When we argue deductively from the omniscience and omnipotence of God, human free-will seems to be obliterated. On the other hand, when we argue deductively from human free-will, the divine foreknowledge and power to determine action seem to be excluded. And yet both truths must be received without detriment to each other. We neither know strictly what God's omnipotence and omniscience are (according to a more exact use of language, we ought to say, perhaps, "perfect power and knowledge"--power and knowledge such as would belong to what we are incapable of conceiving, a perfect Being), nor do we know what human free-will is in itself. It is a necessary postulate if there is to be any synthesis of human life at all; for without it there can be no distinction between good and bad at all. But we do not really know more than that it is that hypothetical faculty in man by virtue of which he is a responsible agent.

To be conformed . . .--The final cause of the whole of this divine process is that the Christian may be conformed to the image of Christ--that he may be like him not merely in spirit, but also in that glorified body, which is to be the copy of the Redeemer's (Philippians 3:21), and so be a fit attendant upon Him in His Messianic kingdom.

Firstborn among many brethren.--The Messianic kingdom is here conceived of rather as a family. In this family Christ has the rights of primogeniture, but all Christians are His brethren; and the object of His mission and of the great scheme of salvation (in all its stages--foreknowledge, calling, justification, &c.) is to make men sufficiently like Him to be His brethren, and so to fill up the number of the Christian family. The word "firstborn" occurs in a similar connection in Colossians 1:15, "firstborn of every creature" (or rather, of all creation), and in Hebrews 1:6, "When he bringeth in the first-begotten (firstborn) into the world." It implies two things--(1) priority in point of time, or in other words the pre-existence of the Son as the Divine Word; and (2) supremacy or sovereignty as the Messiah. The Messianic use of the word is based upon Psalm 89:27, "Also I will make him my first-born, higher than the kings of the earth." . . .

(1) absolute, i.e. irrespective, with regard to its final result, of the condition of man's use of grace given; and, if so, whether

(2) arbitrary, i.e. irrespective of the Divine foreknowledge of what men would be, and themselves deserve. The Calvinistic view is that God from all eternity, of the mere good pleasure of his will, selected certain persons out of mankind to be the heirs of glory; the Arminian is that he foresaw from all eternity who would, in the exercise of their own free-will, respond to his purpose, and, in virtue of such foreknowledge, preordained them to glory. It is hardly necessary to consider whether there is any countenance given to the view that predestination ensures salvation, however a man may live; the obligation of actual holiness in Christians being (as we have seen) so strongly insisted on all along. If, then, the Calvinistic theory should appear to be supported, it must be with the proviso that predestination of necessity carries with it the grace of perseverance in good works, or at any rate a true conversion before the end, as well as final glory. Let us, in the first place, observe the way in which St. Paul introduces the subject, so as better to understand his drift. He has been speaking of the trials and imperfections of the present life, and urging his readers not to be discouraged by them, on the ground that, if they continue to "live after the Spirit," these things will by no means hinder, but rather further, the final issue. To strengthen this position he introduces the thought of God's eternal purpose; in effect thus: Your being in the state of grace in which you now feel yourselves to be, is due to God's eternal purpose to call you to this state, and thus in the end to save you. It is impossible that the circumstances in which he places you now, or any power whatever, should thwart God's eternal purpose. But it is not of necessity implied by anything that is actually said that the persons addressed might not themselves resist the Divine purpose. In fact, their own perseverance appears to be presupposed already, and they have been urged to it all along, as though their use of grace depended on themselves. Hence the apostle in this passage does not really touch the theoretic questions that have been raised by theologians, his purpose being simply the practical one of encouraging his readers to persevere and hope. We may now examine the successive expressions in the passage, and see what they imply. In ver. 28 the context shows πάντα to have especial reference to external circumstances of trial, and not at all to men's own sins. Calvin, commenting on it, quotes St. Augustine as saying, "Peceata quoque sua, ordinante Dei providentia, sanctis ideo non nocere ut potius corum saluti inserviant;" but while he assents to this proposition, he denies, with truth, that any such meaning is intended here. It may be observed, in passing, that Augustine's proposition, though it sounds strange, may, in a certain sense, be accepted as true: "We must continually err in order to be humble; our frailty and sins are the tools that God uses" (General Gordon's 'Letters to his Sister,' p. 371). Further, τοῖς κλητοῖς cannot be understood as limiting τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν Θεὸν, as though among those that love God only some are "the called;" nor can κατὰ πρόθεσιν be understood as limiting κλητοὶ, as though even of the called not all are called with the purpose of saving them. Only a preconceived idea could surely have suggested such an interpretation of the verse. In ver. 29 (γιγνώσκειν bearing the sense of "to determine," as well as of "to know") προέγνω may possibly mean "predetermined" rather than "foreknew." Elsewhere in the New Testament, when used of men, it has the latter sense (Acts 26:5; 2 Peter 3:17). When used of God, it may, as here, have either meaning (cf. Romans 11:2; 1 Peter 1:20); but in the text last referred to the first meaning seems more probable. So also of πρόγνωσις in Acts 2:23 and 1 Peter 1:2. The distinction would not be of much importance but for the fact that the sense of "foreknew" has been pressed in support of the Arminian view; viz. that Divine predestination was consequent on the Divine foreknowledge of what men would be. It would not, indeed, really prove this view, since it might only mean that God knew beforehand the objects of his intended mercy. Calvin, though translating praecognovit, strongly rebuts the Arminian inference, saying, "Insulsi colligunt illi, quos dixi, Deum non alios elegisse nisi quos sua gratia dignos fore praevidit." Again, "Sequitur notitiam hanc a bene placito pendere, quia Deus nihil extra seipsum praeseivit quos voluit adoptando, sod tantum signavit quos eligere volebat.' Προώρισε (which might, perhaps, be better rendered preordained, which is its proper meaning, so as to avoid the necessary idea of irresistible destiny which is commonly associated with the word predestinate) must be taken, not absolutely, but in connection with συμμόρφους. That the elect should in the first place be "conformed to the image of Christ" is all that is, here at least, denoted as preordained by God. The expression, συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος, etc., may be understood, from the preceding context, to refer, primarily at least, to participation in Christ's sufferings (cf. Hebrews 2:10). Coming to ver. 30, we find the following sequence:

(1) eternal foreknowledge (or eternal purpose), . . .

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