Διὸ—well then (as in 12:12, 28)— ἐπὶ τὸν τελειότητα φερώμεθα (6:1). It is a moral duty to grow up, and the duty involves an effort. The τελειότης in question is the mature mental grasp of the truth about Christ as ἀρχιερεύς, a truth which the writer is disappointed that his friends still find it difficult to understand. However, διὰ τὸν χρόνον they ought to understand it. He has every reason to expect an effort from them, and therefore he follows up his remonstrance with a word of encouragement. Instead of the sharp, severe tone of vv. 11 f., he now speaks more hopefully. The connexion is not easy. We expect “however” instead of “well then.” But the connexion is not made more easy by regarding 6:1f. as a resolve of the writer: “since you are so immature, I am going on myself to develop the higher teaching.” It would be senseless for a teacher to take this line, and it is not facilitated by reading φερόμεθα. The plural is not the literary plural as in 5:11. The writer wishes to carry his readers along with him. “If you want anyone to instruct you over again in rudimentary Christianity, I am not the man; I propose to carry you forward into a higher course of lessons. Come, let us advance, you and I together.” The underlying thought, which explains the transition, is revealed in the next paragraph (vv. 4 f.), where the writer practically tells his readers that they must either advance or lose their present position of faith,1 in which latter case there is no second chance for them. In spite of his unqualified censure in 5:12, he shows, in 6:9f., that they are really capable of doing what he summons them to try in 6:1f., i.e. to think out the full significance of Jesus in relation to faith and forgiveness. Only thus, he argues, can quicken the faint pulse of your religious life. “Religion is something different from mere strenuous thinking on the great religious questions. Yet it still remains true that faith and knowledge are inseparable, and that both grow stronger as they react on one another. More often than we know, the failure of religion, as a moral power, is due to no other cause than intellectual sloth” (E. F. Scott, p. 44). After the parenthesis of 5:13, 14, the writer resumes the thought with which he started in 5:11a “you must make an effort to enter into this larger appreciation of what Christ means.” Ἄφεντες … φερώμεθα is a phrase illustrated by Eurip. Androm. 392-393, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεὶς " πρὸς τὴν τελευτὴν ὑστέραν οὖσαν φέρῃ: by ἀφέντες the writer means “leaving behind,” and by φερώμεθα “let us advance.” Ἀφίημι might even mean “to omit” (“not mentioning”); it is so used with λόγον (= to pass over without mentioning), e.g. in Plutarch’s an seni respublica gerenda sit, 18, ἀλλʼ ἀφέντες, εἰ βούλει, τὸν ἀποσπῶντα τῆς πολιτείας λόγον ἐκεῖνο σκοπῶμεν ἤδη κτλ., and even independently (cp. Epict. iv:1. 15, τὸν μὲν Καίσαρα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, and Theophrastus, prooem. ἀφεὶς τὸ προοιμιάζεσθαι καὶ πολλὰ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν). In what follows, τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον is a variant for τὰ στοιχεῖα τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν λογίων τοῦ θεοῦ (5:12). Τοῦ Χριστοῦ is an objective genitive; the writer is not thinking of injunctions issued by Christ (so Harnack, Constitution and Law of the Church, p. 344). Blass follows L in reading λοιπόν after λόγον—needlessly.

The use of the θεμέλιον metaphor after τῆς ἀρχῆς was natural; it occurs in Epictetus (2:15. 8, οὐ θέλεις τὴν ἀρχὴν στῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεμέλιον) and in Philo (de spec. leg. ii. 13, ἀρχὴν ταύτην βαλλόμενος ὥσπερ θεμέλιόν τινα). Indeed the θεμέλιον metaphor is particularly common in Philo, as, e.g., in the de vita contempl. 476 (ἐγκράτειαν δὲ ὥσπερ τινὰ θεμὲλιον προκαταβαλλόμενοι ψυχῆς). This basis (θεμέλιον) of Christian instruction is now described; the contents are arranged in three pairs, but, as the middle pair are not distinctively Christian ideas (v. 2), the writer puts in διδαχήν or διδαχῆς. The θεμέλιον of instruction consists of μετανοίας … καὶ πίστεως (genitives of quality), while διδαχήν, which is in apposition to it (“I mean, instruction about”), controls the other four genitives. Μετάνοια and πίστις, βαπτισμοί and ἐπιθέσις χειρῶν, ἀνάστασις and κρίμα αἰώνιον, are the fundamental truths. Μετάνοια1 ἀπό is like μετανοεῖν ἀπό (Acts 8:22), and πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν like πιστεύειν ἐπί (e.g. Wis 12:2 ἵνα ἀπαλλαγέντες τῆς κακίας πιστεύσωμεν ἐπὶ σέ, κύριε). These two requirements were foremost in the programme of the Christian mission. The other side of repentance is described in 9:14 πόσῳ μᾶλλον τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ … καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν ἡμῶν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι, where the last word indicates that νεκρὰ ἔργα mean the conduct of those who are outside the real life and service of God. Practically, therefore, νεκρὰ ἔργα are sins, as the Greek fathers assumed; the man who wrote 11:25 (θεοῦ … ἁμαρτίας) would hardly have hesitated to call them such. He has coined this phrase to suggest that such ἔργα have no principle of life in them,2 or that they lead to death. The origin of the phrase has not been explained, though Chrysostom and Oecumenius were right in suggesting that the metaphor of 9:14 was derived from the contamination incurred by touching a corpse (see Numbers 19:1f, Numbers 31:19). Its exact meaning is less clear. The one thing that is clear about it is that these ἔργα νεκρά were not habitual sins of Christians; they were moral offences from which a man had to break away, in order to become a Christian at all. They denote not the lifeless, formal ceremonies of Judaism, but occupations, interests, and pleasures, which lay within the sphere of moral death, where, as a contemporary Christian writer put it (Ephesians 2:1), pagans lay νεκροὶ τοῖς παραπτώμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις. The phrase might cover Jewish Christians, if there were any such in the community to which this homily is addressed, but it is a general phrase. Whatever is evil is νεκρόν, for our author, and ἔργα νεκρά render any Christian πίστις or λατρεύειν impossible (cp. Expositor, Jan. 1918, pp. 1-18), because they belong to the profane, contaminating sphere of the world.

In v. 2 διδαχήν is read, instead of διδαχῆς, by B syrharkl and the Old Latin, a very small group—yet the reading is probably original; the surrounding genitives led to its alteration into διδαχῆς. However, it makes no difference to the sense, which reading is chosen. Even διδαχῆς depends on θεμέλιον as a qualifying genitive. But the change of διδαχήν into διδαχῆς is much more likely than the reverse process. Διδαχήν follows βαπτισμῶν like κόσμος in 1 P 3:3 (ἐνδύσεως ἱματίων κόσμος). Βαπτισμοί by itself does not mean specifically Christian baptism either in this epistle (9:10) or elsewhere (Mark 7:4), but ablutions or immersions such as the mystery religions and the Jewish cultus required for initiates, proselytes, and worshippers in general. The singular might mean Christian baptism (as in Colossians 2:12), but why does the writer employ the plural here? Not because in some primitive Christian circles the catechumen was thrice sprinkled or immersed in the name of the Trinity (Didache 7:1-3), but because ancient religions, such as those familiar to the readers, had all manner of purification rites connected with water (see on 10:22). The distinctively Christian uses of water had to be grasped by new adherents. That is, at baptism, e.g., the catechumen would be specially instructed about the difference between this Christian rite, with its symbolic purification from sins of which one repented, and (a) the similar rites in connexion with Jewish proselytes on their reception into the synagogue or with adherents who were initiated into various cults, and (b) the ablutions which were required from Christians in subsequent worship. The latter practice may be alluded to in 10:22 (λελουσμένοι τὸ σῶμα ὗδατι καθαρῷ). Justin (Apol. 1:62) regards these lustrations of the cults as devilish caricatures of real baptism: καὶ τὸ λουτρὸν δὴ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντες οἱ δαίμονες … ἐνήργησαν καὶ ῥαντίζειν ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν ἐπιβαίνοντας καὶ προσιέναι αὐτοῖς μέλλοντας, λοιβὰς καὶ κνίσας ἀποτελοῦντας τέλεον δὲ καὶ λούεσθαι ἐπιόντας πρὶν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερά, ἔνθα ἵδρυνται, ἐνεργοῦσι. The ἐπιθέσις χειρῶν which often followed baptism in primitive days (e.g. Acts 8:17f. Acts 8:19:6), though it is ignored by the Didache and Justin, was supposed to confer the holy Spirit (see v. 4). Tertullian witnesses to the custom (de baptismo, 18, de carnis resurrectione, 8), and Cyprian corroborates it (Ep. lxxiv:5, “manus baptizato imponitur ad accipiendum spiritum sanctum”). The rite was employed in blessing, in exorcising, and at “ordination,” afterwards at the reception of penitents and heretics; here it is mentioned in connexion with baptism particularly (ERE vi:494b).

The subject is discussed in monographs like A. J. Mason’s The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism (1891), and J. Behm’s Die Handauflegung im Urchristenthum (1911).

The final pair of doctrines is ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν καὶ κρίματος (2:14, 15, 9:27) αἰωνίου (as in Acts 24:15, Acts 24:25). Tε is added after ἀναστάσεως mechanically (to conform with the preceding τε) by א A C K L Lat arm syrhkl pesh, just as it is added after βαπτισμῶν by harkl. In the rather elliptical style and loose construction of the whole sentence, “notwithstanding its graceful rhythmical structure,” it is possible to see, with Bruce (p. 203), “an oratorical device to express a feeling of impatience” with people who need to have such principia mentioned. At any rate the writer hastens forward. V. 3 is not a parenthesis (“I will do this,” i.e. go over such elementary truths with you, “if God permits,” when I reach you, 13:23); the τοῦτο refers to the advance proposed in v. 1, and after ποιήσομεν the author adds reverently, “if God permits,” ἐάνπερ ἐπιτρέπῃ ὁ θεός, almost as a contemporary rhetorician might say in a pious aside: ἐὰν δὲ σῴζη τὸ δαιμόνιον ἡμᾶς (Dion. Halicarn. De Admir. Vi dicendi in Dem. 58), or θεῶν ἡμᾶς φυλαττόντων ἀσινεῖς τε καὶ ἀνόσους (De Composit. Verborum, 1). The papyri show that similar phrases were current in the correspondence of the day (cp. Deissmann’s Bible Studies, p. 80), and Josephus (Ant. xx:11. 2) uses κἂν τὸ θεῖον ἐπιτρεπῇ.

ποιήσομεν (א B K L N 1. 2. 5. 6. 33. 69. 88. 216. 218. 221. 226. 242. 255. 337. 429. 489. 919. 920. 1149. 1518. 1739. 1758. 1827. 1867. 2127. 2143. Lat sah boh Chrys.) has been changed into ποιήσωμεν by A C D P arm, etc., though the latter may have been originally, like φερόμεθα in v. 1, an orthographical variant, ο and ω being frequently confused.

4 For in the case of people who have been once enlightened, who tasted the heavenly Gift, who participated in the holy Spirit, 5 who tasted the goodness of God’s word and the powers of the world to come, 6and then fell away—it is impossible to make them repent afresh, since they crucify the Son of God in their own persons and hold him up to obloquy. 7 For “land” which absorbs the rain that often falls on it, and bears “plants” that are useful to those for whom it is tilled, receives a blessing from God; 8 whereas, if it (sc. ἡ γῆ) “produces thorns and thistles,” it is reprobate and on the verge of being cursed—its fate is to be burned.

Vv.4-6 put the reason for τοῦτο ποιήσομεν (v. 3), and vv. 7, 8 give the reason for ἀδύνατον … ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετάνοιαν (vv. 4-6). Ἀδύνατον γάρ κτλ. (v. 4); there are four impossible things in the epistle: this and the three noted in vv. 18, 10:4 and 11:6. Τοὺς … αἰῶνος (4, 5a) is a long description of people who have been initiated into Christianity; then comes the tragic καὶ παραπεσόντας. What makes the latter so fatal is explained in (v. 6) ἀνασταυροῦντας … παραδειγματίζοντας. Logically πάλιν ἀνακαινίζειν εἰς μετάνοιαν ought to come immediately after ἀδύνατον γάρ, but the writer delayed the phrase in order to break up the sequence of participles. The passage is charged with an austerity which shows how seriously the writer took life. Seneca quotes (Ep. xxiii:9-11) to Lucilius the saying of Epicurus, that “it is irksome always to be starting life over again,” and that “they live badly who are always beginning to live.” The reason is: “quia semper illis imperfecta vita est.” But our writer takes a much more sombre view of the position of his friends. He urges them to develop their ideas of Christianity. “You need some one to teach you the rudimentary lessons of the faith all over again,” he had said. “Yes,” he now adds, “and in some cases that is impossible. Relaying a foundation of repentance, etc.! That cannot be done for deliberate apostates.” The implication is that his readers are in danger of this sin, as indeed he has hinted already (in 3:7-4:14), and that one of the things that is weakening them is their religious inability to realize the supreme significance of Jesus. To remain as they are is fatal; it means the possibility of a relapse altogether. “Come on,” the writer bids them, “for if you do not you will fall back, and to fall back is to be ruined.” The connexion between this passage and the foregoing, therefore, is that to rest content with their present elementary hold upon Christian truth is to have an inadequate grasp of it; the force of temptation is so strong that this rudimentary acquaintance with it will not prevent them from falling away altogether, and the one thing to ensure their religious position is to see the full meaning of what Jesus is and does. This meaning he is anxious to impart, not as an extra but as an essential. The situation is so serious, he implies, that only those who fully realize what Jesus means for forgiveness and fellowship will be able to hold out. And once you relapse, he argues, once you let go your faith, it is fatal; people who deliberately abandon their Christian confession of faith are beyond recovery. Such a view of apostasy as a heinous offence, which destroyed all hope of recovery, is characteristic of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους. It was not confined to this writer. That certain persons could not repent of their sins was, e.g., an idea admitted in rabbinic Judaism. “Over and over again we have the saying: ‘For him who sins and causes others to sin no repentance is allowed or possible’ (Aboth v. 26; Sanhedrin, 107b). ‘He who is wholly given up to sin is unable to repent, and there is no forgiveness to him for ever’ (Midrash Tehillim on Psa_1 ad fin.).”1 There is a partial parallel to this passage in the idea thrown out by Philo in de agricultura, 28, as he comments upon Genesis 9:20: “Noah began to till the earth.” Evidently, says Philo, this means that he was merely working at the ἄρχαι of the subject. Ἀρχὴ δʼ, ὁ τῶν παλαιῶν λόγος, ἥμισυ τοῦ πάντος, ὡς ἂν ἡμίσει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀφεστηκυῖα, οὗ μὴ προσγενομένου καὶ τὸ ἄρξασθαι πολλάκις μεγάλα πολλοὺς ἔβλαψεν. His point is that it is dangerous to stop short in any moral endeavour. But our author is more rigorous in his outlook. His warning is modified, however. (a) It is put in the form of a general statement. (b) It contains a note of encouragement in v. 7; and (c) it is at once followed up by an eager hope that the readers will disappoint their friend and teacher’s fear (v. 9). In the later church this feature of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους entered into the ecclesiastical question of penance (cp. ERE ix:716, and Journal of Theological Studies, iv: 321 f.), and seriously affected the vogue of the epistle (cp. Introd. p. xx).

The fourfold description of believers (4, 5a) begins with ἅπαξ φωτισθέντας, where φωτισθέντας corresponds to λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας (10:26), in the general sense of LXX (e.g. Ps 118:130 ἡ δήλωσις τῶν λόγων σου φωτιεῖ, καὶ συνετεῖ νηπίους), i.e. “enlightened” in the sense of having their eyes opened (Ephesians 1:18) to the Christian God. Subsequently, earlier even than Justin Martyr, the verb, with its noun φωτισμός, came to be used of baptism specifically (cp. ERE viii:54, 55).Ἅπαξ is prefixed, in contrast to πάλιν (v. 6); once for all men enter Christianity, it is an experience which, like their own death (9:27) and the death of Jesus (9:28), can never be repeated. In καλὸν γευσαμένους θεοῦ ῥῆμα (“experienced how good the gospel is”) the construction resembles that of Herod. vii:46, where the active voice is used with the accusative (ὁ δὲ θεὸς γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα, φθονερὸς ἐν αὐτῷ εὑρίσκεται ἐών), and the adj. is put first: “the deity, who let us taste the sweetness of life (or, that life is sweet), is found to be spiteful in so doing.” The similar use of the middle here as in Pr 29:36 and John 2:9 probably points to the same meaning (cp., however, Diat. 2016-2018), i.e., practically as if it were ὅτι κτλ. (cp. Psalm 34:8 γεύσασθε καὶ ἴδετε ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος, 1 P 2:3), in contrast to the more common construction with the genitive (v. 4, 2:9). The writer uses genitive and accusative indifferently, for the sake of literary variety; and καλόν here is the same as καλοῦ in 5:14. Γευσαμένους κτλ. recalls the partiality of Philo for this metaphor (e.g. de Abrah. 19; de Somniis, i:26), but indeed it is common (cp. e.g. Jos. Ant. 4:6. 9, ἅπαξ τὸ νέον γευσαμένον ξενικῶν ἐθισμῶν ἀπλήστως αὐτῶν ἐνεφορεῖτο) throughout contemporary Hellenistic Greek as a metaphor for experiencing. Probably γευσαμένους … ἐπουρανίου, μετόχους … ἁγίου, and καλὸν γευσαμένους αἰῶνος are three rhetorical expressions for the initial experience described in ἅπαξ φωτισθέντας. “The heavenly Gift” (τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς ἐπουρανίου) may be the Christian salvation in general, which is then viewed as the impartation of the holy Spirit, and finally as the revelation of the higher world which even already is partly realized in the experience of faith. Note that φωτισθέντας is followed by γευσαμένους κτλ., as the light-metaphor is followed by the food-metaphor in Philo’s (de fuga et invent. 25) remarks upon the manna (Exodus 16:15, Exodus 16:16): ἡ θεία σύνταξις αὕτη τὴν ὁρατικὴν ψυχὴν φωτίζει τε καὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ γλυκαίνει … τοὺς διψῶντας καὶ πεινῶντας καλοκἀγαθίας ἐφηδύνουσα. Also, that δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αἰῶνος1includes the thrilling experiences mentioned in 2:4. The dramatic turn comes in (v. 6) καὶ παραπεσόντας. Παραπίπτειν is here used in its most sinister sense; it corresponds to ἀποστῆναι (3:12), and indeed both verbs are used in the LXX to translate the same term פעל. The usage in Wis 6:9 (μὴ παραπέσητε) 12:2 (τοὺς παραπίπτσοντας) paves the way for this sense of a deliberate renunciation of the Christian God, which is equivalent to ἑκουσίως ἁμαρτάνειν in 10:26. The sin against the holy Spirit, which Jesus regarded as unpardonable, the mysterious ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον of 1 John 5:16, and this sin of apostasy, are on the same level. The writer never hints at what his friends might relapse into. Anything that ignored Christ was to him hopeless.

Ἀδύνατον (sc. ἐστι) is now (v. 6) taken up in ἀνακαινίζειν (for which Paul prefers the form ἀνακαινοῦν), a LXX term (e.g. Psalm 51:12) which is actually used for the Christian start in life by Barnabas (6:11 ἀνακαινίσας ἡμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἀφέσει τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν), and naturally of the divine action. Πάλιν is prefixed for emphasis, as in Isokr. Areopag. 3, τῆς ἔχθρας τῆς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα πάλιν ἀνακεκαινισμένης.

There have been various, vain efforts to explain the apparent harshness of the statement. Erasmus took ἀδύνατον (like d = difficile) as “difficult”; Grotius said it was impossible “per legem Mosis”; others take ἀνακαινίζειν to mean “keep on renewing,” while some, like Schoettgen, Bengel, and Wickham, fall back on the old view that while men could not, God might effect it. But even the last-named idea is out of the question. If the writer thought of any subject to ἁνακαινίζειν, it was probably a Christian διδάσκαλος like himself; but the efforts of such a Christian are assumed to be the channel of the divine power, and no renewal could take place without God. There is not the faintest suggestion that a second repentance might be produced by God when human effort failed. The tenor of passages like 10:28f. and 12:17 tells finally against this modification of the language. A similarly ominous tone is heard in Philo’s comment on Numbers 30:10 in quod deter. pot. insid. 40: φήσομεν διάνοιαν … ἐκβεβλῆσθαι καὶ χήραν θεοῦ, ἣτις ἢ γονὰς θείας οὐ παρεδέξατο ἢ παραδεξαμένη έκουσίως αὖθις ἐξήμβλωσε … ἡ δʼ ἅπαξ διαζευκθεῖσα καὶ διοικισθεῖσα ὡς ἄσπονδος μέχρι τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐκτετόξευται, εἰς τὸν ἀρχαῖον οἶκον ἐπανελθεῖν ἁδυνατοῦσα.

The reason why a second repentance is impossible is given in ἀνασταυροῦντας … παραδειγματίζοντας, where ἀνασταυροῦντας is used instead of σταυροῦντας, for the sake of assonance (after ἀνακαινίζειν), but with the same meaning. Ἀνασταυροῦν simply means “to crucify,” as, e.g., in Plato’s Gorgias, 28 (τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδας τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ); Thucyd. 1:110 (Ἰνάρως … προδοσίᾳ ληφθεὶς ἀνεσταυρώθη); Josephus (Ant. xi. 6. 10, ἀνασταυρῶσαι τὸν Μαρδοχαῖον), etc. The ἀνα = sursum, not rursum, though the Greek fathers (e.g. Chrys. τὶ δέ ἐστιν ἀνασταυροῦντασ; ἄνωθεν πάλιν σταυροῦντας), and several of the versions (e.g. vg “rursum crucifigentes”), took it in the sense of re-crucify. Ἑαυτοῖς: it is their crucifixion of Jesus. “The thought is that of wilfulness rather than of detriment” (Vaughan).

In the story of Jesus and Peter at Rome, which Origen mentions as part of the Acts of Paul (in, Joh. xx. 12), the phrase, “to be crucified over again” occurs in a different sense (Texte u. Unters. xxx. 3, pp. 271-272). Καὶ ὁ κύριος αὐτῷ εἶπεν· εἰσέρχομαι εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην σταυρωθῆναι. Καὶ ὁ Πέτρος εἶπεν αὐτῷ· Κύριε, πάλιν σταυροῦσαι; εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ναὶ, Πέτρε, πάλιν σταυροῦμαι. Origen, quoting this as Ἄνωθεν μέλλω σταυροῦσθαι, holds that such is the meaning of ἀνασταυροῦν in He Hebrews 6:5.

The meaning of the vivid phrase is that they put Jesus out of their life, they break off all connexion with him; he is dead to them. This is the decisive force of σταυροῦσθαι in Galatians 6:14. The writer adds an equally vivid touch in καὶ παραδειγματίζοντας ( = τὸν υἱὸν θεοῦ καταπατήσας κτλ., 10:29)—as if he is not worth their loyalty! Their repudiation of him proclaims to the world that they consider him useless, and that the best thing they can do for themselves is to put him out of their life. Παραδειγματίζειν is used in its Hellenistic sense, which is represented by τιθέναι εἰς παράδειγμα in the LXX (Nahum 3:6). Possibly the term was already associated with impaling (cp. Numbers 25:4 παραδειγμάτισον αὐτοὺς Κυρίῳ),1 but our author does not use it in the LXX sense of “make an example of” (by punishing); the idea is of exposing to contemptuous ignominy, in public (as in Matthew 1:19).

The Bithynians who had renounced Christianity proved to Pliny their desertion by maligning Christ—one of the things which, as he observed, no real Christian would do (“quorum nihil posse cogi dicuntur qui sunt re vera Christiani”). “Omnes … Christi male dixerunt.” When the proconsul urges Polykarp to abandon Christianity, he tells the bishop, λοιδόρησον τὸν Χριστόν (Mart. Polyk. ix. 3). The language of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους is echoed in the saying of Jesus quoted in Apost. Const. vi. 18: οὗτοί εἰσι περὶ ὧν καὶ ὁ κύριος πικρῶς καὶ ἀποτόμως ἀπεφήνατο λέγων ὅτι εἰσὶ ψευδόχριστοι καὶ ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι, οἱ βλασφημήσαντες τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς χάριτος καὶ ὰποπτύσαντες τὴν παρʼ αὐτοῦ δωρεὰν μετὰ τὴν χάριν, οἶς οὐκ ἀφεθήσεται οὔτε ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ οὔτε ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι. In Sir 31:30 (βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ καὶ πάλιν ἁπτόμενος αὐτοῦ, τί ὠφελησεν τῷ λουτρῷ͂ αὐτοῦ;) the allusion is to the taboo-law of Numbers 19:11, Numbers 19:12; the parallel is verbal rather than real. But there is a true parallel in Mongolian Buddhism, which ranks five sins as certain “to be followed by a hell of intense sufferings, and that without cessation … patricide, matricide, killing a Doctor of Divinity (i.e. a lama), bleeding Buddha, sowing hatred among priests.… Drawing blood from the body of Buddha is a figurative expression, after the manner of Hebrews 6:6” (J. Gilmour, Among the Mongols, pp. 233, 234).

In the little illustration (vv. 7, 8), which corresponds to what Jesus might have put in the form of a parable, there are reminiscences of the language about God’s curse upon the ground (Genesis 3:17, Genesis 3:18): ἐπικατάρατος ἡ γῆ … ἀκάνθας καὶ τριβόλους ἀνατελεῖ, and also of the words in Genesis 1:12 καὶ ἐξήνεγκεν ἡ γῆ βοτάνην χόρτου, though the writer uses ἐκφέρειν for ἀνατέλλειν, and prefers τίκτειν to ἐκφέρειν (in v. 7). The image of a plot or field is mentioned by Quintilian (Instit. Orat. v. 11, 24) as a common instance of the παραβολή: “ut, si animum dicas excolendum, similitudine utaris terrae quae neglecta spinas ac dumos, culta fructus creat.” The best Greek instance is in Euripides (Hecuba, 592 f.: οὔκουν δεινόν, εἰ γῆ μὲν κακὴ " τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θεόθεν εὖ στάχυν φέρει, " χρηστὴ δʼ ἁμαρτοῦσʼ ὧν χρεὼν αὐτὴν τυχεῖν " κακὸν δίδωσι καρπόν κτλ.). Πιοῦσα of land, as, e.g., in Deuteronomy 11:11 γῆ … ἐκ τοῦ ὑετοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πίεται ὕδωρ: Isaiah 55:10f. etc. As εὔθετος generally takes εἰς with the accusative, it is possible that τίκτουσα was meant to go with ἐκεινοῖς. Γεωργεῖται, of land being worked or cultivated, is a common term in the papyri (e.g. Syll. 429:9 τά τε χωρία εἰ γεωργεῖται) as well as in the LXX.

(a) Origen’s homiletical comment (Philocalia, xxi. 9) is, τὰ γινόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τεράστια οἰονεὶ ὑετός ἐστιν· αἱ δὲ προαιρέσεις αἱ διάφοροι οἰονεὶ ἡ γεγεωργημένη γῆ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἠμελημένη, μιᾷ τῇ φύσει ὡς γῆ τυγχάνουσα—an idea similar to that of Jerome (tractatus de psalmo xcvi., Anecdota Maredsolana, 3:3, 90: “apostolorum epistolae nostrae pluviae sunt spiritales. Quid enim dicit Paulus in epistola ad Hebraeos? Terra enim saepe venientem super se bibens imbrem, et reliqua”). (b) The Mishna directs that at the repetition of the second of the Eighteen Blessings the worshipper should think of the heavy rain and pray for it at the ninth Blessing (Berachoth, 5:1), evidently because the second declares, “Blessed art thou, O Lord, who restorest the dead” (rain quickening the earth), and the ninth runs, “Bless to us, O Lord our God, this year and grant us a rich harvest and bring a blessing on our land.” Also, “on the occasion of the rains and good news, one says, Blessed be He who is good and does good” (Berachoth, 9:2). Cp. Marcus Aurelius, v. 7, εὐχὴ Ἀθηναίων· ὗσον, ὗσον, ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων.

Μεταλαμβάνει ( = participate in) is not a LXX term, but occurs in this sense in Wis 18:9 etc.; εὐλογίας occurs again in 12:17 (of Esau the apostate missing his εὐλογία), and there is a subtle suggestion here, that those alone who make use of their divine privileges are rewarded. What the writer has in mind is brought out in v. 10; that he was thinking of the Esau-story here is shown by the reminiscence of ἀγροῦ ὃν ηὐλόγησεν Κύριος (Genesis 27:27).

The reverse side of the picture is now shown (v. 8).

Commenting on Genesis 3:18 Philo fancifully plays on the derivation of the word τρίβολος (like “trefoil”): ἓκαστον δὲ τῶν παθῶν τριβόλια εἴρηκεν, ἐπειδὴ τριττά ἐστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἀποτέλεσμα (leg. alleg. iii. 89). He also compares the eradication of evil desires in the soul to a gardener or farmer burning down weeds (de Agric. 4, πάντʼ ἐκκόψω, ἐκτεμῶ … καὶ εʼπικαύσω καὶ τὰς ῥίζας αὐτῶν ἐφιεῖσʼ ἄχρι τῶν ὑστάτων τῆς γῆς φλογὸς ῥιπήν); but in our epistle, as in John 15:6, the burning is a final doom, not a process of severe discipline.

Ἀδόκιμος is used as in 1 Corinthians 9:27; the moral sense breaks through, as in the next clause, where the meaning of εἰς καῦσιν may be illustrated by Deuteronomy 29:22 and by Philo’s more elaborate description of the thunderstorm which destroyed Sodom (de Abrah. 27); God, he says, showered a blast οὐχ ὕδατος ἀλλά πυρός upon the city and its fields, by way of punishment, and everything was consumed, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ καὶ ὑπὲρ γῆς ἅπαντα κατανάλωσεν ἡ φλόξ, ἤδη καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτὴν ἔκαιε … ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδʼ αὖθίς ποτε καρπὸν ἐνεγκεῖν ἢ χλοηφορῆσαι τὸ παράπαν δονηθῆναι. The metaphor otherwise is inexact, for the reference cannot be to the burning of a field in order to eradicate weeds; our author is thinking of final punishment ( = κρίματος αἰωνίου, 6:2), which he associates as usual with fire (10:26, 27, 12:29). The moral application thus impinges on the figurative sketch. The words κατάρας ἐγγύς actually occur in Aristides (Orat. in Rom. 370: τὸ μὲν προχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἃ ἐβούλοντο, ἀμήχανον καὶ κατάρας ἐγγύς).1 There is no thought of mildness in the term ἐγγύς, it being used, as in 8:13, of imminent doom, which is only a matter of time. Meanwhile there is the ἐκδοχή (10:27).

Later on, this conception of unpardonable sins led to the whole system of penance, which really starts from the discussion by Hermas in the second century. But for our author the unpardonable sin is apostasy, and his view is that of a missionary. Modern analogies are not awanting. Thus, in Dr. G. Warneck’s book, The Living Forces of the Gospel (p. 248), we read that “the Battak Christians would have even serious transgressions forgiven; but if a Christian should again sacrifice to ancestors or have anything to do with magic, no earnest Christian will speak in his favour; he is regarded as one who has fallen back into heathenism, and therefore as lost.”

9 Though I say this, beloved, I feel sure you will take the better2 course that means salvation. 10 God is not unfair; he will not forget what you have done, or the love you have shown for his sake in ministering, as you still do, to the saints. 11 It is my heart’s desire that each of you would prove equally keen upon realizing your full (πληροφορίαν, 10:22) hope to the very end, 12 so that instead of being slack you may imitate those who inherit the promises by their steadfast faith.

The ground for his confident hope about his “dear friends” (Tyndale, v. 9) lies in the fact that they are really fruitful (v. 7) in what is the saving quality of a Christian community, viz. brotherly love (v. 10). The God who blesses a faithful life (v. 7) will be sure to reward them for that; stern though he may be, in punishing the disloyal, he never overlooks good service. Only (vv. 11, 12), the writer adds, put as much heart and soul into your realization of what Christianity means as you are putting into your brotherly love; by thus taking the better course, you are sure of God’s blessing. As ἀγαπητοί indicates (the only time he uses it), the writer’s affection leads him to hope for the best; he is deeply concerned about the condition of his friends, but he does not believe their case is desperate (v. 4). He has good hopes of them, and he wishes to encourage them by assuring them that he still believes in them. We may compare the remarks of Seneca to Lucilius, Ep. xxix. 3, about a mutual friend, Marcellinus, about whom both of them were anxious. Seneca says he has not yet lost hope of Marcellinus. For wisdom or philosophy “is an art; let it aim at some definite object, choosing those who will make progress (profecturos) and withdrawing from those of whom it despairs—yet not abandoning them quickly, rather trying drastic remedies when everything seems hopeless.” Elsewhere, he encourages Lucilius himself by assuring him of his friend’s confidence and hope (Ep. xxxii. 2: “habeo quidem fiduciam non posse to detorqueri mansurumque in proposito”), and, in connexion with another case, observes that he will not be deterred from attempting to reform certain people (Ep. xxv. 2): “I would rather lack success than lack faith.”

In καὶ (epexegetic) ἐχόμενα (sc. πράγματα) σωτηρίας, ἐχόμενα, thus employed, is a common Greek phrase (cp. e.g. Marc. Aurel. 1. 6, ὅσα τοιαῦτα τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐχόμενα: Musonius (ed. Hence), 11., ζητεῖν παιδείας ἐχόμενα (v. l. ἐχόμενον): Philo, de Agric. 22, τὰ δὲ καρτερίας καὶ σωφροσύνης … ἐχόμενα) for what has a bearing upon, or is connected with; here, for what pertains to and therefore promotes σωτηρία (the opposite of κατάρα and καῦσις). The reason for this confidence, with which he seeks to hearten his readers, lies in their good record of practical service (τοῦ ἔργου ὑμῶν κτλ.) which God is far too just to ignore. After all, they had some fruits as well as roots of Christianity (v. 10). Ἐπιλαθέσθαι is an infinitive of conceived result (Burton’s Moods and Tenses, 371c; Blass, § 391, 4), instead of ἱνα c. subj., as, e.g., in 1 John 1:9, or ὥστε c. infinitive; cp. Xen. Cyrop. iv. 1. 20, δίκαιος εἶ ἀντιχαρίζεσθαι.1 The text of τοῦ ἔργου ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀγάπης was soon harmonized with that of 1 Thessalonians 1:3 by the insertion of τοῦ κόπου after καὶ (so Dc K L 69*, 256, 263, 1611*, 2005, 2127 boh Theodoret, etc.). The relative ἣν after ἀγάπης has been attracted into the genitive ἧς (as in 9:20). One practical form of this διακονεῖν is mentioned in 10:33, 34. Here εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ goes closely with διακονήσαντες κτλ., as well as with ἐνεδείξασθε, in the sense of “for his sake.” In Pirke Aboth, 2:16 R. Jose’s saying is quoted, “Let all thy works be done for the sake of heaven” (literally לְשֵׁם, i.e. εἰς ὄνομα, as here and in Ign. Romans 9:3 ἡ ἀγάπη τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν τῶν δεξαμένων με εἰς ὄνομα Ἴησοῦ Χριστοῦ). Τοῖς ἁγίοις, the only place (except 13:24) where the writer uses this common term for “fellow-Christians”; God will never be so unjust as to overlook kindness shown to “his own.”

The personal affection of the writer comes out not only in the ἀγαπητοί of v. 9, but again (v. 11) in the deep ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, a term charged with intense yearning (as Chrysostom says, πατρικῆς φιλοστοργίας), and in the individualizing ἕκαστον (cp. 3:12, 13). He is urgent that they should display τὴν αὐτὴν σπουδήν with regard to their Christian ἐλπίς as they display in the sphere of their Christian ἀγάπη. This does not mean that he wishes them to be more concerned about saving their own souls or about heaven than about their duties of brotherly love; his point is that the higher knowledge which he presses upon their minds is the one security for a Christian life at all. Just as Paul cannot assume that the warm mutual affection of the Thessalonian Christians implied a strict social morality (see below on 13:4), or that the same quality in the Philippian Christians implied moral discrimination (Php 1:9), so our author pleads with his friends to complete their brotherly love by a mature grasp of what their faith implied. He reiterates later on the need of φιλαδελφία (13:1), and he is careful to show how it is inspired by the very devotion to Christ for which he pleads (10:19-24). Πληροφορία (not a LXX term) here is less subjective than in 10:22, where it denotes the complete assurance which comes from a realization of all that is involved in some object. Here it is the latter sense of fulness, scope and depth in their—ἐλπίς.1 This is part and parcel of the τελειότης to which he is summoning them to advance (6:1). The result of this grasp of what is involved in their faith will be (v. 12) a vigorous constancy, without which even a kindly, unselfish spirit is inadequate. For ἐνδείκνυσθαι σπουδήν compare Herodian’s remark that the soldiers of Severus in a.d. 193 πᾶσαν ἐνεδείκνυντο προθυμίαν καὶ σπουδήν (2:10:19), Magn 53:61 (iii. b.c.), ἀπόδειξιν ποιούμενος τῆς περὶ τὰ μέγιστα σπουδῆς, and Syll. 342:41 (i. b.c.) τὴν μεγίστην ἐνδείκνυται σπουδὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος σωτηρίαν. The Greeks used the verb as we use “display,” in speaking of some inward quality. This ardour has to be kept up ἄχρι τέλους (cp. pseudo-Musonius, Epp. 1, in Hercher’s Epistolog. Graeci, 401 f.: τηροῦντας δὲ ἣν ἔχουσι νῦν πρόθεσιν ἄχρι τέλους φιλοσοφῆσαι); it is the sustained interest in essential Christian truth which issues practically in μακροθυμία (v. 12), or in the confident attitude of hope (3:6, 14).

Aristotle, in Rhet. ii. 19. 5, argues that οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδʼ ἄρχεται γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, a paradox which really means that “if you want to know whether the end of any course of action, plan, scheme, or indeed of anything—is possible, you must look to the beginning: beginning implies end: if it can be begun, it can also be brought to an end” (Cope).

In v. 12 the appeal is rounded off with ἵνα μὴ νωθροὶ γένησθε, that you may not prove remiss (repeating νωθροί from 5:11, but in a slightly different sense: they are to be alert not simply to understand, but to act upon the solid truths of their faith), μιμηταὶ δέ κτλ. Hitherto he has only mentioned people who were a warning; now he encourages them by pointing out that they had predecessors in the line of loyalty. This incentive is left over for the time being; the writer returns to it in his panegyric upon faith in chapter 11. Meanwhile he is content to emphasize the steadfast faith (πίστεως καὶ μακροθυμίας, a hendiadys) that characterizes this loyalty. Μακροθυμία means here (as in Jam 5:7f.) the tenacity with which faith holds out. Compare Menander’s couplet (Kock’s Com. Attic. Fragm. 549), ἄνθρωπος ὢν μηδέποτε τὴν ἀλυπίαν " αἰτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μακροθυμίαν, and Test. Joshua 2:7 μέγα φάρμακόν ἐστιν ἡ μακροθυμία " καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ δίδωσιν ἡ ὑπομονή. But this aspect of πίστις is not brought forward till 10:35f., after the discussion of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ. In κληρονομούντων τὰς ἐπαγγελίας the writer implies that hope is invariably sustained by a promise or promises. He has already mentioned ἡ ἐπαγγελία (4:1). Κληρονομεῖν τὰς ἐπαγγελίας can hardly mean “get a promise of something”; as the appended διὰ πίστεως καὶ μακροθυμίας suggests, it denotes “coming into possession of what is promised.” This is proved by the equivalent ἐπέτυχε τῆς ἐπαγγελίας in v. 15.

Taking Abraham as the first or as a typical instance of steadfast faith in God’s promises, the writer now (vv. 13-19) lays stress not upon the human quality, but upon the divine basis for this undaunted reliance. Constancy means an effort. But it is evoked by a divine revelation; what stirs and sustains it is a word of God. From the first the supreme Promise of God has been guaranteed by him to men so securely that there need be no uncertainty or hesitation in committing oneself to this Hope. The paragraph carries on the thought of vv. 11, 12; at the end, by a dexterous turn, the writer regains the line of argument which he had dropped when he turned aside to incite and reprove his readers (5:11f).

13 For in making, a promise to Abraham God “swore by himself” (since he could swear by none greater), 14 “I will indeed bless you and multiply you.” 15 Thus it was (i.e. thanks to the divine Oath) that Abraham by his steadfastness obtained (so 11:33) what he had been promised. 16 For as1 men swear by a greater than themselves, and as an oath means to them a guarantee that ends any dispute, 17 God, in his desire to afford the heirs of the Promise a special proof of the solid character of his purpose, interposed with an oath; 18 so that by these two solid facts (the Promise and the Oath), where it is impossible for God to be false, we refugees might have strong encouragement (παράκλησιν, see on 12:5) to seize the hope set before us, 19 anchoring the soul to it safe and sure, as it “enters the inner” Presence “behind the veil.”

As usual, he likes to give a biblical proof or illustration (vv. 13, 14), God’s famous promise to Abraham, but the main point in it is that God ratified the promise with an oath.

Our author takes the OT references to God’s oath quite naively. Others had felt a difficulty, as is shown by Philo’s treatise de Abrahamo (46): “God, enamoured of this man [i.e. Abraham], for his faith (πίστιν) in him, gives him in return a pledge (πίστιν), guaranteeing by an oath (τὴν διʼ ὅρκου βεβαίωσιν) the gifts he had promised … for he says, ‘I swear by myself’ (Genesis 22:16)—and with him a word is an oath—for the sake of confirming his mind more steadfastly and immovably than ever before.” But the references to God’s oaths were a perplexity to Philo; his mystical mind was embarrassed by their realism. In de sacrif. Abelis et Caini (28, 29) he returns to the subject. Hosts of people, he admits, regard the literal sense of these OT words as inconsistent with God’s character, since an oath implies (μαρτυρία θεοῦ περὶ πράγματος ἀμφισβητουμένου) God giving evidence in a disputed matter; whereas θεῷ οὐδὲν ἄδηλον οὐδὲ ἀμφισβητούμενον, God’s mere word ought to be enough: ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ λέγων πιστός ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ βεβαιότητος ἕνεκα μηδὲν ὅρκων διαφέρειν. He inclines to regard the OT references to God’s oaths as a condescension of the sacred writer to dull minds rather than as a condescension upon God’s part. In Leg. Allegor. iii. 72 he quotes this very passage (Genesis 22:16, Genesis 22:17), adding: εὖ καὶ τὸ ὅρκῳ βεβαιῶσαι τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν καὶ ὅρκῳ θεοπρεπεῖ· ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι οὐ καθʼ ἑτέρου ὀμνύει θεός, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ, ὅς ἐστι πάντων ἄριστος. But he feels bound to explain it. Some of his contemporaries had begun to take exception to such representations of God, on the ground that God’s word required no formal confirmation—it confirmed itself by being fulfilled—and that it was absurd (ἄτοπον) to speak of God swearing by himself, in order to bear testimony to himself.1 Philo (ibid. 73) attempts to meet this objection by urging that only God can bear testimony to himself, since no one else knows the divine nature truly; consequently it is appropriate for him to add confirmation to his word, although the latter by itself is amply deserving of belief. In Berachoth, 32. 1 (on Exodus 32:13), it is asked, “What means בך? R. Eleazar answered: ‘Thus saith Moses to God (Blessed be He!), ‘Lord of all the world, hadst thou sworn by heaven and earth, I would say, even as heaven and earth shall perish, so too thine oath shall perish. But now thou hast sworn by thy Great Name, which lives and lasts for ever and ever; so shall thine oath also last for ever and ever.’”

Εἶχε (v. 13) with infin. = ἐδύνατο as usual. Ὤμοσεν. … εἰ μήν … εὐλογήσω. Both the LXX (Thackeray, pp. 83, 84) and the papyri (Deissmann, Bible Studies, 205 f.) show that εἶ μήν after ὀμνύειν in oaths is common as an asseveration; in some cases, as here, the classical form ἦ μήν, from which εἰ μήν arose by itacism, is textually possible. The quotation (v. 14) is from the promise made to Abraham after the sacrifice of Isaac (Genesis 22:16, Genesis 22:17): κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ὤμοσα … εἰ μὴν εὐλογῶν εὐλογήσω σε, καὶ πλη θύνων πληθυνῶ τὸ σπέρμα σου. The practical religious value of God’s promise being thus (v. 15) confirmed is now brought out for the present generation (vv. 16f.—another long sentence). Κατὰ τοῦ μείζονος, i.e. by God. Which, Philo argues, is irreverent: ἀσεβεῖς ἂν νομισθεῖεν οἱ φάσκοντες ὀμνύναι κατὰ θεοῦ (Leg. Allegor. iii. 73), since only swearing by the Name of God is permissible (cp. Deuteronomy 6:13). But our author has no such scruples (see above). And he is quite unconscious of any objection to oaths, such as some early Christian teachers felt (e.g. Jam 5:12); he speaks of the practice of taking oaths without any scruples. “Hic locus … docet aliquem inter Christianos jurisjurandi usum esse legitimum … porro non dicit olim fuisse in usu, sed adhuc vigere pronuntiat” (Calvin). Ἀντιλογίας, dispute or quarrel (the derived sense in 7:7 χωρὶς πάσης ἀντιλογίας, there is no disputing). Εἰς βεβαίσωσιν only occurs once in the LXX (Leviticus 25:23), but is a current phrase in the papyri (cp. Deissmann’s Bible Studies, 163 f.) for “by way of guarantee”; it is opposed to εἰς ἀθέτησιν, and used here as in Wis 6:19 προσοχὴ δὲ νόμων βεβαίωσις ἀφθαρσίας. In Philo (see on v. 13) it is the oath which is guaranteed; here the oath guarantees. The general idea of v. 17 is that of OGIS (2. b.c.), ὅπως ἂν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἀκίνητα καὶ ἀμετάθετα μένηι τά τε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τίμια καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθήναιον φιλάνθρωπα. Ἐν ᾧ ( = διό, Theophylact), such being the case. Περισσότερον, which goes with ἐπιδεῖξαι, is illustrated by what Philo says in de Abrahamo, 46 (see above): “abundantius quam sine juramento factum videretur” (Bengel). It is an equivalent for περισσοτερῶς, which, indeed, B reads here. Ἐπιδεῖξαι (cp. Elephantine-Papyri [1907] 1:7 (iv. b.c.) ἐπιδειξάτω δὲ Ἡρακλείδης ὅτι ἂν ἐγκαλῆι Δημητρίαι ἐναντίον ἀνδρῶν τριῶν): the verb, which is only once used of God in the LXX (Isaiah 37:26 νῦν δὲ ἐπέδειξα ἐξερημῶσαι ἔθνη κτλ.), means here “to afford proof of.” The writer uses the general plural, τοῖς κληρονόμοις τῆς ἐπαγγελίας,1 instead of the singular “Abraham,” since the Promise in its mystical sense applied to the entire People, who had faith like that of Abraham. The reference is not specifically to Isaac and Jacob, although these are called his συγκληρονόμοι in 11:9. In τὸ ἀμετάθετον τῆς βουλῆς our author evidently chooses βουλῆς for the sake of the assonance with βουλόμενος. Ἀμετάθετος is a synonym for ἀκίνητος (cp. above on v. 17 and Schol. on Soph. Antig. 1027), and, as the papyri show, had a frequent connexion with wills in the sense of “irrevocable.” Here, in connexion with βουλῆς, it implies final determination (cp. 3 Mac 5:11, 12); the purpose had a fixed character or solidity about it. The verb ἐμεσίτευσεν (“intervened”) does not occur in the LXX, and is here used intransitively, instead of, as usual (cp. e.g. Dion. Halic. Ant. ix. 59. 5; OGIS 437:76 etc.), with some accusative like συνθήκας. In Jos. Ant. vii. 8 .5 it is used intransitively, but in the sense of “interceding” (πεισθεὶς δʼ ὁ Ἰώαβος καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην αὐτοῦ κατοικτείρας ἐμεσίτευσε πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα). The oath is almost certainly that just mentioned. Less probable is the interpretation (Delitzsch, Hofmann, M. Stuart, von Soden, Peake, Seeberg, Wickham) which regards the oath referred to in vv. 16f. as the oath in the writer’s favourite Psalm 110:4:

ὤμοσεν Κύριος καὶ οὐ μεταμεληθήσεται

Σὺ εἶ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισέδεκ.

This oath does refer to the priesthood of Jesus, which the writer is about to re-introduce (in v. 20); but it is not a thought which is brought forward till 7:20, 21, 28; and the second line of the couplet has been already quoted (5:6) without any allusion to the first.

In v. 18 καταφεύγειν and ἐλπίς are connected, but not as in Wis 14:6 (Noah = ἡ ἐλπὶς τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ σχεδίας, καταφυγοῦσα). Here, as ἐλπίς means what is hoped for, i.e. the object of expectation, “the only thought is that we are moored to an immoveable object” (A. B. Davidson). The details of the anchor-metaphor are not to be pressed (v. 19); the writer simply argues that we are meant to fix ourselves to what has been fixed for us by God and in God. To change the metaphor, our hope roots itself in the eternal order. What we hope for is unseen, being out of sight, but it is secure and real, and we can grasp it by faith.

(a) Philo (Quaest. in Exodus 22:20) ascribes the survival and success of the Israelites in Egypt διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν σωτῆρα θεὸν καταφυγήν, ὃς ἐξ ἀπόρων καὶ ἀμηχάνων ἐπιπέμψας τὴν εὐεργέτιν δύναμιν ἐρρύσατο τοὺς ίκέτας. (b) τόν is inserted in v. 18 before θεόν (by א* A C R 33. 1245. 1739. 1827. 2005 Ath Chrys.), probably to harmonize with ὁ θεός in v. 17 (where 1912 omits ὁ). But θεόν (“one who is God”) is quite apposite.

Παράκλησιν goes with κρατῆσαι (aor. = “seize,” rather than “hold fast to,” like κρατεῖν in 4:14), and οἱ καταφυγόντες stands by itself, though there is no need to conjecture οἱ κατὰ φυγὴν ὄντες = in our flight (so J. J. Reiske, etc.). Is not eternal life, Philo asks, ἡ πρὸς τὸ ὂν καταφυγή (de fuga, 15) ? In τῆς προκειμένης ἐλπίδος, προκειμένης must have the same sense as in 12:2; the colloquial sense of “aforesaid,” which is common in the papyri (e.g. OP. 1275:25 εἰς τὴν προκιμένην κώμην), would be flat. Ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ βεβαίαν reflects one of the ordinary phrases in Greek ethics which the writer is so fond of employing. Cp. Plutarch, de comm. not. 1061c, καίτοι πᾶσα κατάληψις ἐν τῷ σοφῷ καὶ μνήμη τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχουσα καὶ βέβαιον κτλ. : Sextus Empir. adv. log. ii. 374, ἐς τὸ ὑποτιθέμενον ᾗ ὑποτίθεται βέβαιον ἐστι καὶ ἀσφαλές: and Philo, quis rer. div. 62, κατάληφις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ βεβαία. The ἄγκυρα of hope is safe and sure, as it is fixed in eternity. All hope for the Christian rests in what Jesus has done in the eternal order by his sacrifice.

Chrysostom’s comment on the “anchor” metaphor is all that is needed: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὴ ἄγκυρα ἐξαρτηθεῖσα τοῦ πλοίου, οὐκ ὰφίησεν αὐτὸ περιφέρεσθαι, κἂν μυρίοι παρασαλεύωσιν ἄνεμοι, ἀλλʼ ἐξαρτηθεῖσα ἑδραῖον ποιε͂ʼ οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς. The anchor of hope was a fairly common metaphor in the later Greek ethic (e.g. Heliod. vii. 25, πᾶσα ἐλπίδος ἄ γκυρα παντοίως ἀνέσπασται, and Epict. Fragm. (30) 89, οὔτε ναῦν ὲξ ἑνὸς ἀγκυριου οὔτε βίον ἐκ μιᾶς ἐλπίδος ὁρμιστέον), but our author may have taken the religious application from Philo, who writes (de Somniis, i. 39),1 οὐ χρὴ κατεπτηχέναι τὸν ἐλπίδι θείας συμμαχίας ἐφορμοῦντα (lies moored to). He does not use it as a metaphor for stability, however, like most of the Greeks from Euripides (e.g. Helena, 277, ἄγκυρα δʼ ἥ μου τὰς τύχας ὤχει μόνη) and Aristophanes (e.g. Knights, 1244, λεπτή τις ἐλπίς ἐστʼ ἐφʼ ἧς ὀχούμεθα) onwards, as, e.g., in the most famous use of the anchor-metaphor,2 that by Pythagoras (Stob. Eclog. 3: πλοῦτος ἀσθενὴς ἄγκυρα, δόξα ἔτι ἀσθενεστέρα … τίνες οὖν ἄγκυραι δυναταί; φρόνησις, μεγαλοψυχία, ἀνδρία· ταύτας οὐθεὶς χειμεὼν σαλεύει).

Suddenly he breaks the metaphor,3 in order to regain the idea of the priesthood of Jesus in the invisible world. Hope enters the unseen world; the Christian hope, as he conceives it, is bound up with the sacrifice and intercession of Jesus in the Presence of God, and so he uses language from the ritual of Leviticus 16:2f. about Aaron “passing inside the veil,” or curtain that screened the innermost shrine. To this conception he returns in 9:3f. after he has described the vital functions of Jesus as ἱερεύς (6:20f.). For at last he has reached what he regards as the cardinal theme of his homily.

1 Compare the motto which Cromwell is said to have written on his pocket-bible, “qui cessat esse melior cessat esse bonus.”

Blass F. Blass, Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch: vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage, besorgt von Albert Debrunner (1913); also, Brief an die Hebräer, Text mit Angabe der Rhythmen (1903).

L [020: α 5] cont. 1:1-13:10.

Philo Philonis Alexandriai Opera Quae Supersunt (recognoverunt L. Cohn et P. Wendland).

1 According to Philo (de Abrah. 2, 3), next to hope, which is the ἄρχη μετουσίας ἀγαθῶν, comes ἡ ἐπὶ ἁμαρτανομένοις μετάνοια καὶ βελτίωσις. Only, he adds (ibid. 4), repentance is second to τελειότης, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀνόσου σώματος ἡ πρὸς ὑγιείαν ἑξ ἀσθενείας μεταβολὴ … ἡ δʼ ἀπό τινος χρόνου βελτίωσις ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν εὐφυοῦς ψυχῆς ἐστι μὴ τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπιμενούσης ἀλλʼ ἁδροτέροις καὶ ἀνδρὸς ὄντως φρονήμασιν ἐπιζητούσης εὔδιον κατάστασιν [ψυχῆς] καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτρεχούσης.

2 Cp. the use of νεκρός in Epict. iii:23. 28, καὶ μὴν ἃν μὴ ταῦτα ἐμποιῇ ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος, νεκρός ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων. This passage indicates how νεκρός could pass from the vivid application to persons (Matthew 8:22, Luke 15:32, cp. Colossians 2:13), into a secondary application to their sphere and conduct.

Expositor The Expositor. Small superior numbers indicate the series.

B [03: δ 1] cont. 1:1-9:18: for remainder cp. cursive 293.

ERE Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ed. J. Hastings).

אԠ[01: δ 2).

A [02: δ 4].

C [04: δ 3] cont. 2:4-7:26 9:15-10:24 12:16-13:25.

K [018:1:1].

Josephus Flavii Josephi Opera Omnia post Immanuelem Bekkerum, recognovit S. A. Naber.

N [0122: α 1030] cont. 5:8-6:10.

1 [δ 254]

2 [α 253]

5 [δ 453]

6 [δ 356] cont. 1:1-9:3 10:22-13:25

33 [δ 48] Hort’s 17

69 [δ 505]

88 [α 200]

216 [α 469]

218 [δ 300]

221 [α 69]

226 [δ 156]

242 [δ 206]

255 [α 174]

337 [α 205]

429 [α 398]

489 [δ 459] Hort’s 102

919 [α 113]

920 [α 55]

1149 [δ 370]

1518 [α 116]

1739 [α 78]

1758 [α 396] cont. 1:1-13:14

1827 [α 367]

1867 [α 154]

2127 [δ 202]

2143 [α 184]

sah The Coptic Version of the NT in the Southern Dialect (Oxford, 1920), vol. v. pp. 1-131.

boh The Coptic Version of the NT in the Northern Dialect (Oxford, 1905), vol. iii. pp. 472-555.

D [06: α 1026] cont. 1:1-13:20. Codex Claromontanus is a Graeco-Latin MS, whose Greek text is poorly* reproduced in the later (saec. ix.-x.) E = codex Sangermanensis. The Greek text of the latter (1:1-12:8) is therefore of no independent value (cp. Hort in WH, §§ 335-337); for its Latin text, as well as for that of F=codex Augiensis (saec. ix.), whose Greek text of Πρὸς Ἐβραίους has not been preserved, see below, p. lxix.

P [025: α 3] cont. 1:1-12:8 12:11-13:25.

1 C. G. Montefiore, in Jewish Quarterly Review (1904), p. 225.

LXX The Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint Version (ed. H. B. Swete).

1

Tertullian’s translation, “occidente iam aevo” (de Pudicitia, 20) shows that his Greek text had omitted a line by accident:

νουΣΘΥρημαδυν

αμειΣτεμελλ

οντοΣαιωνοσκαι,

i.e. δυν[άμεις τε μέλλ]οντος αἰῶνος.

Erasmus Adnotationes (1516), In epist. Pauli apostoli ad Hebraeos paraphrasis (1521).

1 In alluding to the gibbeting law of Deuteronomy 21:22f., Josephus (Bell. Jud. iv. 5. 2) speaks of ἀνασταυροῖν.

1 Cp. Eurip. Hippolytus, 1070: αἰαῖ, πρὸς ἦπαρ· δακρύων ἐγγὺς τόδε.

2 For some reason the softer linguistic form κρείσσονα is used here, as at 10:34, in preference to κρείττονα.

1 See Dolon’s remark in the Rhesus of Euripides (161, 162): οὐκοῦν πονεῖν μὲν χρή, πονοῦντα δʼ ἄξιον μισθὸν φέρεσθαι.

2005 [α 1436] cont. 1:1-7:2

1 For ἐλπίδος, πίστεως is read in W 1867.

Magn Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander (ed. Kern, 1900).

Syll. Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum2 (ed. W. Dittenberger).

1 To make the connexion clear, some inferior texts (C Dc K L 6, 33, 104, 1610, etc.) add μέν.

1 This is the point raised in John 8:13f.

Thackeray H. St J. Thackeray, A Grammar of the Old Testament in Greek (1909).

OGIS Dittenberger’s Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae (1903-1905).

1 Eusebius once (Dem. iv. 15, 40) omits τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, and once (ibid. v. 3. 21) reads τῆς βασιλείας, either accidentally or with a recollection of Jam 2:5.

1245 [α 158]

Ath Athanasius

1912 [α 1066]

c (Codex Colbertinus: saec. xii.)

1 The comparison between hope and a voyage in de Abrahamo, 9, is different: ὁ δὲ ἐλπίζων, ὡς αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοὔνομα, ἐλλιπής, ἐφιέμενος μὲν ἀεὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, μήπω δʼ ἐφικέσθαι τούτου δεδυνημένος, ἀλλʼ ἑοικὼς τοῖς πλέουσιν, οἳ σπεύδοντες εἰς λιμένας καταίρειν θαλαττεύουσιν ἐνορμίσασθαι μὴ δυνάμενοι. This is nearer to the thought of Romans 8:24, Romans 8:25.

2 For the anchor as a symbol on tombs, pagan and Christian, see Le Blant’s Inscr. Chrét. de Gaule, ii. 158, 312. Contrast with Hebrews 6:18, Hebrews 6:19 the bitter melancholy of the epitaph in the Greek Anthology (ix. 49): ἐλπὶς καὶ σύ, Τύχη, μέγα χαίρετε· τὸν λιμένʼ εὗρον· " οὐδὲν ἐμοί χʼ ὑμῖν· παίζετε τοὺς μετʼ ἐμέ.

3 A similar mixture of metaphor in Ep. Aristeas, 230 (σὲ μὲν οὐ δυνατόν ἐστι πταῖσαι, πᾶσι γάρ χάριτας ἔσπαρκας αἵ βλαστάνουσιν εὔνοιαν, ἥ τὰ μέγιστὄ τῶν ὄπλων κατισχύουσα περιλαμβάνει τὴν μεγίστην ἀσφάλειαν), and Philo, de praemiis, 2 (ταύτης δʼ ὁ πρῶτος σπόρος ἐστὶν ἐλπίς, ἡ πηγὴ τῶν βίων).