought that the law pronounces a curse on the sinner, from which Christ by his death frees us. But it is essential to the interpretation now under consideration that he should have thought of the law as bringing Christ to his death, and thereby ending its own dominion over men who are joined with Christ by faith—a thought which Paul has nowhere expressed. That the work of Christ should avail to avert the curse of the law from man, and to end the dominion of law, affords a basis for the statement that through Christ I died to law (cf. Romans 8:2) but not for “through law I died to law.” See Sief. for defence of this general view and criticism of other interpretations, and Zahn for a criticism of it.

ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω· “that I might live to God.” Cf. Romans 6:10, Romans 6:11, Romans 6:14:7, Romans 6:8, 2 Corinthians 5:15. This clause expressing the purpose of the apostle’s death to law is in effect also an argument in defence of it. It is implied that subjection to law in reality prevented the unreserved devotion of the life to God—this is one vice of legalism, that it comes between the soul and God, interposing law in place of God—and that it had to be abandoned if the life was really to be given to God. This is a most important element of Paul’s anti-legalism, showing the basis of his opposition to legalism in its failure religiously, as in Romans 7:7-25 he sets forth its ethical failure.

The dative θεῷ is, as in Romans 6:10, Romans 6:11, primarily a dative of relation in antithesis to the dative νόμῳ in the preceding clause—but while it results from the nature of the verb ἀποθνήτκω that a dative of relation after it implies separation, it results equally from the nature of the verb ζάω that the dative of relation with it involves, or at least suggests, the force of a dative of advantage, as is clearly the case also in 2 Corinthians 5:15. On the force of θεός without the article see p. 89.

The verb ζάω is used by the apostle Paul in four senses, which are, however, not always sharply distinguished: 1. “To be alive, to be a living being”: (a) of men in contrast with dying or with the dead: 1 Thessalonians 4:15, 1 Thessalonians 4:17, 1 Corinthians 7:39, 1 Corinthians 7:15:45, 2 Corinthians 1:3, 2 Corinthians 4:11, 2 Corinthians 5:15* 6:9, Romans 6:11 (?) 7:1, 2, 3, 12:1, 14:7, 8 Php 1:21, Php 1:22; cf. 1 Timothy 5:6, 2 Timothy 4:1; (b) of God, in contrast with lifeless idols: 1 Thessalonians 1:9, 2 Corinthians 3:3, 2 Corinthians 6:16, Romans 9:26, Romans 9:10:5, Romans 9:14:11; cf. 1 Timothy 3:15, 1 Timothy 3:4:10; (c) metaphorically, “to enjoy life,” “to live happily”: 1 Thessalonians 3:8, Romans 7:9 (?); “to have one’s living”: 1 Corinthians 9:14.

2. In an ethical or qualitative sense: “to live in a certain way” (usually ethically defined) with reference either to the source of vital power or to the direction of energy: chap. 2:14, 19, 20, 5:25, Romans 6:2, Romans 6:8:12, Romans 6:13, Colossians 2:20, Colossians 2:3:7; cf. 2 Timothy 3:12, Titus 2:12.

3. In quotations from O. T. in a soteriological sense: “to escape death,” the penalty of sin, “to attain the divine approval,” “to be justified”: chap. 3:11, Romans 1:17 (in quotation from Habakkuk 2:4); chap. 3:12, Romans 10:5 (quotation from Leviticus 18:5).

4. “To live after death,” “to possess eternal life”: 1 Thessalonians 5:10, 2 Corinthians 13:4, Romans 6:10, Romans 14:9.

All the instances in this chap. fall under 2 above; those in chap. 3 under 3.

20. Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι· “I have been crucified with Christ.” The thought of participation with Christ in the experiences of his redemptive work is a favourite one with Paul, and the metaphors by which he expresses it are sometimes quite complicated. Cf. Romans 6:4-8, Romans 8:17, Php 3:10, Colossians 2:12-14, Colossians 2:20, 3:Colossians 2:1-4. A literal interpretation of these expressions, as if the believer were in literal fact crucified with Christ, buried with him, raised with him, etc., is, of course, impossible. The thought which the apostle’s type of mind and enthusiastic joy in the thought of fellowship with Christ led him to express in this form involves in itself three elements, which with varying degrees of emphasis are present in his several expressions of it, viz.: the participation of the believer in the benefits of Christ’s experience, a spiritual fellowship with him in respect to these experiences, and the passing of the believer through a similar or analogous experience. The first element is distinctly expressed in 2 Corinthians 5:15 and Romans 4:24, Romans 4:25, and is probably in mind along with the third in Colossians 2:20, Colossians 2:3:1; cf. 2:14. The second is the predominant element in Php 3:10, and the third in Romans 8:17, while in Romans 6:5 both the second and the third are probably in mind. In the present instance the verb συνεσταύρωμαι indicates that the experience of Christ referred to is his death upon the cross, and the context implies that the experience of Paul here spoken of is his death to law. Whether this death to law is related to the death of Christ objectively by virtue of a participation of the believer in the effects of Christ’s death (cf. Romans 3:24, Romans 3:25) or subjectively by a spiritual fellowship of the believer with Christ in respect to his death (cf. Romans 6:10, Romans 6:11) is not decisively indicated. On the one side, Paul has elsewhere expressed the idea that the believer is free from law by virtue of the work, specifically the death, of Christ (chap. 3:13, Colossians 2:14, Ephesians 3:15, Ephesians 3:16; cf. Galatians 2:4, Galatians 5:1, Romans 10:4), and in Colossians 2:20 expressed this participation as a dying with Christ. On the other hand, while he has several times spoken of dying with Christ in the sense of entering into a spiritual fellowship with him in his death, he has nowhere clearly connected the freedom from the law with such fellowship.* Probably therefore he has here in mind rather the objective fact that the death of Christ brings to an end the reign of law (as in Romans 10:4, and esp. Colossians 2:14) than that the individual believer is freed from law by his spiritual fellowship with Christ in death. Yet such is the many-sidedness of the apostle’s thought that neither element can be decisively excluded. In either case the expression still further enforces the argument in defence of his death to law. It was brought about through law; it was necessary in order that I might live to God; it is demanded by the death of Christ on the cross, wherein he made us free from law, bringing it to an end, or by my fellowship with him in that death.

Ltft., interpreting συνεσταύρωμαι by the use of the same word in Romans 6:6 and by the use of the simple verb in Galatians 5:24, Galatians 6:14 refers it to a death to sin, the annihilation of old sins. Such a change in the application of a figure is by no means impossible in Paul (see the varied use of ἡμέρα in 1 Thessalonians 5:2-8). But a sudden veering off from the central subject of his thought—the point which it was essential that he should carry—to an irrelevant matter is not characteristic of the apostle, and is certainly not demanded here by the mere fact that he has in another context used similar phraseology in a sense required by that context, but not harmonious with this.

ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός· “and it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me.” The order of the Greek is very expressive even when reproduced in English: “and live no longer I, but liveth in me Christ.” The first δέ is not adversative but continuative, the sentence expressing another aspect of the same fact set forth in the preceding sentence. The translation of AV. and RV., “Yet I live, yet no longer I,” is wholly unwarranted; this meaning would have required ἀλλά before οὐκέτι. Cf. RV. mg. The second δέ is sub-adversative (Ell.), equivalent to the German “sondern,” introducing the positive correlative to a preceding negative, statement. In this sentence Paul is clearly speaking of spiritual fellowship with Christ (cf. on v. 19). Yet this is not a departure from the central thought of the whole passage. He has already said in v. 19 that the purpose of the dying to law was that he might devote himself directly to the service of God instead of to the keeping of commandments. He now adds that in so doing he gains a new power for the achievement of that purpose, thus further justifying his course. Saying that it is no longer “I” that live, he implies that under law it was the “I” that lived, and the emphatic ἐγώ is the same as in Romans 7:15-20. There, indeed, it stands in vv. 17, 20 in direct antithesis to the ἁμαρτία which is inherited from the past (cf. Romans 5:12), here over against the Christ who is the power for good in the life of one who, leaving law, turns to him in faith. But the ἐγώ is the same, the natural man having good impulses and willing the good which the law commands, but opposed by the inherited evil impulse and under law unable to do the good. On the significance of the expression ἐν ἐμοί, see Romans 8:9, Romans 8:11, 1 Corinthians 2:16, Colossians 1:27-29, Ephesians 3:16-19. It is, of course, the heavenly Christ of whom he speaks, who in religious experience is not distinguishable from the Spirit of God (cf. chap. 5:16, 18, 25). With this spiritual being Paul feels himself to be living in such intimate fellowship, by him his whole life is so controlled, that he conceives him to be resident in him, imparting to him impulse and power, transforming him morally and working through him for and upon other men. Cf. 4:19. Substantially the same fact of fellowship with Christ by which he becomes the controlling factor of the life is expressed, with a difference of form of thought rather than of essential conception of the nature of the relation, by the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ, which is more frequent in Paul than ἐν ἐμοί. Cf. 1:22, 3:26, 28, 5:4, and Frame on 1 Thessalonians 1:1, and references there given to modern literature.

ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ “and the life that I now live in the flesh, I live in faith.” The sentence is continuative and epexegetic of the preceding, explaining the life which, despite his preceding affirmation that he is no longer living, he obviously still lives, by declaring that it is not an independent life of his own, but a life of faith, of dependence on the Son of God. See below.

The relative ὅ is an accusative of content, which simply puts into substantive form the content of the verb ζῶ (Delbrück, Vergleichende Syntax, III 1, §179; Rob. p. 478). νῦν manifestly refers to the time subsequent to the change expressed in νόμῳ ἀπέθανον and the corresponding later phrases. ἐν σαρκί is therefore not an ethical characterisation of the life (as in Romans 8:7, Romans 8:8) but refers to the body as the outward sphere in which the life is lived, in contrast with the life itself and the spiritual force by which it was lived. By this contrast and the fact that σάρξ often has an ethical sense, the phrase takes on perhaps a slightly concessive force: “the life that I now live though in the flesh is in reality a life of faith.” On the use of σάρξ in general, see detached note on Πνεῦμα and Σάρξ, p. 492.

The words ἐν πίστει stand in emphatic contrast with those which they immediately follow, a contrast heightened by the use of the same preposition ἐν in a different sense, or rather with different implication. For, while in both cases ἐν denotes the sphere in which the life is lived, in ἐν σαρκί the sphere is physical and not determinative of the nature of the life, in ἐν πίστει it is moral and is determinative of the character of the life. πίστει without the article is, like σαρκί, qualitative in force, and though properly a noun of personal action, is here conceived of rather as an atmosphere in which one lives and by which one’s life is characterised. For other instances of this use of the preposition with nouns properly denoting activity or condition, see 1 Corinthians 4:21, 2 Corinthians 3:7 ff. Ephesians 4:15, Ephesians 5:2.

τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ “(faith) which is in the Son of God.” Having in the expression ἐν πίστει described faith qualitatively as the sphere of his new life, the apostle now hastens to identify that faith by the addition of the article τῇ and a genitive expressing the object of the faith. For other instances of a qualitative noun made definite by a subjoined article and limiting phrase, see W. XX 4 (WM. p. 174); Rad. p. 93; Gild.Syn. p. 283; Rob. p. 777; BMT 424; and cf. chap. 1:7, 3:21. On the objective genitive after πίστις, see on διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, v. 16. On the meaning of τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, see detached note on The Titles and Predicates of Jesus, V, p. 404. What particular phase of the meaning of this title as applied to Jesus is here in mind, or why it is chosen instead of Χριστός or Χριστός Ἰησοῦς, which have been used in this passage thus far, there is nothing in the context clearly to indicate. No theory is more probable than that here, as in 1:16, it is the Son of God as the revelation of God that he has in mind, and that this expression comes naturally to his lips in thinking of the love of Christ. See Romans 8:3, Romans 8:32; but notice also Romans 5:8, Romans 5:8:35, 39, and observe in the context of these passages the alternation of titles of Jesus while speaking of his love or the love of God, without apparent reason for the change.

τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ: so אACDb et cKL P, all the cursives, f Vg. Syr. (psh. harcl.), Boh. Sah. Arm. Eth. Goth. Clem., and other fathers. Ln. adopted the reading τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ attested by BD* FG d g. Despite its attestation by B, this is probably a Western corruption. The apostle never speaks of God expressly as the object of a Christian’s faith.

τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ· “who loved me and gave himself up for me.” Cf. the note on τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, chap. 1:4. Here as there, and even more clearly because of the use of the verb παραδίδωμι (cf. Romans 4:25, Romans 4:8:32, 1 Corinthians 11:23, Ephesians 5:2, Ephesians 5:25, esp. Ephesians 5:2) in place of the simple δίδωμι, the reference is to Christ’s voluntary surrender of himself to death. The use of μέ and ἐμοῦ rather than ἡμᾶς and ἡμῶν indicates the deep personal feeling with which the apostle writes. The whole expression, while suggesting the ground of faith and the aspect of Christ’s work with which faith has specially to do, is rather a spontaneous and grateful utterance of the apostle’s feeling called forth by the mention of the Son of God as the object of his faith than a phrase introduced with argumentative intent. On the meaning of ἀγαπάω, see on 5:14.

21. Οὐκ ἀθετῶ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ· “I do not make of no effect the grace of God.” This sentence, abruptly introduced without connective, is doubtless an answer to an objection which the apostle knows to have been urged or which he foresees may easily be urged against his doctrine. This objection, as is shown by the χάριν of this sentence and the reference to law in the next, is to the effect that he is making of no account the special grace of God to Israel in giving them the law (cf. Romans 3:31). Since χάρις is a favourite term of the apostle in reference to the gospel, it is not impossible that it was taken up by his critics and turned against him in some such statement as that by his doctrine of grace as against law he was really making of no account the grace of God to Israel. This criticism he answers by direct denial, which he sustains in the next sentence. It would be natural to expect him to turn the criticism upon his critics by intimating that it was they who rejected the grace of the gospel. But to have suggested this thought he must, it would seem, have used the emphatic ἐγώ.

On ἀθετῶ, “to set aside,” “to reject,” cf. Mark 7:9, 1 Thessalonians 4:3, Galatians 3:15; M. and M. Voc. s. v. On the meaning of χάρις, see on 1:6.

εἰ γὰρ διὰ νόμου δικαιοσύνη, ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν. “for if righteousness is through law, then Christ died needlessly.” On the use of the word δικαιοσύνη, see detached note, p. 460. It is doubtless to be taken here, chiefly at least, in its forensic sense (VI B. 2, p. 469), this rather than the ethical sense having been the subject of discussion from v. 15 on, and it being this also which the apostle a little more frequently associates with the death of Christ (chap. 3:13, 14, Romans 3:24-26, Romans 3:5:9, Romans 3:10; cf. note on chap. 1:4). διὰ νόμον is doubtless also to be taken, as throughout the passage, in its legalistic sense (see detached note on Νόμος V 2 (c), p. 457, and cf. on v. 19 above). δωρεάν means not “without result,” a meaning which it apparently never has, certainly not in N. T., nor “freely,” in the sense “gratuitously,” “without (giving or receiving) pay,” which, though a well-established meaning of the word (see Romans 3:24, and cf. also M. and M. Voc. s. v.), would be wholly inappropriate here, but “without cause,” “needlessly,” as in John 15:25. The protasis εἰ … δικαιοσύνη is in form a simple supposition, which is often used, as in chap. 1:9, Romans 5:10, when the context makes it clear that the condition is fulfilled, but also not infrequently, as here and in 3:18, where it is equally clear that in the opinion of the writer it is contrary to fact. See BMT 248, 249. The argument of the sentence is from a Christian point of view a reductio ad absurdum, and is adduced as proof of the preceding statement. If, as you affirm but I deny, men must obey the statutes of the law in order to achieve righteousness, then there was no need that Christ should die. Law in the legalistic sense, and the conception of righteousness as obtainable through it, was well established in the world. If this conception was correct, if righteousness could really be attained in this way, there was no need of a new revelation of God’s way of righteousness (see Romans 1:17, Romans 3:21); and the death of Christ, with its demonstration of divine righteousness (Romans 3:25 f.) and God’s love (Romans 5:7-10) and its redemption of men from the curse of the law (see chap. 3:13 and notes on it), was needless. That in the plan of God it came to pass (chap. 1:4, 4:4, Romans 8:32) is evidence that it was not needless, and this in turn proves that righteousness through law was not God’s plan for the world, and refutes the charge that denial of the validity of law to secure righteousness involves a setting aside of the grace of God.

Mey. and others understand χάριν to refer exclusively and directly to the grace of God manifest in the gospel and take οὐκ ἀθετῶ, etc., not as an answer to an objection but as an indirect condemnation of the course of Peter, the meaning being, I do not set aside the grace of God manifest in the death of Christ, as is virtually done by those who insist that righteousness is through law. The clause εἰ … δικαιοσύνη is then designed to prove, not, as above, that the rejection of righteousness by law does not involve a setting aside of the grace of God, but that insistence on righteousness by law does involve it. For to affirm that righteousness is through law is to say that God’s grace manifest in his death was useless. Such an interpretation of the argument, though not perhaps impossible, is open to two objections: first, that the form of expression, “I do not set aside,” etc., suggests a denial of something that is said or might be speciously said against Paul’s view, rather than a claim made by himself for his view or an objection to his opponent’s view; and, secondly, that it makes the εἰ γάρ sentence a proof of something only remotely implied in the preceding statement instead of taking it as directly related to what is expressed in the preceding sentence, viz., that Paul’s view does not involve a setting at nought of God’s grace.

Cyr. Cyril of Alexandria. † 444. See Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines. Edited by Wm. Smith and Henry Wace. 4 vols. London 1877-87.

L.&S. Liddell, H. G., and Scott, R., Greek English Lexicon. Seventh edition revised. New York, 1882.

W. Winer, G. B., Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms. Various editions and translations.

Wies. Wieseler, Karl, Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Galater. Göttingen, 1859.

Ell. Ellicott, Charles John, A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians. London, 1854. Various subsequent editions.

Ltft. Lightfoot, Joseph Barber, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians. London, 1865. 2d ed., revised, 1866. Various later editions.

Mey. Meyer, Heinrich August Wilhelm, Kritisch-exegetisches Handbuch über den Brief an die Galater. Göttingen, 1841, in Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, 1832-59. E. T., with bibliography, by Venables and Dickson. Edinburgh, 1873-85. Various later editions. See also under Sieffert, F. Galatien und seine ersten Christengemeinden, in Zeitschrift für nistorische Theologie., vol. XLI, 1871.

Sief. Sieffert, F. Galatien und seine ersten Christengemeinden, in Zeitschrift für nistorische Theologie., vol. XLI, 1871.

Bous. Bousset, Wilhelm, in Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments. Göttingen, 1907. 2te Aufl., 1908.

Grot. Grotius, Hugo (Huig van Groot), Annotationes in Novum Testamentum. Paris, 1644. See Sanday, Wm., and Headlam, A. C.. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Edinburgh and New York, 1895. , p. civ.

Seml. Semler, Johann Salomo, Paraphrasis Epistolæ ad Galatas, cum Prolegomenis, Notis, etc. Magdeburg, 1779.

D D. Codex Claromontanus. Sixth century. In National Library, Paris. Greek-Latin. Edited by Tischendorf, 1852.

F F. Codex Augiensis. Ninth century. In Trinity College, Cambridge. Greek-Latin. Edited by Scrivener, 1859. Closely related to Codex Bærnerianus. See Gregory, Textkritik des Neuen Testaments, vol. II, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 113 f.

G G. Codex Bærnerianus. Ninth century. In Royal Library, Dresden. Greek-Latin. Edited by Matthæi, 1791; photographic reproduction issued by the Hiersemann publishing house, Leipzig, 1909.

Mcion. Marcion. See Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines. Edited by Wm. Smith and Henry Wace. 4 vols. London 1877-87.

Iren. Irenæus. † 190. See Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines. Edited by Wm. Smith and Henry Wace. 4 vols. London 1877-87.

Ambrst. Ambrosiaster. Ca. 305 a.d. See Lightfoot, Joseph Barber, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians. London, 1865. 2d ed., revised, 1866. Various later editions., p. 232; Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines. Edited by Wm. Smith and Henry Wace. 4 vols. London 1877-87.

Chrys. Joannes Chrysostomus. † 407. See Lightfoot, Joseph Barber, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians. London, 1865. 2d ed., revised, 1866. Various later editions., p. 228.

B Burton, Ernest De Witt, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek. Third edition. Chicago, 1898.

Cf. Confer, compare.

Weizs. Weizsäcker, C., Das apostolische Zeitalter. Zweite Aufl. Freiburg, i. B. 1892. Das Neue Testament, übersetzt von C. Weizsäcker.

Lxx The Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint. Quotations are from the edition of H. B. Swete. 3 vols. Cambridge, 1887-94.

Frit. Fritzsche, Karl Friedrich August, Commentarius de nonnullis Epistolæ ad Galatas Locis. Rostock, 1833-4.

GMT Gildersleeve, Basil L., Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb. Revised and enlarged. Boston, 1889.

Kühner-Gerth Kühner, Raphael, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Dritte Auflage in neuer Bearbeitung, besorgt von Bernhard Gerth. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1898, 1904.

Th. Thayer, Joseph Henry, A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament. New York, 1886. Rev. edition, 1889.

Tert. Tertullian. † ca. 223. See Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines. Edited by Wm. Smith and Henry Wace. 4 vols. London 1877-87.

* Zahn, like Tert. before him, finds the yielding and the subjection to have been to the pillar apostles and in the fact of coming to Jerusalem to submit this question to the apostles there (not in the circumcision of Titus, which he maintains Paul denies to have taken place) yet supposes that it was not demanded by the apostles, but more probably by the Antioch church. See Com. pp. 93 f. A stranger distortion of the record it would be hard to imagine.

Butt. Buttmann, A., A Grammar of the New Testament Greek. E. T. by J. H. Thayer. Andover, 1873.

Rück. Rückert, Leopold Immanuel, Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Galater. Leipzig, 1833.

WH. Westcott, B. F., and Hort, F. J. A., The New Testament in the original Greek. London, 1881. Vol. I, Text; vol. II, Introduction and Appendix.

E. T. English translation.

Victorin. C. Marius Victorinus. Ca. 360 a.d. See Lightfoot, Joseph Barber, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians. London, 1865. 2d ed., revised, 1866. Various later editions., p. 231; Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines. Edited by Wm. Smith and Henry Wace. 4 vols. London 1877-87