Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Jump to: Alford • Barnes • Bengel • Benson • BI • Calvin • Cambridge • Chrysostom • Clarke • Darby • Ellicott • Expositor's • Exp Dct • Exp Grk • Gaebelein • GSB • Gill • Gray • Guzik • Haydock • Hastings • Homiletics • ICC • JFB • Kelly • King • Lange • MacLaren • MHC • MHCW • Meyer • Newell • Parker • PNT • Poole • Pulpit • Sermon • SCO • Teed • TTB • VWS • WES • TSK EXPOSITORY (ENGLISH BIBLE) (19-21) These verses contain the third part of the vindication, which is based upon a possible extension of the objection. Not only might it seem as if this absolute choice and rejection was unjust in itself, but also unjust in its consequences. How can a man be blamed or punished, when his actions are determined for him? The Apostle meets this by a simple but emphatic assertion of the absolute and unquestionable prerogative of God over His creatures.Romans 9:19. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault — As if he had said, Because I affirm concerning God, that whom he will he hardeneth, thou wilt say, Why then doth he yet find fault with, or complain of, such persons, that they continue disobedient! For who hath resisted his will — Who hath been, is, or ever will be, able to hinder that from coming to pass which God willeth shall come to pass? Here it must be observed, that when the apostle saith, Whom he will he hardeneth, he doth not suppose any purpose or decree to be formed by God to harden any man, without his having previously committed those sins which he might not have committed: and having resisted the strivings of God’s Spirit, and abused the light and grace whereby he might both have known and complied with the divine will; but, at the most, only a purpose to harden those who first voluntarily harden themselves. Nor do his words suppose that they, who are actually hardened by God, have no capacity or possibility left them, by means of that grace which is yet vouchsafed to them, of recovering themselves from the state of hardness in which they are, and yet of turning to God in true repentance and reformation of life. Although then the will of God be, in a sense, irresistible, yet if this will be, 1st, To harden none but those who first voluntarily harden themselves, by known and wilful sin; and, 2d, To leave those whom he doth harden in a capacity of relenting and returning to him, being furnished with sufficient helps for that purpose, so that if they do it not, it becomes a high aggravation of their former sins; certainly he hath reason to reprove and complain of those who are, at any time, thus hardened by it.9:14-24 Whatever God does, must be just. Wherein the holy, happy people of God differ from others, God's grace alone makes them differ. In this preventing, effectual, distinguishing grace, he acts as a benefactor, whose grace is his own. None have deserved it; so that those who are saved, must thank God only; and those who perish, must blame themselves only, Hos 13:9. God is bound no further than he has been pleased to bind himself by his own covenant and promise, which is his revealed will. And this is, that he will receive, and not cast out, those that come to Christ; but the drawing of souls in order to that coming, is an anticipating, distinguishing favour to whom he will. Why does he yet find fault? This is not an objection to be made by the creature against his Creator, by man against God. The truth, as it is in Jesus, abases man as nothing, as less than nothing, and advances God as sovereign Lord of all. Who art thou that art so foolish, so feeble, so unable to judge the Divine counsels? It becomes us to submit to him, not to reply against him. Would not men allow the infinite God the same sovereign right to manage the affairs of the creation, as the potter exercises in disposing of his clay, when of the same lump he makes one vessel to a more honourable, and one to a meaner use? God could do no wrong, however it might appear to men. God will make it appear that he hates sin. Also, he formed vessels filled with mercy. Sanctification is the preparation of the soul for glory. This is God's work. Sinners fit themselves for hell, but it is God who prepares saints for heaven; and all whom God designs for heaven hereafter, he fits for heaven now. Would we know who these vessels of mercy are? Those whom God has called; and these not of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles. Surely there can be no unrighteousness in any of these Divine dispensations. Nor in God's exercising long-suffering, patience, and forbearance towards sinners under increasing guilt, before he brings utter destruction upon them. The fault is in the hardened sinner himself. As to all who love and fear God, however such truths appear beyond their reason to fathom, yet they should keep silence before him. It is the Lord alone who made us to differ; we should adore his pardoning mercy and new-creating grace, and give diligence to make our calling and election sure.Thou wilt say then unto me - The apostle here refers to an objection that might be made to his argument. If the position which he had been endeavoring to establish were true; if God had a purpose in all his dealings with people; if all the revolutions among people happened according to his decree, so that he was not disappointed, or his plan frustrated; and if his own glory was secured in all this, why could he blame people? Why doth he yet find fault? - Why does he blame people, since their conduct is in accordance with his purpose, and since he bestows mercy according to his sovereign will? This objection has been made by sinners in all ages. It is the standing objection against the doctrines of grace. The objection is founded, (1) On the difficulty of reconciling the purposes of God with the free agency of man. (2) it assumes, what cannot be proved, that a plan or purpose of God must destroy the freedom of man. (3) it is said that if the plan of God is accomplished, then what is best to be done is done, and, of course, man cannot be blamed. These objections are met by the apostle in the following argument. Who hath resisted his will? - That is, who has "successfully opposed" his will, or frustrated his plan? The word translated "resist" is commonly used to denote the resistance offered by soldiers or armed men. Thus, Ephesians 6:13, "Take unto you the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to withstand (resist or successfully oppose) in the evil day:" see Luke 21:15, "I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist;" see also Acts 7:10; Acts 13:8, "But Elymas ...withstood them, etc." The same Greek word, Romans 13:2; Galatians 2:11. This does not mean that no one has offered resistance or opposition to God, but that no one has done it successfully. God had accomplished his purposes "in spite of" their opposition. This was an established point in the sacred writings, and one of the admitted doctrines of the Jews. To establish it had even been a part of the apostle's design; and the difficulty now was to see how, this being admitted, people could be held chargeable with crime. That it was the doctrine of the Scriptures, see 2 Chronicles 20:6, "In thine hand "is there not" power and might, so that none is able to withstand thee?" Daniel 4:35, "he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" See also the case of Joseph and his brethren, Genesis 50:20, "As for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good." 19. Thou shalt say then unto me, Why—"Why then" is the true reading.doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted—"Who resisteth" his will?—that is, "This doctrine is incompatible with human responsibility"; If God chooses and rejects, pardons and punishes, whom He pleases, why are those blamed who, if rejected by Him, cannot help sinning and perishing? This objection shows quite as conclusively as the former the real nature of the doctrine objected to—that it is Election and Non-election to eternal salvation prior to any difference of personal character; this is the only doctrine that could suggest the objection here stated, and to this doctrine the objection is plausible. What now is the apostle's answer? It is twofold. First: "It is irreverence and presumption in the creature to arraign the Creator." Here he obviates a third objection or cavil. The first was, that God is unfaithful, Romans 9:6; the second, that God is unjust, Romans 9:14; now the third is, that God is severe and cruel. Some might object and say, If God, in those courses which he takes with men and sinners, doth follow only his own will and pleasure, and all things are done thereafter; why then doth he complain of sinners, and find fault with them? It seems it is his will to reject them; and who hath resisted, or can make resistance thereunto? It seems to be a common saying amongst the Hebrews, that None can withstand God: Romans 9:2 2 Chronicles 20:6, and elsewhere.Thou wilt say then unto me,.... That is, thou wilt object to me; for this is another objection of the adversary, against the doctrine the apostle was advancing: and it is an objection of a mere natural man, of one given up to a reprobate mind, of an insolent hardened sinner; it discovers the enmity of the carnal mind to God; if is one of the high things that exalts itself against the knowledge of him; it is with a witness a stretching out of the hand against God, and strengthening a man's self against the Almighty; it is a running upon him, even upon the thick bosses of his bucklers; it carries in it the marks of ill nature, surliness, and rudeness, to the last degree: why doth he yet find fault? The objector does not think fit to name the name of "God", or "the Lord", but calls him "he"; and a considerable emphasis lies upon the word "yet": what as if he should say, is he not content with the injustice he has already exercised, in passing by some, when he chose others; in leaving them to themselves, and hardening their hearts against him, and to go on in their own ways, which must unavoidably end in destruction; but after all this, is angry with them, finds fault with them, blames, accuses, and condemns them, for that which they cannot help; nay, for that which he himself wills? this is downright cruelty and tyranny. The objector seems to have a particular regard to the case of Pharaoh, the apostle had instanced in, when after God had declared that he had raised him up for this very purpose, to make known his power, and show forth his glory in all the world, still finds fault with him and says, "as yet exaltest thou thyself against my people, that thou wilt not let them go?" Exodus 9:17; and yet he himself had hardened his heart, and continued to harden his heart, that he might not let them go as yet; and when he had let them go, hardened his heart again to pursue after them, when he drowned him and his host in the Red sea; all which in this objection, is represented as unparalleled cruelty and unmercifulness; though it is not restrained to this particular case, but is designed to be applied to all other hardened persons; and to expose the unreasonableness of the divine proceedings, in hardening men at his pleasure; and then blaming them for acting as hardened ones, when he himself has made them so, and wills they should act in this manner: for who hath resisted his will? This is said in support of the former, and means not God's will of command, which is always resisted more or less, by wicked men and devils; but his will of purpose, his counsels and decrees, which stand firm and sure, and can never be resisted, so as to be frustrated and made void. This the objector takes up, and improves against God; that since he hardens whom he will, and there is no resisting his will, the fault then can never lie in them who are hardened, and who act as such, but in God; and therefore it must be unreasonable in him to be angry with, blame, accuse, and condemn persons for being and doing that, which he himself wills them to be and do. Let the disputers of this world, the reasoners of the present age, come and see their own faces, and read the whole strength of their objections, in this wicked man's; and from whence we may be assured, that since the objections are the same, the doctrine must be the same that is objected to: and this we gain however by it, that the doctrines of particular and personal election and reprobation, were the doctrines of the apostle; since against no other, with any face, or under any pretence, could such an objection be formed: next follows the apostle's answer. {16} Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?(16) Another objection, but only for the reprobate, rising upon the former answer. If God appoints to everlasting destruction, such as he wishes, and if that which he has decreed cannot be hindered nor withstood, how does he justly condemn those who perish by his will? EXEGETICAL (ORIGINAL LANGUAGES) Romans 9:19. An objection supposed by the apostle (comp. Romans 11:19) which might be raised against Romans 9:18, not merely by a Jew, but generally.οὖν] in pursuance of the ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει. ἔτι] logical, as in Romans 3:7, and frequently: If He hardens out of His own determination of will, why does He still find fault? That fact surely takes away all warrant from the reproaches which God makes against hardened sinners, since they have been hardened by the divine will itself, to which no one yet offers opposition (with success). τῷ γὰρ βουλ. κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the question, τί ἔτι μέμφ. ἀνθέστηκε] Who withstands? whereby, concretely, the irresistibility of the divine decree is set forth. The divine decree is exalted above any one’s opposition. According to the present opinion of Hofmann (it was otherwise in the Schriftbew. I. p. 246 f.), the opponent wishes to establish that, if the words ὃν θέλει, σκληρύνει be correct, no one may offer opposition to that which God wills, and therefore God can in no one have anything to censure. But thus the thought of the question τίς ἀνθέστηκε would be one so irrational and impious (as though, forsooth, no sinner would be opposed to God), that Paul would not even have had ground or warrant to have invented it as an objection. That question is not impious, but tragic, the expression of human weakness in presence of the divine decree of hardening. On the classical βούλημα (more frequently βούλευμα), the thing willed, i.e. captum consilium (only here in Paul), see van Hengel, Lobeck, ad Aj. 44. Comp., as to the distinction between βούλομαι and θέλω (Ephesians 1:11), on Matthew 1:19. Romans 9:19-21. Third part of the Theodicée: But man is not entitled to dispute with God, why He should still find fault. For his relation to God is as that of the thing formed to its former, or of the vessel to the potter, who has power to fashion out of a single lump vessels to honour and dishonour. Romans 9:19 ff. But human nature is not so easily silenced. This interpretation of all human life, with all its diversities of character and experience, through the will of God alone, as if that will by itself explained everything, is not adequate to the facts. If Moses and Pharaoh alike are to be explained by reference to that will—that is, are to be explained in precisely the same way—then the difference between Moses and Pharaoh disappears. The moral interpretation of the world is annulled by the religious one. If God is equally behind the most opposite moral phenomena, then it is open to any one to say, what Paul here anticipates will be said, τί ἔτι μέμφεται; why does he still find fault? For who withstands his resolve? To this objection there is really no answer, and it ought to be frankly admitted that the Apostle does not answer it. The attempt to understand the relation between the human will and the Divine seems to lead of necessity to an antinomy which thought has not as yet succeeded in transcending. To assert the absoluteness of God in the unexplained unqualified sense of Romans 9:18 makes the moral life unintelligible; but to explain the moral life by ascribing to man a freedom which makes him stand in independence over against God reduces the universe to anarchy. Up to this point Paul has been insisting on the former point of view, and he insists on it still as against the human presumption which would plead its rights against God; but in the very act of doing so he passes over (in Romans 9:22) to an intermediate standpoint, showing that God has not in point of fact acted arbitrarily, in a freedom uncontrolled by moral law; and from that again he advances in the following chapter to do full justice to the other side of the antinomy—the liberty and responsibility of man. The act of Israel, as well as the will of God, lies behind the painful situation he is trying to understand. (B) Is Man responsible? 19. Thou wilt say then] St Paul is still, as so often before, writing as if an opponent were at his side. How vividly this suggests that he had himself experienced the conflicts of thought which indeed every earnest mind more or less encounters! But conflicts do not always end in further doubts. Difficulties, often most distressing ones, must meet us in any theory of religion that is not merely evolved from our own likings; and difficulties are not necessarily impossibilities. At one point or another we must be prepared to submit to fact and mystery. yet] Q. d., “why, after such statements of His sovereignty, does He go on to treat us as free agents?” Here is the second head of objection. God’s justice was the first; now it is man’s accountability. who hath resisted] This is not the place to discuss the profound problem here suggested. It must be enough to point out (1) that St Paul makes no attempt to solve it. He rests upon the facts (a) that God declares Himself sovereign in His mercy; (b) that He treats man’s will as a reality: and he bids us accept those facts, and trust, and act. (2) The contradiction to the hint that “no man hath resisted” lies, not in abstruse theory, but in our innermost consciousness. We know the fact of our will; we know the reality of moral differences; we know that we can “resist the Holy Ghost.” On the other hand, the truth of God’s foreknowledge is alone sufficient, on reflection, to assure us that every movement of will, as being foreseen, could not be otherwise than in fact it is. And this is exactly as true of the simplest acts and tenderest affections of common life, as of things eternal: in each emotion of pity or joy we move along the line of prescience, a line which thus may be regarded as, for us, irrevocably fixed beforehand. But meanwhile in these things we feel and act without a moment’s misgiving (except artificial misgiving) about our freedom. Just so in matters of religion; but the special relations of sinful man to God compel these plain and even stern statements of the truth of God’s action in the matter, even in the midst of arguments and pleadings which all assume the reality of our will. Romans 9:19. Ἔτι, as yet) even still. This particle well expresses the peevish outcry. To the objection here put, Paul answers in two ways. I. The power of God over men is greater than the power of the potter over the clay, Romans 9:20-21. Then II. He answers more mildly: God has not exercised His power, not even over the vessels of wrath, Romans 9:22.—αὐτοῦ, His) It is put for, of God, and expresses the feeling, by which objectors of this description show their aversion from God. Verse 19. - Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who resisteth his will? Having shown that injustice cannot be imputed to God in hardening as well as having mercy on whom he will, the apostle now meets the supposed difficulty of understanding why men should be held guilty before God for but being as he wills them to be. It is immediately suggested by Pharaoh's case, which led to the conclusion, ὅν θέλει σκληρύνει; but the apostle foresees that an objection might be raised on this ground to his finding fault with the Jews for rejecting Christ, and them he especially has in view in what follows. It may be observed here that there is undoubtedly a difficulty to the human mind in reconciling theoretically Divine omnipotence with human free-will and responsibility. (On the general question, see notes on ch. 8.) St. Paul here, after his manner, does not attempt to solve the general problem, confining himself for the present to the Divine side of it. His answer, in vers. 20, 21, is simply to the effect that God has the absolute right as well as power to deal with his own creation as he pleases, and that man is in no position to "contend with the Almighty" (see Job 40:2). He brings in from the prophets the illustration of the potter's power and right over the clay, which he fashions and deals with as he chooses. It will be seen, however, as we go on, that this illustration by no means involves, as by some it has been supposed to do, the idea of rejection and condemnation irrespectively of desert. Romans 9:19Hath resisted (ἀνθέστηκεν) Rev., more correctly, with-standeth. The idea is the result rather than the process of resistance. A man may resist God's will, but cannot maintain his resistance. The question means, who can resist him? Links Romans 9:19 InterlinearRomans 9:19 Parallel Texts Romans 9:19 NIV Romans 9:19 NLT Romans 9:19 ESV Romans 9:19 NASB Romans 9:19 KJV Romans 9:19 Bible Apps Romans 9:19 Parallel Romans 9:19 Biblia Paralela Romans 9:19 Chinese Bible Romans 9:19 French Bible Romans 9:19 German Bible Bible Hub |